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Introduction 
Hal Hill and Terry Hull 
Since 1983 the Indonesia Update has been an important element in 
developing a more sophisticated understanding of Indonesia among 
Australia policy-makers, academics and business people. Because 
of the increasing number of Indonesian visitors attracted to the 
annual meetings, the Update also helps to promote an 
understanding of Australian society in intellectual circles in 
Indonesia. This mutually beneficial exchange has resulted in 
growing numbers attending each year, and an increasingly open, 
reflective and critical debate representing a wide variety of views. 
In 1989 the basic purpose of the Update was taken up by a major 
week-long conference on the theme: Indonesia's New Order. A 
volume is currently in preparation summarizing the papers 
presented in six sessions of the conference, while separate 
collections of revised versions of papers are being prepared by some 
session organizers. These various scholarly works will be 
completed in 1991. 
However, since the speedy publication of papers from the 1988 
Update in a volume edited by Hill and Mackie (Indonesia 
Assessment, 1988) proved to be very popular in Australia and 
overseas, we are attempting to provide the 1990 proceedings 
quickly to readers who want a timely review of developments in 
Indonesia. The papers are published with some minor 
modifications in response to discussion from the floor, or for 
consistency of language. We trust the readers will appreciate the 
opportunity to consider the papers substantially as they were 
presented to the audience in the Huxley Lecture Theatre on August 
24, 1990. 
The usefulness of the 1990 Update was reinforced by the 
important contribution made by the Secretary of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard Woolcott, in his informative 
paper which opened the day's deliberations. We are pleased to be 
able to reprint the full paper here. 
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In 1990 the basic format of previous Updates was followed, 
with the morning sessions devoted to reviews of contemporary 
Indonesian economics and politics. John Conroy of the 
IDP /University of New England project at the Bogor Agricultural 
Institute presented a comprehensive analysis based on the Survey 
of the economy he co-authored for the August 1990 issue of the 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Political developments, 
and the speculations over the possible scenarios for presidential 
succession, were reviewed by Robert Cribb of the University of 
Queensland's History Department. This year an additional 
morning session was added to discuss social developments in 
Indonesia, and the audience was treated to a fascinating 
presentation by Soetjipto Wirosardjono, a senior official of the 
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. Proving that statisticians 
can be both critical and stimulating, Soetjipto provided an ideal 
introductory presentation in what promises to become a feature of 
the Update. His brief paper has been supplemented by sections of 
the transcript of the lively question and answer period which 
followed. 
The afternoon session generally addressed a theme of 
importance both for the year under review and in the context of 
Indonesia's long term development. This year the theme was 
ownership issues in Indonesia's evolving corporate economy. These 
have become increasingly important topics of public debate as 
foreign investment flows reach unprecedented levels, as the 
government grapples with problems associated with a large and 
(generally) poorly performing state enterprise sector, and as large 
national business empires emerge for the first time in Indonesia's 
history. These konglomerasi reflect the process of expansion of 
huge corporate structures which are exerting a growing influence 
over many aspects of economic life in Indonesia. 
The panel assembled to discuss these developments from a 
variety of perspectives - business, economics, politics and history 
- provided fascinating insights into the dynamics of Indonesian 
development at what many see as a turning point. The implications 
of the trends identified in the discussion extend beyond the question 
of simple ownership of wealth in society into the impact of new 
structures on the patterns and levels of foreign trade, and the role 
and workings of the government sector. Konglomerasi has arisen at 
a time when government is promoting deregulation of the economy 
and the privatisation of long standing state industries. 
While these developments are viewed with suspicion in some 
quarters, there is a sense of inevitability about the changes 
underway. A large and dynamic private sector is central to the 
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growth .of an increasingly sophisticated, internationally oriented 
Indonesian economy. Foreign capital moves across increasingly 
porous national boundaries at ever greater speeds, and reinforces 
Indonesia's integration within the dynamic Asia-Pacific economy. 
The changes in the state enterprise sector reflect the re-evaluation 
occurring across the world regarding the appropriate role of the 
state in a capitalist economy. 
The real issues, as reflected in the papers and the discussion at 
the Update, are not whether these trends are desirable or not, but 
rat~er ~ow to ensure the emergence of an efficient corporate sector 
which 1s cap.ab.le of resolving pressing social problems such as 
poverty allev1~hon and the provision of employment opportunities 
f~r a burgeoning labour force. How Indonesia's modern corporate 
giants respond. to th~se cha!lenges will reveal whether they are 
merely ~ mamfestat10n of rent-seeking', 'ersatz' capitalism as 
some writers have charged, or if instead the 1980s has witnessed 
the establishment of an efficient commercial-industrial complex 
~ble to lead the country into the twenty-first century. An equally 
important question ~ris~s as to whether the government's open 
posture towards foreign investment can be sustained in what is still 
an ~ntensely nati~nalistic society, and whether the government can 
seriously entertain the prospect of a wholesale disposal of state-
own~d enterprises in a country whose private business community 
con~nues to be fractured along ethnic lines. The next few years will 
be 1~porta~t in determining whether the political and social 
te~s1ons wh.1ch are an inherent feature of rapid industrialisation 
will be amehorated by the material benefits of economic progress. 
. The Update Conference and this volume depend on the 
ass1stanc~ of many people, and we would like to acknowledge their 
help. Liz Drysdale, Lynn Moir, and Alex Bellis served on the 
organizing committee and put in many hours of work to ensure the 
availability of papers and the arrangements for visitors. Alex 
Bellis. and, following Alex's resignation from the ANU, Lulu Turner 
contributed substantially to the editing of this volume, while Bev 
Fraser typed a~d formatt~ the ~anuscripts. Thanks to Allison Ley 
f~r pro?f-reading and Claire Smith for transcribing sections of the 
discuss10n from audio tape. 
Fin~ncial support fo~ the Update was provided by the 
Australia-Indonesia Institute, the Australian International 
Development Assistance Bureau's International Seminar Support 
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Scheme, The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ~through 
the Indonesia Project of the Department of Economics), th~ 
Department of Political and Social Change, and the Researc 
School of Pacific Studies conference budget. . . . h 
We are also grateful to Tempo for perm1ss1on to repn.nt .t e 
cover desi n which so skilfully captures one of the pn~c1p~e 
uestions agddressed first in the Update discussion a~d now m this 
q 1 me We trust that these provide the opportunity for people 
~~tE~~est~d in Indonesia's development to consider the i~por~~t 
uestions of economic ownership and control, and to formu ate t . e!r ~wn opinions as to the likely impact of these trends on Indonesia s 
future. 
2 
Opening Remarks of the Secretary of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr R.A. Woolcott, A.O. 
Domestic Politics 
It is now more than 25 years since the abortive coup attempt of 30 
September 1965 in Indonesia. At that time the country appeared to 
be on the brink of disaster, facing economic collapse, with an 
unstable domestic political configuration, and an aggressive foreign 
policy. It is unlikely that anyone then would have been able to 
predict the nature of the Indonesia that has since emerged: in 
particular that a little known Major General Soeharto could not 
only outmanoeuvre President Sukarno but still be in power in 1990, 
having overseen a fundamental restructuring of the political and 
economic system, while remaining the undisputed leader of the 
country. 
The central focus of debate in Indonesia now-as indeed it is in 
Australia - is economic matters. Given the ongoing pace of economic 
reform in Indonesia this should not be surprising. However, there is 
also developing in Indonesia a healthy public discussion over the 
nature of the New Order. The focus of this debate is changing as 
Indonesians contemplate the political and social framework 
necessary to enable the country to adapt both to the effects of its 
own achievements over the past 25 years and to the impact of 
outside influences on its future prospects. Moreover, discussion of a 
more political nature is likely to intensify over the next year, as 
preparations begin in earnest for the April 1992 general elections 
and lead-up to the all important presidential and vice-
presidential elections in March 1993. 
Yet, the process of generational change in the civilian and 
military leadership has been going on uneventfully in recent years; 
and there is no reason why this should not continue, whether under 
the continuing leadership of President Soeharto, or through the 
election of another person. 
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What is clear is that the lessons of 1965 have been well learnt, 
and that the political and military elite are committed to any 
change to the political system being peaceful, and not a threat to 
the stability of Indonesia. This can only reinforce the belief that 
the fundamental changes we are currently seeing in the Indonesian 
economy are likely to be real and permanent. 
Economic Developments 
The I~do~esi~n economy is currently growing at about 7 per cent a 
year, indicating clearly that the period of slow growth brought 
about by the decline in the price of oil in the mid-1980s has ended. 
Barring a serious international economic recession, the economy 
appears set to maintain this momentum of growth for the next few 
years. 
. Several ?evelopm~nts support this conclusion. First, foreign 
investment is continuing to increase, with approvals for the first 
half of 1990 already exceeding the record figure set for the whole of 
1989. Domestic investment figures are also at record levels. 
Secondly, non-oil/ gas exports are currently expanding at 9.6 per cent 
a year, maintaining a solid pattern of growth begun in 1987. 
Increased investment in export-oriented production facilities also 
augers well for the maintenance of this export performance into the 
medium term. Thirdly, a solid increase in rice production in 1989, 
and prospects for a similar level of production in 1990, suggest that 
Indonesia's self-sufficiency in rice production will be maintained for 
at least another year. Finally, one little noted achievement has 
been in the area of poverty reduction. The annual World Bank 
report (Indonesia: Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report) 
released in May 1990 indicated that there was a reduction in 
relative and even absolute levels of poverty in Indonesia during the 
1980s, although the magnitude of the reduction varied depending on 
the measure used. 
Th~ solid performance of the Indonesian economy at present can 
be attnbuted substantially to the decisions taken by the Indonesian 
Government during the difficult times of the mid 1980s. The overall 
policy direction since that time has been towards economic and 
financial deregulation. These include: 
• the May 1990 cuts in tariff protection and moves towards 
greater transparency in the protection regime, which 
suggest that the thrust towards deregulation is continuing 
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• deregulation of the banking sector and capital markets in 
1987 and 1988, now revolutionizing the country's finance 
industry 
In spite of these significant developments, daunting economic 
challenges still confront the country. The fundamental imbalance 
between western Indonesia and the less populated eastern half of 
the archipelago has become more pronounced, as the west has 
developed and the east has lagged behind. This is being recognized 
by Indonesian authorities and, I might add, by the Australian 
government, which aims to focus the major part of its development 
assistance program in the less developed eastern region. The 
em~rgence of large business houses in Indonesia, a development 
wh1~h has been made more public with financial deregulation, 
particularly of the stock markets, adds another dimension to the 
ongoing debate about the distribution of economic benefits in the 
country. Then there is the challenge of finding employment for over 
2 million new entrants into the workforce each year. Nevertheless, 
it is anticipated that current rates of economic growth should be 
sufficient to contain and possibly even reduce levels of labour 
underutilization. Finally, the recent rapid rates of economic 
growth have begun to create infrastructure pressures, especially in 
the transport and communications sectors. In response, the 
Indonesian government has decided that the private sector should 
have a greater role in providing services in these sectors. 
Australia-Indonesia Relations 
Bilateral relations continue to develop in a very positive manner. 
Bilateral trade is at record levels-almost A$1.5 billion in 1989-
and rose by some 40 per cent during the year. Of this total, exports 
to Indonesia were worth A$962 million (up 49 per cent) and imports 
were worth A$496 million (up 23 per cent). There is also a growing 
range of goods traded, which will add long-term stability and 
depth to the economic relationship. 
Investment from Australia is also rising, especially in the coal 
and gold mining sectors. It needs to be stressed that, while 
Australian businesses are operating successfully in Indonesia, there 
are still too few of them, by comparison with the number of 
opportunities opening up. We must recognize that Indonesia 
represents a promising area of real opportunity for Australian 
industry. The ongoing process of deregulation offers wide scope for 
further Australian commercial engagement in the Indonesian 
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economy, particularly as economic development and diversification 
in Indonesia creates greater complementarity between our two 
economies. 
People-to-people contact between the two countries is also 
expanding across a wide range of fields, including tourism, 
education, business and media. The establishment of the Australia-
Indonesia Institute in 1989 has provided another vehicle through 
which to develop such contacts, and record numbers of Indonesian 
students are now studying in Australia. At an official level, there 
has been a substantial increase in contact and cooperation between 
the two governments. In the past 18 months eleven Indonesians of 
ministerial rank have visited Australia after a long drought; the 
Foreign Minister, Mr Alatas, has made more than one visit. The 
Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty is reaching the final stages 
of legislative implementation and should enter into force in the 
near future. Negotiations for a double tax agreement with 
Indonesia commenced in September. Senior officials talks were 
reinstituted and I led the first delegation to Jakarta in February 
1990. Consultations involving officials of other departments have 
also been developing, including for example the High Level Group 
on Energy and Mineral Resources Consultations, which concluded its 
second meeting on 21 August 1990. We have also developed a useful 
dialogue on fisheries, which we hope will not only help reduce the 
problem of illegal Indonesian fishing in Australian waters, but lead 
on to further fisheries cooperation. 
The many encouraging signs of a more substantial and practical 
bilateral relationship do not, of course, mean that we will not 
continue to have differences with our closest neighbour. We 
continue to have differences about the observance of human rights. 
We pursue an active approach to human rights violations in 
Indonesia, as we do elsewhere, without discrimination. 
Beyond bilateral issues, Australia and Indonesia have been 
cooperating on a number of multilateral issues, such as the Uruguay 
Round and the Cairns Group, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) initiative, the Government-Industry Conference on 
Chemical Weapons, Cambodia, and Indochinese refugee issues. 
There have also been useful discussions on environmental issues, for 
example through the International Tropical Timber Organisation, 
which met in Bali in May 1990. 
3 
The Indonesian Economy, 1989-1990* 
John D. Conroy 
In the ~ontext of a discussion of the role of conglomerates in Indon~sia, I see my role as that of an academic carpet-layer, 
p:epan~g a factual surface for colleagues to tread while they 
discuss .issues central to the theme of the 1990 Update. I shall begin 
by s~llmg out some connections between recent economic trends and 
the nse of.'congl~merates'l to prominence as a public issue. 
The first pomt of connection is simply that 'conglomerates' 
have bee~ deb~ted in public more frequently and heatedly with the 
recent qmckerung of econo.mic growth in Indonesia. Secondly, the 
deregulatory process, which has contributed to the rapidity of 
recent growth and to its qualitative and structural characteristics 
api:'e~:s to ~ave been particularly favourable to the economi~ 
activities of ~onglon:'erates'. A final point is that a deregulated 
and .burgeonmg capital market has focused public attention on lea~mg entr~preneurs and business groups, while the availability 
of. mfor~ahon on their activities has greatly increased, thus 
he1ghterung the potential for controversy. I shall touch on each of 
these connections in this chapter. 
Economic Growth 
During Repelita IV, the fourth development plan (1984-1988) the 
economy achieved a creditable growth rate averaging 5.1 per ~ent. 
From President Soeharto's Independence Day address in August 
1990 we. now know t~at GDP grew during 1989 at 7.4 per cent, the 
Indonesian economy s best performance for eight years. This year 
... 
1 
For a fuller discussion of a number of points touched on in this paper, 
see Conroy and Drake (1990). 
Sin~e the term '.conglomerates' as used in Indonesia has no clearly 
defined economic meaning, I leave it to my colleagues to discuss its 
use and meaning in political debate. 
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began with something approaching boom ~onditi_on~, but there ~re 
now some worrying indications of overheating, with mer.eased pnce 
inflation and the emergence of corrective monetary pohcy. Of the 
oil sector, and the changes in the economic outlook res~lting from 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, I shall say nothmg for the 
present. 
Deregulation 
Towards the end of 1989 the deregulatory impulse seemed to be 
weakening (Mackie and Sjahrir, 1989). So far during 199? there 
have been further signs of a tendency to re-regulation or 
intervention, especially in pursuit of distributional goals or what 
are seen by the State as strategic imperatives: . Examples of the 
former include the Pakjan policy package requmng banks to meet 
targets for substantially increased le~ding to small busin~ss, and 
the Tapos episode in which the President ur~e~ large ~usmess. to 
issue shares to co-operatives. Among strategic imperatives (whic~ 
are exempted from ordinary financial disciplines to some. extent) it 
is evident from the President's August speech that science and 
technology in general, and Professor J:Iabibie~s BPIS _(~he Agency .for 
Strategic Industries) in particular, will receive pohtical protection 
and budgetary support. . . , 
As against these interventionist measures, ~he governmen~ s 
Paket Mei, the policy package of May 1990, ~ontamed a s~bstanttal 
liberalisation of the Indonesian tariff regime. It also _mclu~ed 
specific deregulatory measures in a number of sectors, mcludmg 
agriculture (the sector of the economy least benefited. by 
deregulation so far). But deregulatory measures expected m a 
number of other sectors appear to have stalled. These include the 
privatisation of a number of ~tate enterp.rises, an?. further 
reductions in restrictions on foreign ownership of equities. ~he 
creation of the BPIS was in itself seen as a move to quarant~ne 
certain government enterprises from the influences of deregulation 
and privatisation. 
The Capital Market 
This term is used broadly to include the banking industry and the 
stock exchange. The growth of the former has been parti~ularly 
rapid since Pakto, the policy package of Oct~b~r 1988, with the 
emergence of 36 new private banks and 12 new JOmt-venture banks, 
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together with more than 400 new bank branch offices, of which 
more than 80 per cent have been opened by the burgeoning private 
commercial bank sector. Although the growth of the private banks 
has been particularly marked since Pakto, the trend has been 
evident since the initial deregulatory measures affecting the 
banking industry, which occurred in 1983. Thousands of new 
receiving points for savings accounts have been opened throughout 
the country, and Indonesia's aggregate savings and investment rates 
are both high and rising (the former approaching 30 per cent and 
the latter exceeding 30 per cent of GNP; see Conroy and Drake, 1990, 
pp24-27). There is a growing tendency for Indonesians to hold their 
savings in the form of financial assets, which is a factor 
contributing to the growth of the Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
Development of the Stock Exchange has been facilitated by a 
number of deregulatory measures and by the active encouragement 
of BAPEPAM (the Capital Market Board) to companies to issue 
shares to the public. From a total of only 25 companies listed in 
March 1989 the number rose to 57 at end-1989, and to 93 by June 1990. 
The share price index, which had stood at 82.5 at end-1987, had 
climbed to almost 400 by end-1989. The index peaked at 648 on 18 
May this year (with price/ earnings ratios at extremely high 
levels). It has subsequently trended down, and stood at around 583 
in mid-August. High shares prices reflect large premiums which 
have been established on new issues rather than any process of 
bidding up prices on the trading floor. So far these high issue prices 
have been substantially maintained in the rather thin and rarefied 
atmosphere of that floor, but the market appears to be fragile and 
to have many potential problems. Nonetheless its recent growth 
has served to provide a channel for personal savings to finance 
corporate investment, for the first time on such a scale in Indonesia. 
In doing so the stockmarket has captured a great deal of public 
attention and has dramatised the 'conglomerate' issue, because of 
the prominence of major business groups among companies whose 
shares are listed. 
Structural Change and the Real Economy 
Evidence concerning real sources of growth in the economy during 
the 1980s is found in national accounts data (Table 3.1). Over the 
period 1983 to 1988, corresponding broadly to the fourth 
development plan period (Repelita IV), we see a pattern of 
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Industrial Group 
Agriculture, livestock, 
forestry, fisheries 
Farm food crops 
Farm non-food crops 
Estate crops 
Livestock & products 
Fores try 
Fisheries 
Mining and quarrying 
Petroleum & natural 
gas 
Other 
Manufacturing industry 
Non-oil/gas mfg 
Petroleum refining 
L"IG 
Electrici ty, gas, water 
Construction 
Trade, hotels, restaurants 
Wholesale & retail 
trade 
I lotels and restaurants 
Transport/communications 
Transport 
Communications 
Banking/financial institutions 
Dwelling ownership 
Public admin./defence 
Services 
GDP 
Oil/ gas sector 
Non-oil/gas sector 
Table3.1: Gross Domestic Product 1983-1988 by Industrial Origin 
(Con&tant 1983 Prices) 
1983 1988a Annual Contrib-
Rpbn Share Rpbn Share Average ution to 
17,696.2 
11,057.4 
2,294.9 
375.3 
1,754.3 
994.2 
1,220.1 
16,107.4 
15,103.0 
1,004.4 
9,896.4 
7,666.3 
358.9 
1,871.2 
313.9 
4,597.2 
11,540.7 
9,932.5 
1,608.2 
4,098.1 
3,693.7 
404.4 
2,358.6 
2,355.5 
5,711.S 
3,000.8 
77,676.3 
'l'o % Rate of Growth 
22.8 21 ,007.6 
14.2 12,796.9 
3.0 2,832.9 
0.5 576.8 
2.3 2,211.7 
1.3 1,013.0 
1.6 1,576.4 
20.7 15,934.0 
19.4 14,691.2 
1.3 1,242.8 
12.7 18,339.9 
9.9 13,758.2 
0.5 980.4 
2.4 3,601.3 
0.4 547.5 
5.9 5, 119.1 
14.9 15,662 .3 
12.8 12,998.5 
2.1 
5.3 
4.8 
0.5 
3.0 
3.0 
7.4 
3.9 
100.0 
22.3 
77.7 
2,663.8 
5,225.2 
4,637.5 
587.7 
3,597.2 
2,762 .2 
7,932.1 
3,569.8 
99,696.9 
21.1 
12.8 
2.8 
0.6 
2.2 
1.0 
1.6 
16.0 
14.7 
1.3 
18.4 
13.8 
1.0 
3.6 
0.6 
5.1 
15.7 
13.0 
2.7 
5.2 
4.7 
0.6 
3.6 
2.8 
8.0 
3.6 
100.0 
19.3 
80.7 
Growthb of GDP 
% 1983to 
3.5 
3.0 
4.3 
8.9 
4.7 
0.4 
5.2 
(0.2) 
(0.5) 
4.3 
13.1 
12.4 
22 .3 
14.0 
11.7 
2.2 
6.3 
5.5 
10.6 
5.0 
4.6 
7.8 
8.8 
3.2 
6.8 
3.5 
5.1 
2.1 
5.9 
1988b 
% 
15.0 
7.9 
2.4 
1.0 
2.1 
0.1 
1.6 
(0.8) 
(1.9) 
1.1 
38.3 
27.7 
2.8 
7.9 
1.1 
2.4 
18.7 
13.9 
4.8 
5.1 
4.3 
0.8 
5.6 
1.9 
10.1 
2.6 
100.0 
8.8 
91.2 
Figures in brackets are negative. 
•Preliminary figures. 
bcalculated by the author. From lJzmpira• Piddo Kntegaraan 1990. 
Source: BPS . 
1989" 
Rate of 
Growth 
over 
1988 
% 
4.3 
5.3 
9.1 
11.6 
12.2 
11 .8 
10.0 
8.7 
14.3 
7.4 
8.2 
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structural change in which the agricultural sector has continued its 
gradual d ecline in relative importance, with its share of GDP 
falling from 22.8 per cent to 21.1 per cent. It is significant that the 
sector' s decline is merely relative and that it was still capable of 
contributing 15 per cent of measured growth in GDP between 1983 
and 1988. Its average annual rate of growth was a healthy 3.5 per 
cent, quite a strong performance by international standards. 
Agriculture in Indonesia is in no sense stagnant, but merely 
overshadowed by more dynamic sectors. 
Manufacturing increased its share of output from 12.7 per cent 
to 18.4 per cent over the period, with an annual growth rate 
averaging 13 per cent, and was the source of almost 40 per cent of 
measured growth in GDP during Repelita IV. Non-oil/gas 
manufacturing contributed the greater part of this, but the growth 
of refining and processing in the oil/ gas subsector indicated 
substantial progress in retaining value-added from Indonesia's 
hydrocarbon resources. By contrast, the primary oil and gas sector 
contributed negatively to Indonesia's growth performance, with its 
share of output falling from 19.4. per cent to 14.7 per cent. Overall, 
the decline in the contribution of all oil and gas activities over the 
Repelita period (from 22.3 per cent to 19.3 per cent of GDP) and the 
dominant role of non-oil/ gas activities as sources of dynamism 
(contributing more than 90 per cent of measured growth) indicate a 
pattern of structural change and economic diversification away 
from hydrocarbons which is further supported by data in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 indicates a marked decline during the 1980s in the 
proportion of merchandise exports from the oil/ gas sector, a 
correspondingly increased capacity for non-oil/ gas activities to 
government revenue. The shift of export activities away from 
hydrocarbons represents a shift of resources away from the 
government, and is a primary explanation for the concomitant 
increase (from 52 per cent to 62 per cent) in the share of private 
investment in total capital formation. Continuing strong growth of 
private investment represents the consolidation of an economic 
structure diversified away from oil and gas. 
More Recent Developments 
By contrast with the decline of the oil/gas sector during Repelita 
N, 1989 saw the beginnings of a revival. While estimates of state 
revenue and export receipts in the 1989/90 national budget were 
based on an assumed oil price of $14 per barrel, the actual realized 
price was better than $17. Table 3.1 includes preliminary data on 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
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Table 3.2: Indonesia's Economic Structure, 1981182-1989/90 
Ratio of: 1981/82 1985/86 1989/90 
% % % 
Oil/LNG exports to 
66.6 39.8 total merchandise exports 81.9 
Non-oil exports to 
28.6 55.2 85.8 non-oil imports 
Oil/LNG revenue to 
total revenue 70.6 57.1 38.2 
Private fixed investment 62.0 to total fixed investment 52.1 49.1 
. 
Non-oil manufacturing 
11.5 14.3 to GDP 8.4 
Source: World Bank, published in Indonesian Capital Market 
Journal, May 1990. 
GDP growth for 1989, drawn from President. Soe~arto's '\ugust 
speech. By contrast with negative growth m primary 01.l/ gas 
output during Repelita IV, strong positive growth oc~u~~ m the 
sector in 1989 (5.3 per cent in real terms for the Mmmg and 
Quarrying' sector as against 7.4 per cent for G~P ~s a whole). 
Agriculture's growth picked up, to ~.3 .per cent, ~nncipally on ~e 
score of an outstanding performance m nee production. Construction 
(11.8 per cent growth in 1989) and Ba~l<ing/finance _{~4.3 per cent) 
were leading sectors, the latter particularly benefiting from the 
deregulatory measures of October 1988. The manufacturing sector 
appears to have grown at 'only' 9.1 per cent in 1989, rather more 
restrained than the annual average rate of better than 13 per cent 
achieved during Repelita IV. On the other hand growth in. the 
non-oil/ gas subsector of manufacturing, at 11.6 per cent, remained 
close to the levels of recent years. 
Reflecting the capacity of a deregulated and growing banking 
sector to attract deposits, and vigorous competition to expand 
lending, especially among private banks, money supply gro~th has 
been rapid. Both narrow money (currency and demand deposits) and 
broad money (narrow money plus savings and time deposits) grew by 
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some 40 per cent in 1989. The most striking element has been rapid 
growth of bank credit on the private sector. In 1989 this lending 
grew by some 80 per cent, and most rapidly during the second half of 
the year; if anything growth accelerated further in the early 
months of 1990. 
The surge in the early part of 1990 was probably stimulated by 
one measure in Pakjan, the January policy package, which decreed 
an end to new 'liquidity credits' from the end of March 1990, and 
their progressive withdrawal from the system from April onward. 
A surge in bank lending in February and March seems to have 
occurred as borrowers moved to beat this deadline. Liquidity 
credits are highly subsidized funds made available by Bank 
Indonesia to state and private commercial banks, which are then 
on-lent by these institutions to enterprises in particular sectors and 
activities at sub-market rates. 
Early commentary on the discontinuation of liquidity credits 
focused on the desirability of removing a particularly marked 
capital market distortion. But the move is now more clearly seen as 
the initial shot in a campaign by monetary authorities to tighten )(, 
up on potentially inflationary growth in lending and money supply. 
Certainly it is true to say that, despite the rapid expansion of bank 
lending in 1989, the banking sector as a whole commenced the new 
year in a highly liquid condition. 
During 1989 consume• prices rnse by ~; 6.1 pe• cent, smcely 
more t~an the 1~88 figure of 5.6 per cent: Increasing monetizayon 
(occurrmg more m growth of bank depos1 an of pu fChOTamgs 
of currency), together with Indonesia's openness to international 
trade and capital movements, appeared to prevent any buildup of 
domestic inflation during 19891- without any accelerated 
depreciation of the exchange ratei But continued expansion of 
lending during 1990 at rates experienced in the second half of 1989 
would have been difficult to sustain without an increase in 
inflationary pressures. 
Indeed 1990 has brought evidence of boom conditions, together 
with emerging supply constraints on domestic output in a number of 
sectors. Excess demand for motor vehicles has resulted in price 
increases for commercial and private vehicles and emergency 
government measures to permit imports. The building and 
contruction sector is operating at a high level of activity, with 
strong performance in dwelling construction and home renovation for 
middle-to-upper income families, and with an unambiguous boom at 
the top end of the market, for office block construction in Jakarta. 
Soaring urban land prices are reported and this is influencing land 
values well beyond the central business districts. 
11 
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Despite these conditions there was no evidence of any 
acceleration of price increases in the first five months of 1990,2 with 
an increase of just 3.5 per cent in the consumer price index. However 
May brought an increase in domestic fuel prices, forced upon the 
government by a desire to eliminate the subsidy on domestic 
consumption of fuel oils. The impact of this on passenger transport 
costs was felt by July. Inflation for the year to July was 7.2 per cent, 
well above last year's figure for the same period. 
With these figures newly-published, the President delivered 
"a strong anti-inflationary message in his August speech. The 
tightening of monetary policy, as mentioned above, was initiated 
by the withdrawal of liquidity credits, commencing by degrees from 
March/ April. Interest rates on the interbank market reached their 
lowest point in March (Table 3.3), reflecting peak liquidity in the 
banking system. They have since risen substantially. For some 
months the Central Bank was apparently content to allow market 
forces to push interest rates higher, without further intervention. 
But a new phase commenced late in July when Bank Indonesia 
moved to mop up liquidity through large scale sales of the SBI 
(Sertifikat Bank Indonesia), its money market instrument. 
While the trend to rising interbank interest rates is clear from 
Table 3.3, the figures conceal some rather flurried activity in the 
market in recent months. This has occurred because of differences 
between the balance sheets of private and state banks, the former 
in general having been more aggressive in seeking new deposits and 
in expanding private commercial lending, with the result that 
many private banks have come to rely on the interbank market for 
funds to match their liquid assets with their short-term 
obligations. State banks, on the other hand, have been responsible 
for disbursing some 70 per cent of liquidity credits. Some state banks 
appear to have preferred to specialise in this rather unadventurous 
mode of operation and to channel their excess liquidity through the 
interbank market rather than seeking new borrowers. But as 
liquidity credits have begun to phase out such banks are less able to 
place funds on the interbank market, being obliged to reduce their 
indebtedness to the Central Bank each month. Thus in June, July, 
and August, there has been a scramble on the interbank market, 
with overnight rates rising to 35 per cent or more for a few days as 
over-extended banks, mainly private, seek to correct mismatches in 
their balance sheets. 
2 The comparison is somewhat complicated by the introduction of a 
new consumer price index in April. 
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Table 3.3: Inter-bank Money Market 
Quarter 
1987 December 
1988 March 
Jure 
September 
December 
1989 March 
Jure 
September 
December 
1990 March 
April 
May 
Jure 
July 
Interest Rate 
(Weighted Average) 
(% per annum) 
11.86 
13.49 
14.32 
14.98 
16.92 
13.82 
12.06 
12.29 
12.10 
10.37 
11.57 
11.53 
15.24 
17.37 
Transactions 
(Daily Average 
Volume) 
(Rp billion) 
34.4 
46.5 
40.1 
39.0 
40.6 
48.9 
71.1 
81.2 
104.6 
95.7 
121.0 
127.6 
171.8 
147.9 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Laporan Mingguan, 2August1990. 
Overall the banking system remains quite liquid (hence the 
commencement of SBI operations by Bank Indonesia in July). This is 
shown by thj fact that overnight rates have settled down after a 
short-lived disturbance in each of the last three months, though 
the tre~d of market r~te~ is clearly upward. But two groups are 
emergm?, one cons1stmg of relatively weaker though not 
necessanly smaller banks with high loan to deposit ratios and 
definite liquidity problems. 
The Central Bank has opened its discount window to a number 
of these banks in the past month. Others are seeking funds 
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Table 3.4: Petroleum Sector Foreign Exchange Earnings 
($million) 
1988/89 1989/90 1989/90 1990/91 
Actual Budget Actual a Budget 
Oil 
Exports, f.o.b. 5,007 4,780 6,288 5,537 
Imports, f.o.b. (1,912) (1,889) (2,342) (2,043) 
Services (1,560) (1,460) (1,635) (1,452) 
Sub-total 1,535 1,431 2,311 2,042 
I.NG 
Exports, f.o .b. 2,633 2,465 3,049 3,048 
Imports, f.o .b. (160) (204) (187) (208) 
Services (948) (963) (1,262) (162) 
Sub-total 1,525 1,298 1,600 1,678 
Net petroleum exports 3,060 2,729 3,911 3,720 
Net non-oil exports (4,919) (5,165) (5,510) (5,022) 
Current account (1,859) (2,436) (1,599) (1,302) 
Figures in brackets are negative. 
aprovisional figures, updated from Lampiran Pidato Kenegaraan 
1990. 
Source: US Embassy, Petroleum Sector Report, Jakarta, 1990. 
overseas. Where this is done to replace liquidity cr~dits 
previously available to finance exports it see.m~ a comm~r~1ally­
viable strategy, but in any case Bank Indonesia 1mJ>?ses h~ts on 
their exposure to overseas debt. The Central Banks capacity to 
supervise such limits is relatively untested. . 
If the banking sector is vulnerable under. present mone~ary 
conditions so also is the stockmarket. As mentioned above, pnces 
appear to 
1
have peaked and have recently been d~~clini~g .. Some 
trading appears to have been financed by bank credit, which is now 
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Table 3.5: Petroleum Sector Contribution to Government Revenue 
(Rp trillion) 
1989/90 1989/90 1990/91 
Budget Actual Budget 
Domestic revenues, 25.2 28.7 31.6 
of which: 
All hydrocarbons, 7.9 11.3 10.8 
of which: 
Oil 6.7 9.5 8.8 
LNG 1.2 1.8 1.9 
Non-hydrocarbon 17.4 17.5 20.8 
Development revenue 11.3 9.4 11.3 
Total Government Revenue 36.6 38.2 42.9 
Source: US Embassy, Petroleum Sector Report, Jakarta, 1990. 
tightening, with increasing selectivity even on the part of 
relatively liquid dealers. Meanwhile there is a queue of companies 
lined up to make new issues, with the distinct possibility that the 
supply of stocks may be overtaking market demand. 
Resurgence of the Oil and Gas Sector 
As mentioned above, developments in international oil markets in 
1989-90 reversed the decline in fortunes of Indonesia's oil/ gas 
sector, which had occurred during the fourth Repelita (1984-1988). 
This served as a useful reminder of what, since the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait on 2 August, seems a point too obvious to require emphasis: 
the petroleum sector remains extremely important in terms of its 1 
capacity to impact rapidly and substantially upon key ~ 
macroeconomic aggregates. 
The beneficial impact of higher oil prices on the balance of 
payments is shown in Table 3.4. Current account projections in the 
1989 budget were based on a crude oil price of $14 per barrel, while 
11 
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the average realised figure was better than $17. Net petroleum 
exports of more than $3.9 billion ($0.8 billion greater than 
expected) contributed to holding down the current account deficit to 
$1.6 billion, less than 2 per cent of GDP. 
Th~ assumed price of $14 for 1989-90 also underlay budget 
calculations of government revenue. Table 3.5 shows the impact of 
higher realised prices upon the budget in that year, together with 
some details of the current (1990-91) budget, which is based on a 
crude oil price of $16.50 per barrel. 
While domestic revenues from non-petroleum sources came in 
very close to the budgeted Rp17.4 trillion in 1989-90, 'hydrocarbon' 
revenues, at Rpl 1.3 trillion, exceeded budget by Rp3.4 trillion. 
Under the 'balanced budget' convention, the government was able to 
expand outlays by some Rpl.6 trillion over budget, while drawing 
down about Rpl.9 trillion less than had been anticipated from 
external development assistance sources. 
Recent Developments in the Oil Market 
In December 1989, while the Indonesian budget was in the final 
stages of preparation, the oil price stood at $18 per barrel. An 
apparently conservative price estimate of $16.50 was used to frame 
balance of payments and state revenue estimates for 1990-91. The 
government's indicator price, the ICP (Indonesian Crude Price) 
~aked at $19.32 in February, and then began to slide. In April, the 
first month of the new financial year, it was $17.26. In May the 
ICP fell below the $16.50 budgeted price level, continuing down to 
below $15 in July and apparently justifying pessimistic prognoses 
for the 1990-91 balance of payments and government revenue 
outcomes. But shortly after the invasion of Kuwait the ICP for 
August was set at $19.19, while the spot rate is substantially 
higher. A shortfall in oil revenues is the last policy contingency 
troubling Indonesian policymakers at present. 
Choices: allocating windfall gains 
The possibility of higher oil prices for the remainder of 1990-91 
offers the chance of substantial budgetary and foreign exchange 
gains. But if any windfall is to be translated into sustained 
benefits, careful choices will be required. As discussed above, better 
than expected oil and gas prices last year permitted the 
government to lessen its reliance on external assistance, while 
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increasing expenditures. These developments are presented in 
Table_3.6, in the context of more recent budget data. 
The budget for 1990-91 called for an external assistance 
package of Rp 11.3 trillion, substantially more than the Rp9.4 
trillion realised in the previous year. But the 1990 meeting of IGGI 
(the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia) produced a catalogue of 
pledges, half-pledges, and indications from donor nations, summed 
in the group's communique to a total of $4.516 billion (or RP 8.3 
tr~llion) . This is some Rp 3.0 trillion less than budgeted. Thus, 
without the current surge in oil prices and revenues, there would be 
grounds for doubting the sustainability of planned expenditures. 
Assu~n~ domestic re~enues are sustained at the budgeted level, 
the 011 ~mdfall i:nust yield revenues of Rp 3.0 trillion to bridge the 
gap (which certamly seems a strong possibility now) and even more 
tha~ that to permit any reduced call on external development 
assistance. Substantial windfall gains would offer that 
opportunity, with corresponding reduction in debt service burden, as 
was experienced last year. 
An alternative is some judicious combination of debt reduction 
and increased government investment in infrastructure. The World 
~ank's 1990 country report on Indonesia has identified significant 
mfrastructural deficiencies, in power supply, telecommunications, 
transport and port facilities, inter alia. These are seen as critical 
constraints on industrial output and export capacity. Physical 
co~straints . on productive capacity have become particularly 
evident dunng 1990, and there are also signs that the growth rate 
of non-oil/ gas exports is slowing. Thus in the first five months of 
~990, non-oil/gas exports rose only 8.9 per cent over the same period 
m 1989, well below the average performance during Repelita IV, 
and below the Repelita V target of 15 per cent growth. If 
government expenditure is to be permitted to increase in consequence 
of oil revenue gains, the relaxation of infrastructural constraints 
should probably receive priority. 
Infrastructural deficiencies could be addressed by financing 
'big ticket' projects with substantial import content, directly 
benefiting manufacturing. Or they could be ameliorated by local 
level Inpres activities which would impact more immediately on 
middle-and lower-income people, with distributional benefits that 
may be politically attractive. Political considerations might also 
support a case for increases in civil service and ABRI salaries. 
The worse possible outcome would be a division of spoils 
between special interest groups while the impetus for policy reform 
and deregulation is blunted. The maxim 'hard times make good 
, I 
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policies' was popular until recently in Jakarta; now some people 
fear that the reverse may again be proved correct. 
In terms of balance of payments effects, substained high oil 
prices and revenues could strengthen the rupiah exchange rate to 
the disadvantage of exports priced in rupiah, especially 
manufactures. This could act to reverse the beneficial trend to 
diversification of exports away from the oil/ gas sector. 
Table: 3.6 State Budgets, 1989/90 and 1990/91 
(Rp trillion) 
1989/90 1989/90 1990/91 
Budget Outcome Budget 
Revenue/Expenditure 36.6 38.2 42.9 
Domestic Revenue 25.2 28.7 31.6 
Routine Expenditure 23.5 24.3 26.6 
Government Savings 1.8 4.4 5.0 
Development Revenue 11.3 9.4 11.3 
Program Revenue 1.8 1.0 2.9 
Project Revenue 9.5 8.4 8.4 
Sources: Nata Keuangan (various issues); Kompas, 15 May 1990. 
There is also the possibility that the consequences of the Gulf 
crisis will include a worsening of the downturn in economic activity 
already threatening industrialised countries, with consequent 
reductions in Indonesian export income, and in investment flows to 
Indonesia. 
Thus the economic environment presents a number of 
challenges. The resurgence of oil prices and any substantial growth 
of export income and government revenue will require careful 
management. Together with an apparent weakening of non-oil/gas 
export growth, an oil boom would reverse the healthy 
diversification process of recent years. Increased domestic 
inflationary pressures could add to the sense of social imbalance 
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which underlies the suspicion of 'conglomerates' and the worsening 
?f the external economic environment, if global recessionary 
~nfluences strengthen, could reduce the currently high levels of 
investment, both domestic and foreign, in Indonesia, as well as 
depressing demand for non-oil/ gas exports. 
, , 
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Indonesian Political Developments, 1989-1990 
Robert Cribb 
The terrain of Indonesian politics during the last twelve months 
has been surprisingly free of historical landmarks. We are, almost 
everyone is now willing to admit, in the final years of the Soeharto 
era. Whether or not the president decides to accept another term in 
office from 1993, we are no closer than we were two years or even 
five years ago to distinguishing the likely post-Soeharto flow of 
events amongst the swirls and eddies of day-to-day politics. 
Jakarta politics is increasingly 2._0litics-in-waiting in which most 
players are attempting a double game; seeking to ensure their 
positions in the present order but at the same time attempting to 
position themselves for a possibly new and different order in the 
future. Indonesia-watchers are in something of the same position, 
attempting to build analyses of the current order in such a way as to 
allow both for its continuation of strong institutions and for the 
possibility of significant political change in the future . The 
example of Eastern Europe has been a warning to us all. My own 
view, however, is that President Soeharto will seek a further term 
in 1993 and the atmosphere of politics-in-waiting will continue for 
some years to come. 
The succession issue has been very much a topic of public and 
private discussion in Indonesia over the past year or more. In early ._ 
1989 in his own memoirs, Soeharto sparked an extensive debate on 
the matter by hinting that his 1988 inauguration would be his last. 
No less a figure than Admiral Sudomo, Coordinating Minister for 
Politics and Security and one of the New Order's long-time 
political fixers, then commented publicly on the possibility of 
there being more than one candidate for the presidency in 1993, 
while Kharis Suhud, chair of the MPR and thus the person directly 
in charge of the process of choosing a president, declared that a 
parliamentary vote to select the president was not haram, 
although current practice is that the members of the MPR endorse a 
single candidate previously chosen by means of consultation and 
consensus. Soeharto hosed this speculation down in early May, 
telling people that discussing the succession issue was a waste of 
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time. He used the technical argument that the president would be 
chosen by the next MPR and only the MPR was empowered to 
discuss the issue. The succession question, however, bubbled on and 
in September Soeharto issued his now-notorious warning that he 
would 'clobber' (gebug) anyone who tried to depose him 
unconstitutionallyl; the expression 'unconstitutionally' seems to 
have been meant to encompass any attempt to pre-empt Soeharto's 
own decision whether or not to stand for re-election. Since then we 
have seen the start of the familiar process in which prominent 
public groups make pledges of support for Soeharto's re-election in 
1993.2 A complex web of calculations and considerations underpins 
this kind of declaration, ranging from genuine affection for the 
president through sycophancy to a careful staking of the right to be 
consulted on presidential nominations. The clear purpose of these 
actions is to create the impression of a groundswell of popular 
support for Soeharto's re-election. Most recently, moreover, the 
President's Independence Day speech on 16 August 1990 told the 
country that the so-called Generation of '45-the generation which 
brought the country to independence and to which Soeharto himself 
belongs-should ask itself what it can continue to do 'during the 
remaining period of its dedication as the liberating generation of 
our nation's history' .3 Whatever intentions the president may 
have, therefore, nothing he has done stands in the way of his 
seeking another term in 1993, and a petition published on 14 August 
1990 over the signatures of fifty-eight dissidents calling on 
Soeharto not to stand for re-election reflects the fact that his 
renomination now looks increasingly likely. 
Just what Soeharto's own thoughts on the matter may be, 
however, is entirely a matter of speculation. Most observers agree 
that concern for the political and economic security of his family 
after his departure is an important preoccupation. It has always 
been possible to imagine that Soeharto might be happy to let his 
half-brother Probosutejo or his banker Liem Sioe Uong sink or swim 
after his departure-partly because both are accomplished 
swimmers-but it is hard to imagine that he is not deeply worried 
about the fate of his children. The extent of their economic 
1 
2 
3 
For debate on the succession issue, see FEER 22 June 1989, p.25; 18 
January 1990, pp.22-23; Asiaweek 23 June 1989, p .37; The Age 
(Melbourne) 15 September 1989, p.8; Tempo 7 April 1990, pp.22-29; 26 
May 1990, pp.22-28. 
Tempo 28 April 1990, p.14; 7 July 1990, p.26; Inside Indonesia 23 (June 
1990), p.1 
FEER 30August1990, p.10. 
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interests has become a matter for widespread resentment, not 
necessarily because people believe that they should not have 
profited at all from their father's position but because they are 
seen to have benefited excessively and at the direct expense of 
others. Retribution against the presidential children, whether 
through withdrawal of licences or wholesale confiscation of 
property, would be an immensely popular act with few political or 
economic disadvantages for any successor to Soeharto; the 
President, one assumes, is aware of this. If this indeed is a major 
worry, then he seems to have two options. First is simply to hang 
on long enough for his children's economic interests to become an 
accepted part of the political landscape, as those of Probo and Liem 
have become. Even Ibu Tien and the Yayasan Harapan Kita, 
which were the target of a great deal of antagonism in the early 
1970s, are now much less often mentioned in a hostile context. If and 
when the children become major capitalists in their own right, the 
sharp resentment which springs from what is seen as their special 
privilege may weaken. The second option is to ensure a dynastic 
succession. Talk of this possibility has begun to circulate only 
recently, and its neatness and audacity give it instant appeal to the 
Indonesia-watcher. Speculation has centred on the President's son-
in-law Prabowo, currently a lieutenant-colonel in Kopsus. He is 
tainted somewhat by the perceived treason of his father, economist 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, in the PRRI rebellion in the late 1950s, 
but he balances this with solid military credentials, which none of 
the president's sons possesses. Opinions appear to vary over the 
quality of his performance in Timor, but it is unlikely that military 
field experience will do Prabowo's long-term career any harm. On 
the other hand, the recent appointment of the president's brother-
in-law, Major-General Wismoyo Arismunandar, as commander of 
Kostrad, the same power base from which Soeharto leapt to power, 
gives scope for another set of speculations. 
Some presidential speculation has also focussed on Soeharto's 
daughter Tutut, an even more audacious idea. It is hard to think of 
any particular qualifications she has for the job, except for her 
family connection and the fact that she seems to take a greater 
interest in public affairs than do her brothers. It is perhaps worth 
bearing in mind that many pre-colonial states in Indonesia 
underwent long periods of female rule, and that women rulers were 
often praised for their fairness in the administration of justi~e and 
for their sponsorship of commerce (Reid 1988:169-172). A succession 
by Tutut, improbable though it now seems, could have the backing 
of business groups keen to install a sympathetic president and 
anxious to avoid a destabilizing round of widespread government 
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hostility to established business interests. Each of these options 
demands time to develop and herein lies a further reason for 
suspecting that Soeharto will renominate in 1993. 
Conventional wisdom, on the other hand, suggests that the 
best chance of a smooth transition will come with a planned 
retirement by Soeharto and an orderly, constitutional process for 
the selection of his successor. This would also, of course, allow 
Soeharto himself greatest influence over his successor, though it is 
inconvenient that Indonesia has no honorific post of head of state to 
which the president might retire gracefully and with a resid~e of 
formal constitutional power. When he departs, Soeharto will be 
ex-president and nothing more, at least in formal terms. 
Nonetheless, as retiring and then retired president, Soeharto could 
expect to wield enough influence to s~rength~n .the pro~pects for a 
smooth transition. If he dies in office or 1s mcapac1tated, that 
transition would be fraught with many more uncertainties. 
Many observers have pointed out that ~o~harto's reluctance ~o 
' designate a successor may stem from an unw1llmgness to weaken his 
authority by creating an alternative source of po:wer, but he .n:'ay 
I have more altruistic motives. First, a Jong penod of transition 
would merely prolong uncertainty, which would be di~turbing to t~e 
political and the economic environment. Indeed, 1f Soeharto is 
contemplating an earlier rather than a later departure from power, 
he would have good reason to keep that decision secret until the 
last possible moment before the crucial MPR session in 199~, 
reserving all his remaining political strength to ensure that his 
preferred successor is elected for the five year term ~ 993-1998. 
Second, he may well believe that his own path to power 1s the best 
testaf true leadership, that is, that the new president should. be 
the person in the right place at the right time, with the .gumption 
to seize the opportunity of the moment. If we scan the field at the 
moment, a list of potential candidates might include State 
Secretary Moerdiono, Internal Affairs Minister Rudini and. ~BRI 
commander Try Sutrisno, with perhaps the Ener~y M1~1ster 
Ginanjar Kartasasmita and the Army commander Edi ~ud~aiat ~s 
outside possibilities. I am not sure, however, that a hst h~e this 
has much meaning. Under constitutional provisions, .follow1~g the 
death or incapacity of the president today, the v1ce-pres1dent, 
Sudharmono would automatically succeed him until 1993. There 
would be no particular reason to suppose that an heir apparen~ such 
as Moerdiono would survive until then. Similarly, if the president, 
against the odds were to announce definitively and unambiguously 
tomorrow that h~ would not accept another term but would remain 
in office until 1993, there is still no reason to suppose that current 
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configurations of power and eminence would persist until the 
election. Try Sutrisno, for instance, reaches the official retirement 
age of 55 at the end of 1990, and will be dependent for an extension 
on the favour of whoever is president. 
There is one further reason for expecting Soeharto to stay on. 
He has been at the heart of Indonesian politics for almost 25 years. 
His time in office has seen a far-reaching transformation of 
Indonesia's political and economic order. Although there has 
always been much to criticize, both in the specific vision of the 
New Order and in its day-to-day practice, there is not much doubt 
that Soeharto looks back on these years with a good deal of 
satisfaction. He has done, in broad terms, what he set out to do. 
There is a study in its own right, however, to be made of the minds 
of long-reigning rulers close to the ends of their careers. Typically, 
they look both backwards and forwards: backwards to polish up 
what they see as the correct version of their place in history, 
forwards to ensure that their work survives them. Soeharto has 
clearly been concerned for some time for his place in history. His 
family mausoleum near Solo, apparent ambivalence towards direct 
criticism of Indonesia's only other president, Sukarno, and more 
recently his memoirs and his cooperation in the hagiographical 
biography by Donald Wilson,4 are all the actions of a man with an 
eye to history. Departing leaders also commonly attempt to carry 
out one or two acts of politically difficult or potentially unpopular 
statesmanship as a kind of political gift to their successors. The 
normalization of relations with China, completed recently, may 
fall into this category; another may be the celebrated Tapos 
initiative on 4 March 1990, in which the president assembled the 
owners of thirty-one major business conglomerates at his cattle 
station outside Bogor and announced that he expected them to hand 
over 25 per cent of their businesses to 'the people' by devolving 
shares to cooperatives. 
. This eye to history, however, can also work in peculiar ways. 
Louis XIV was not the last monarch to murmur 'Apres moi la 
deluge' -after me the flood. Will history be kinder to Soeharto if 
he is succeeded by politically milder presidents and a less 
authoritarian order, thereby highlighting Soeharto's own 
shortcomings, or if the New Order dissolves into chaos and 
uncertainty, thereby showing for once and for all that it was 
Soeharto who held the show together? It would be wildly 
unrealistic to suggest that Soeharto wants to see the destruction of 
4 Donald Wilson, The Long Journey from Turmoil to Self-Sufficiency, 
cited in Tempo 16 June 1990, pp.22-23. 
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all he has worked for, but as we watch him over the next few years, 
we should bear in mind the peculiar recklessness that often afflicts 
leaders in his position. And we have to remember how little we 
know of Soeharto as an individual. His memoirs, the occasional 
public outburst, snippets of televised speeches, and stories 
remembered by people who knew him long ago-this is not the 
material for an analysis of the deepest thoughts of the man. 
Even more intriguing than the question of succession is the 
question of what form the New Order will take after Soeharto's 
departure. One of the paradoxes of Indonesian politics is that after 
twenty-three years of political stability unparalleled since the 
colonial era, there is still a high degree of doubt about the extent to 
which the New Order's political structures have been 
institutionalized.5 In particular, there is deep uncertainty about 
the inherent power of the presidency in relation to other 
institutions and forces in the Indonesian power elite. Although the 
1945 Constitution gives the president a pivotal role in national 
government, this has been insufficient to prevent the shunting aside 
of an incumbent president on two occasions, in 1945 and 1965-67. 
Because the relationship between the army and the presidency has 
not been seriously tested since 1967, we do not have more than 
speculation to tell us who will call the shots when and if a conflict 
comes to a head. This can be illustrated best, perhaps, by asking 
what would happen if Soeharto were to die suddenly before the 
end of his current term, certainly not an impossibility for a man in 
his late 60s. As pointed out earlier, the constitution provides that 
the vice-president should take over and serve out the remainder of 
Soeharto's term. Vice-President Sudharmono, however, seems to be 
deeply unpopular in military circles, and open opposition to him 
was expressed by officers at the time of his appointment. This 
opposition has continued with the circulation of pamphlets calling 
attention to Sudharmono's alleged links during the revolution with 
the Socialist Youth, Pesindo, and accusations that he is a crypto-
Communist; obviously a strong attack on the character of a New 
Order politician. There are widely expressed doubts about 
whether the army would tolerate Sudharmono even as acting 
president, and it has been reported that Defence Minister Benny 
Murdani, Internal Affairs Minister Rudini and Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas have formed an informal crisis committee to manage the 
5 The nature of this uncertainty remains unchanged since the last 
Indonesia Update (1988). For a summary of the debate on the topic 
see Mackie (1989:a21-26). 
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affairs of state if the president is incapacitated. Sudharmono, 
pointedly, is apparently not a member of this co~tt~. . 
More generally, the actual practice of presidential power in 
the New Order has depended not just on the president's formal 
constitutional position but on the consummate mana~ement of 
subordinates. New words like mendropkan and mengorbitkan have 
entered the Indonesian language to describe the process by which 
the president ensures that key positions are in the hands of 
loyalists, but Soeharto's repertoire of techniques is broader than 
this and includes the deft use of promotions to honourable but ~eak 
posts such as the vice-presidency, the chair of the MP~ and van~us 
ambassadorships, the careful playing off of subordinates against 
each other and a careful strategy which permits potential 
troublemakers to rise within the state and political hierarchy to a 
point where they are implicated in the system wit~out being ab~e 
to transform it. It is of course possible that Soeharto s successor will 
be able to do all these things as well as the incumbent, but this is 
far from guaranteed. 
The New Order's best chance for institutionalization has 
always been that Golkar might develoi:> from being. merely a 
government electoral vehicle to something approaching a real 
political party. Golkar members in the early to mid 1980s spoke of 
modelling Golkar on the Japanese Liberal De~o~r~tic Party, by 
which they meant establishing a system of civilian one-party 
dominance and close business government ties. However, although 
Golkar has made dramatic progress as an institution in many 
respects over the past decade, especi~lly with th~ introduction of 
individual membership and the adoption of prorrunent and capable 
leaders such as Sudharmono, Wahono and Sarwono 
Kusumaatmadja, it still looks structurally more like a Burma 
Socialist Programme Party or Marcos' KBL than an LOP. There was 
a good deal of excitement in April 1989 when G?l~ar memb~rs e 
actually protested against a government decision to raise 
electricity charges by 25 per cent,6 but on the ~hole Golk~r seems ~o 
have lost the momentum it had suddenly picked up in the mid 
1980s, and has been disrupted recently by accusations of Communist 
infiltration and by delays in the appointment of a new board after 
the national congress in October 1988.7 
A second reason for suspecting that the form of the New Order 
\ may change significantly after Soeharto's departure is that its 
6 FEER 20 April 1989, p.27. 
7 FEER 12January1989, p.22. 
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I distinctive and imaginative political construction seems to have 
\ reached its limits without achieving its goals. The New Order was 
constructed as a reaction to the extreme responsiveness of the 
political order under Parliamentary and Guided Democracy to the 
demands of social and political groups. The basic struct 
co nts of the New Order-the political demo i izat10n of the 
people, a separation of orma politics from the decision-making 
process but with the military deeply involved in both, heavy 
emphasis on economic development, including foreign investment, 
and a willingness on the part of the state to resort to violence 
against its opponents but a preference for more subtle means of 
control-were all apparent soon after Soeharto's accession to 
power. For all the political stability and economic develo ment 
~ch this system delivered, it failed to satisfy the thirst in 
v_?rious parts of society for real political participation, and at 
various times during the history of the New Order, those around 
Soeharto attempted to counter accusations that the government is 
impervious to public opinion by opening dialogue with what might 
;:_cry roadly be called dissident groups. The most spectacular 
example of this was in 1974, when Generals Ali Murtopo and 
Sumitro began talking to students, but we see it in a more modest 
form today in Emil Salim's dialogue with environmentalist NGOs 
and several of Rudini's initiatives such as his call in early 1989 for 
a special tax on the very rich or his suggestion that elections based 
on a district system might lead to better communication between 
parliamentarians and the public.8 
In the past, Soeharto has been able to end this kind of dialogue 
partly by force majeure, but partly because he could hold out the 
prospect of an alternative system-the Golkar-Pancasila system-
which promised to do away with the basis for dissidence. The 
I Golkar-Pancasila format has been an ingenious formula which insulates the task of ruling from mass political pressure while 
attempting to preserve a sense of popular participation in national 
affairs. Indonesia's present system attributes wisdom to the state 
apparatus and largely denies Indon~ian citizens any legitimate 
channel to challenge that wisdomL Golkar, the floating mass 
concept, the inter-relationship between president, MPR, elections 
and GBHN, together with dwifungsi and the Law on Mass 
Organizations all work to ensure that public opinion does Q,Ot place 
any significant pressure on the process of policy making~ At the 
same time it is an elaborate attempt, not necessarily insincere, to 
8 FEER 9 Feb. 1989, p.13; Indonesia Reports Log 31 July 1989 (October 
1989). 
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ensure that the Indonesian public will feel that the government 
belongs to them while never having the power to force a decision on 
it. This promise of an alternative system was always the most 
distinctive feature of the New Order and its most imaginative 
contribution to Indonesian politics. 
The New Order's program of imaginative political 
construction, however, seems now to have reached its limits. In this 
respect, Indonesian economics and politics present strikingly 
(
different pictures. Post-Soeharto Indonesia has a clear economic 
vision, a glistening path to wealth and modernity along the trail 
blazed by South Korea and Taiwan. A coherent political vision for 
the future is absent; the political order is on hold. In fact, perhaps 
the most striking feature of Indonesian politics over the last year 
has been the relative absence of structural political initiative on 
the part of the Indonesian government. The determined social and 
political engineering of the early and mid 1980s, which saw such 
major innovations as the Law on Social Organizations and a major 
restructuring of the Armed Forces (ABRI), has had no recent 
parallel. This absence of initiative, I suspect, has more to do with 
a shortage of ideas than with any conviction in government ranks 
that all is rosy. Most of the imaginative old fixers of the early 
New Order are gone, and the elaborate apparatus of New Order 
power has left little room for bold innovation. 
Under these circumstances, I think, any successor to Soeharto is 
likely to be tempted to open and broaden the kind of dialogue 
which Soeharto closed off. We saw in 1989 the blossoming of the 
idea of keterbukaan, or openness, pointedly a close translation of 
glasnost, and the enthusiasm with which at least Jakarta opinion 
leaders greeted the idea that Indonesia might become a less 
restricted society. In 1990, we have seen keterbukaan rather fade 
from the scene and the old New Order reluctance to share its counsel 
with anyone has been reasserted. Any new president, however, 
will be aware of three things: first, that the Golkar-Pancasila 
formula leaves little room for innovation or development; second, 
that the option of repression is always close at hand; and third, 
that dialogue with society could bring short-term, and possibly 
long-term, political advantages, particularly if the president 
needs allies outside the military establishment. In early 1990, we 
have seen a new Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights 
(Infight), incorporating various activist groups, prepare a platform 
for opposition to the present order.9 I don't believe that they 
9 Inside Indonesia 23 (June 1990), pp.2-7. 
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represent a significant challenge to the New Order but they do 
represent a s~anding challe~ge to the government to ~gin dialogue. 
A new president, strugghng to assert authority within the state 
burea1:1cracy and looking for allies where he, or she, can find them 
may fmd the temptation irresistible to reach out to the masses i~ 
some form.~f pop.ulist.dialogue. If this were to happen, we would 
face a pohttcal situation perhaps reminiscent of the early New 
Order but fundamentally different from it in that the Golkar-
Pancasila optio~ would have been exhausted. Since the system can 
no longer be fme-.tuned, !he temptation will be to bypass the 
system, probably with the kind of populist communication Generals 
Sumitro and Ali Murtopo used during the Malari affair of 1974. 
. To make this poi~t clearer, it is worth considering a few recent 
issues where a popuhst strategy would be immediately appealing. 
In 1985, the World Bank approved a major loan to the Indonesian 
gov.ernment for construction of an irrigation and hydroelectric 
pr~Ject at Ked~ng Ombo on the Serang river in Central Java. 
Thirty-seven villages were to be inundated and 5390 families 
displaced, of whom about 65 per cent were landowners and 
therefore entitled to compensation. Compensation offered 
however, was far below the market value of the land and when th~ 
peasants protested they were labelled as Communist sympathizers 
by government officials. When the dam began to fill in January 
1989, 1500 families still refused to leave the area and a student 
activist group calle~ K~lompok Solidaritas Karban Pembangunan 
Kedung Ombo, or Sohdanty Group for the Victims of Development 
at Kedung Ombo, began campaigning on their behalf. The matter 
was !aken up by. Indonesian and Western NGOs at the April 1989 
meetmg of INGI m Brussels, and the Indonesian NGOs in tum were 
severely rebuked by the Internal Affairs minister Rudini in August 
for allegedly blackening Indonesia's name abroad. Finally, in late 
1989, many of the farmers who had refused to move were allocated 
new land in forest reserves in the vicinity of the dam.IO 
Another case: in 1987, a company called Bandung Asri Mulia 
(~AM) offered to take over the lease of an area in the village of 
Cimacan, near the Cibodas Botanical Gardens, for construction of a 
golf course. The land had been leased and cultivated since 1943 by 
about 300 farmers who had tried on various occasions, but without 
success, to convert their leasehold to freehold. In 1988, the governor 
of West Java allocated the land to the golf course on the grounds 
10 
Injustice, ~ersecution, eviction: a human rights update on Indonesia 
and East T1mor (New York: Asia Watch, 1990), pp.61-65; FEER 6 April 
1989, p.34; Tempo 28 April 1990, p.15; 2June1990, pp.25-26. 
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that it was not being cultivated, and offered the farmers Rp 30 per 
square metre in compensation. When they objected the farmers 
were intimidated and harassed; their crops were destroyed, they 
were threatened with dismissal from other jobs, and some were sued 
by the company for illegal occupation of land. In July 1989, Rudini, 
as minister for Internal Affairs, stepped in-apparently another 
populist foray-and ordered that construction of the golf course 
cease. Fairly quickly, however, he was apparently persuaded by 
the local authorities that the lease to BAM was entirely legal and 
that almost all the farmers had accepted the new, higher level of 
compensation.11 In both these cases, the dispute was not conducted 
as an issue of legal principle but of fairness, and it is here that I see 
considerable temptation for any successor to set his mark on the 
government by populist intervention. Injustices of this kind, common 
though they are, offend the officially paternalistic ethos of the 
New Order government, making them a logical point for a new 
broom to begin sweeping. Whereas Soeharto could put the genie of 
popular dialogue back in the bottle while he worked on an 
alternative, his successor will not have that option. 
In various other respects, too, we see the New Order relying not 
on its elaborate political apparatus, but on much cruder techniques. 
The arrest and trial of three students in Yogyakarta who had 
helped distribute banned publications by Pramoedya Ananta Toer 
is only the latest episode in a long tradition of persecution of 
dissent. It is both distressing and depressing to report that the 
prosecution of these students has been accompanied by torture and a 
disregard for due legal process.12 Such lack of political or social 
imagination does not mean structural weakness on the part of the 
New Order, but it does suggest three things. First, that power 
holders at a wide range of levels within the New Order see it as 
fragile-otherwise why bother with petty brutality over minor 
issues; second, that the existing legal structure is incapable of 
dealing with this kind of challenge, so that the government feels 
forced to resort to crude repressive institutions to deal with them; 
and third, that the careful construction of Golkar, plus years of 
inculcating Pancasila into the nation's youth, have failed to create 
11 
12 
Injustice, persecution, eviction, pp.68-71; Indonesia Reports Log 25, 29 
July 1989 (October 1989); Inside Indonesia 21 (December 1989}, pp.6-
8. 
Injustice, persecution, eviction, pp. 68-71; Indonesia Reports Log 25, 
29 July 1989 (October 1989); Inside Indonesia 21 (December 1989), pp. 
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the kind of society in which this sort of political challenge is seen 
as unnecessary. 
Perhaps the strongest sign that ideas are in short supply in the 
current regime is the government's revival of an alleged Communist 
threat. In itself, perhaps, this is hardly new. Throughout the 
1980s, government figures repeatedly warned against the 'latent 
danger' of the PKI and launched actions to remind the public of the 
dangers of Communism, ranging from the dismissal of allegedly 
left-wing oil industry workers and the commissioning of the film 
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKJ to the execution of PKI members detained 
since the late 1960s. Early in 1990, the terror tactics continued with 
the execution of four former members of the Presidential Guard 
under Sukarno who had been implicated in the coup.13 The form 
taken by the campaign in 1990, however, has been somewhat more 
comprehensive. In July 1990 the government introduced a major 
reformulation of its criteria for suspecting communist sympathies. 
It was once necessary for Indonesian citizens working in sensitive 
areas or undertaking various actions to account for their activities 
on the evening of 30th September 1965 and to obtain a certificate 
confirming that they were not 'involved' (terlibat) in the 
GESTAPU coup. In 1988, this term terlibat was displaced by the 
term bersih lingkungan and bersih diri (roughly 'environmentally 
clean' and 'personally clean'), the former particularly implying 
that holders of government posts should not only be free of personal 
involvement in the PKI but should come from a family environment 
totally free of PKI influence.14 This was a sweeping requirement, 
implicating many millions of Indonesians who had previously been 
considered politically safe and ignoring circumstances such as 
political divisions within families. Earlier this year, on 17 April, 
a new presidential decision (Kepres) seemed to resolve this 
anomaly by establishing a formal screening process for all 
government employees to establish that they were not involved in 
the PKI or in any banned organization.JS The July measure is 
formally known as a juklak, or petunjuk pelaksanaan of 
Bakorstanas, defining the implementation of the earlier 
13 
14 
15 
Officially the timing of these executions has been described as an 
administrative matter - the victims had come to the end of the long 
process of appeal and reconsideration needed before a long death 
sentence is carried out. Reports circulated in March 1990 that 
another batch had been executed, though this now seems not to have 
been the case. See Tempo 24 March 1990, p.25; 31 March 1990, p.15. 
Tempo 12 November 1988, pp.22-28. 
Tempo 12 May 1990, p.14. 
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presidential decision. It modifies, however, the earlier decision by 
introducing a new term, keterpengaruhan, or 'state of being 
influenced'.16 Try Sutrisno has defined keterpengaruhan as 'acting, 
speaking, writing or showing an attitude in a way which resembles 
or assists PKI strategy'; in other words the narrow direct nexus 
between the events of 1965 and political crime has been formally 
broken. 
It is tempting to see this new arrangement as simply a rather 
unsubtle tool for enforcing discipline in the public sector; the 
vagueness of the term keterpengaruhan gives the upper levels of 
the bureaucracy and government a Sword of Damocles to suspend 
over the heads of their subordinates, while the screening process is 
an administrative procedure not subject to the rules of legal process, 
where accusations of communist affiliation can turn out to be risky 
for the accuser. (There have been two cases in recent years of courts 
imposing severe penalties on individuals who incorrectly accused 
others of PKI connections.)17 Given the existing executive authority 
of the government, however, this is an unnecessarily heavy tool for 
administrative discipline. Much more plausible is to see it as a 
reaffirmation of the significance of the Communist threat, despite 
the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle 
East. This is an old formula: from very early on, the New Order 
has presented itself as a moderate, restraining force between left 
and right, between Communism and radical Islam. But it is a 
formula that looks increasingly unrealistic in 1990, both because 
time has dimmed the sharpness of memories of the Old Order and 
its violent demise, and because the proposition that the only 
alternatives to the New Order are Islam and Communism is hardly 
as plausible as it once seemed. 
It is hard, however, not to concede that organized Islam does 
present a challenge, if not an immediate threat, to the New Order's 
authority. The targeting of Communism, I suspect, has more to do 
with the strength of Islam than with Communism's own prospects. 
Since about 1976, the Indonesian government has reported a series of 
incidents in which radical Islamic groups have launched violent 
action against the state. Some of these, such as the bombing of 
Borobudur in January 1985, have seemed so provocative that some 
people at least have speculated on the possibility of their having 
been carried out by pro-government agents provocateur; in other 
cases, the government appears to have been rather quick to brand 
16 
17 
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simple economic discontent, for instance over land, as 
fundamentalist Islam. There is, however, no doubt that radical 
Islam is a significant element in opposition to the New Order. Most 
recently, in particular, there have been incidents involving alleged 
Islamic radicals both in Lampung and in Aceh. The Lampung affair 
is similar in its outlines to the Tanjung Priok riots of September 
1984. A local Muslim teacher, Anwar alias Warsidi, was said to 
have begun preaching a radical Islamic message, including 
accusations that the national government was kafir or infidel, and 
calling for the abolition of Pancasila. Rumours of plots began to 
circulate and the local military commander arrested a group of 
young Muslims as a part of his investigation of alleged plotting. 
The following day, he was attacked and killed by angry villagers. 
One or two other soldiers were also killed, before the army counter-
attacked, killing reportedly 27 people, including Warsidi 
himself.JS 
Just what led to the incident, however, and what its broader 
political significance may have been is rather more obscure. Initial 
reports identified the so-called extremists as the Komando 
Mujaheddin Fisabillah, or Warriors of Allah, making the affair 
appear to be one of a long series of Muslim uprisings against 
supposedly irreligious rulers. State authorities, however, quickly 
attempted to discount this possibility and implied that land 
disputes between older and newer settlers in Lampung were the 
cause; other observers pointed out that the sharpest land issues in 
the province are between established transmigrant settlers and 
government departments and private businesses who claim land 
occupied by the settlers. The Forestry Department has been 
attempting to move settlers from upland areas where forest clearing 
is said to be causing erosion and disrupting rainfall patterns, while 
various private Jakarta interests are said to be muscling in on the 
local coffee industry. Try Sutrisno expanded on this theme during 
the week after the incident by suggesting that those involved had 
been 'from left-wing or right-wing extremists or a combination of 
both'; two weeks later, he was describing the movement as an effort 
by Communists to use Islam as a cover to make a comeback, while 
official accounts of the incident dropped all reference to those 
words 'Mujaheddin Fisabillah', using instead the term 'Movement 
to Subvert Order'. More recently, however, the trials of alleged 
surviving participants in the uprising have indicated that there 
was indeed a strong Islamic element in the affair, and that 
18 FEER 23 February 1989, pp.10-11; 9 March 1990, p.25; Asiaweek 24 
February 1989, pp.21-22, 25. 
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Warsidi preached not only against Pancasila, but also again~t 
family planning and taxation. This confusion of evidence makes 1t 
difficult to say just how the different elements of the Lampung 
affair relate to each other, but one thing is certainly clear, and 
that is that the government is uncertain about how to handle this 
kind of challenge. It is aware that simple repression is probably 
not enough, but it is uncertain about what path to take .. 
Something similar seems to apply in Aceh. In particular, Aceh 
has once again become a centre of major regional unrest. The 
province appeared to be a problem solved during the last ele~tions, 
when Golkar for the first time pulled ahead of the PPP m the 
provincial vote, but the government's election victory is now clearly 
pyrrhic. After February, 1990 there was. a series of armed .clashes 
in the province, including ambushes, raids and c~unter-ra1d.s: At 
least five civilians were killed more or less by accident at rmhtary 
checkpoints and the rebels are said to have captured significant 
quantities of arms from the armr Just what i.s ha~pening, let alone 
why, is uncertain. The rebels did not clearly identify themselves or 
issue demands. Here too, conflicting hints have dropped from 
official circles. On the one hand there have been reports of 150 
Indon-esians trained in Libya who have allegedly re-entered the 
country and in preparation for an Islamic revolution. On the other 
hand the unrest is claimed to have started because of a crackdown 
on powerful local marijuana (ganja) lords.19 . . 
In central politics, the New Order has achieved something of 
a remarkable coup in prising the Nahdatul Ulama away from the 
PPP and giving it a respectable place in political counsels, even to 
the extent of appointing Slamet Effendi Yusuf, the head of Ansor, 
NU's youth wing, as head of Golkar's own youth win~.20 Awa.y 
from elite politics, however, the government's hand with Islam 1s 
much less sure. The government vacillated uneasily between 
appeasement, attack and disregard. The government's dithering 
over the football pools (formerly parkas) has hardly been edifying, 
while last year an incident in which bags of poison were 
accidentally used in place of baking powder by biscuit factories, 
leading to the death of dozens of people, especially children, led to 
a rumour campaign that women dressed in Muslim head shawls 
were going about the country poisoning supplies. 
19 Tempo 28 April 1990, p.17; 30 June 1990, pp.23-31; 14 July 1990, p.22; 21 
July 1990, p.35; FEER 28 June 1990, pp.12-13. 
20 Asiaweek 13 January 1989, p.23; FEER 12 January 1989, p.22. 
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My own feeling is that uncertainty about how to cope with 
Islamic mobilization will have a conservative effect on Indonesian 
politics, that the kind of populist breaking away from the New 
Order format which I described earlier will appear more risky 
given the presence of radical Islamic demands on the state. I 
suspect, however, that the process will nonetheless proceed. For 
all its economic achievements, for all its elaborate constitutional 
apparatus and for all the bureaucratic and military power backing 
it, Soeharto's New Order continues to look more like a transitional 
stage in Indonesia's political development than the portent of 
things to come. 
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SUMMARY OF EVENTS, JANUARY 1989-AUGUST 1990 
1 January 1989 
6-8February1989 
24February1989 
March 1989 
April 1989 
April 1989 
24May1989 
2June 1989 
8June1989 
16June 1989 
28-30August1989 
September 1989 
9-13October1989 
Indonesia bans export of some 
categories of raw rubber to stimulate 
local processing 
Violent clashes in Lampung between 
troops and local settlers facing 
eviction from their lands 
Indonesia and China announce 
agreement to restore diplomatic 
relations 
Commercial television (RCTI) 
introduced to Jakarta 
Golkar members protest over 25 per 
cent increase in electricity prices 
Student protests over dispossession of 
small farmers for development 
projects 
Australia-Indonesia Institute founded 
in Canberra 
Gen. Yoga Sugama retires as Bakin 
head; replaced by Maj. Gen. Soedibjo 
President Soeharto receives UN 
Population Award for Indonesia's 
family planning program. 
Private stock exchange opens in 
Surabaya 
Second national congress of PPP 
removed Jaelani Naro as leader 
Soeharto visits the Soviet Union 
Pope John Paul visits Indonesia 
(including East Timor, 12 October) 
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13 October 1989 
13 October 1989 
11December1989 
December 1989-
February 1990 
14-15 February 1990 
February 1990 
4 March 1990 
7 March 1990 
March-May 1990 
9-11 April 1990 
23May1990 
New patent law passed to protect 
intellectual property rights 
Scott Astra Company pulls out of 
proposed pulp manufacturing project 
in Irian Jaya 
Timor Gap Treaty signed between 
Australia and Indonesia 
Intensified government program to 
remove becaks and traders from the 
streets of Jakarta 
Four condemned members of former 
President Sukarno's palace guard 
executed 
Major upsurge of violence in Aceh 
President Soeharto's 'Tapos 
initiative' accouncing that large 
businesses will be required to give 25 
per cent of their shares to 'the 
people', as represented by 
co operatives 
Prince Mangkubumi accedes to the 
sultanate of Yogyakarta as Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono X 
Arrival of hundreds of Cambodian 
boat people in Indonesia, which 
identified them as economic migrants 
and encouraged those with seaworthy 
vessels to proceed to other 
resettlement points 
INGI Conference in Bonn 
Conclusion of International Tropical 
Timber Organization (ITTO) 
42 
28May1990 
12-13June1990 
9July1990 
August 1990 
8 August 1990 
14 August 1990 
Robert Cribb 
conference in Bali which agreed that 
by the year 2000 all exports of 
tropical timber products should come 
from sustainably developed forests 
Major reduction in tariffs on 
industrial goods and removal of non-
tariff barriers 
33rd IGGI Conference, The Hague 
About 560 Indonesian Muslims among 
victims trampled to death in a 
stampede in a crowded tunnel during 
the annual pilgrimage to Mekka 
Appointment of Wis mo yo 
Arismunandar as Kostrad commander 
announced 
Indonesia and China resume full 
diplomatic relations 
Fifty-eight dissidents present a 
petition calling on Soeharto not to 
stand for the presidency in 1993 
5 
Cultural Prayer 1990 
Soetjipto Wirosardjono 
On the night of 16 August 1990, the eve of the forty-fifth 
anniversary of national independence, the Jakarta Cultural Center, 
Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM), in cooperation with the cultural 
section of the Indonesian Journalist Association, Jakarta Chapter, 
held an open cultural forum. Taking the Open Theatre, which is 
located at the heart of the Cultural Center, as the performance 
site, the night was attended by more than a thousand mostly young 
men and women of Jakarta. Music, songs, poetry readings and 
theatre stage performances, were presented by a wide range of 
performing art groups from different social strata; the University of 
Indonesia's Choir (paduan suara) Paragita Ul, Theater Kubur, Lab 
69, Bengkel Deklamasi, Institute Kesenian Jakarta, Sanggar AS 
IAIN, Kelompok Musik Jalanan (Street Musicians Group) etc. 
The interesting part of the performance was that it reflected 
the prevailing social sentiment among Indonesians. Unlike the 
usual commemoration events for Independence Day, where people 
are expected to glorify patriotic past achievements and present 
heroic performances, the young men and women performing and 
attending the cultural performance at TIM that night cried out 
about a gloomy social reality. Their thoughts ranged over 
unemployment, the deteriorating environment, overcrowding of the 
island of Java and the future of an Indonesian population of more 
than 200 million, prevailing injustice, social gaps, ethnic and other 
social prejudices, conglomerates, corruption, lack of democracy and 
gloom over the lack of hope for effective participation. 
'Freedom' (Merdeka) has given us many things. Freedom has 
given us government, institutions, parliament, education, law, 
army, but also concerns and fears. Because ultimately what has 
been given by independence has become self-perpetuating gods and 
goals. This is a cultural question', said Bur Rasuanto, the new 
director of the Jakarta Cultural Institute, TIM. Opening the event 
Bur Rasuanto noted that ' ... therefore we need to congregate for a 
cultural prayer to renew our cultural orientation, to purify ourselves 
from the accumulated dirt of the accelerated modernization 
process, to free ourselves from the myth of 'sustaining' values. For 
what we need is not only an accelerated modernization as such, but 
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also a sustainable cultural conscience. What we are aiming at is 
not the sustainance of values but a transformation of values.' 
From my perspective, the commemoration was indeed a 
declaration for independence from several myths. Culturally one 
has to realize that harmony cannot exist side by side with injustice 
under the myth of social tolerance, peace and stability. Equality 
becomes a myth if not an empty slogan used by the establishment to 
preach about unobserved values and norms, stipulated in the 
nation's ideology. While ideologically we believe that all persons 
are equal, in practice it is a naked reality that a few clearly have 
more access to national resources, material and otherwise, than 
does the majority. The unfortunate reality also reveals very 
clearly that those who have the least access to resources are those 
who have at present acquired the least in life. For that reason, the 
citizenry, if their sentiment was truly represented by the soul of the 
cultural performance, have begun to question the validity of an 
accepted myth about the true role of government. In the preamble 
of our constitution, it is stipulated that the government was set up 
to promote public welfare and to enhance the nation's intellectual 
life; to establish a just and prosperous society. If this is the case 
then one may expect that the government should set a firm 
political agenda to guarantee that those who have less in life 
should have more under law. 
In the eyes, ears and consciences of the performing artists that 
night, much of the prevailing jargon has lost credibility. Rather, 
the performers underscored the social reality they found at all 
levels of society. Under the development bridge, among petty 
criminals and prostitutes, within the competing interests among 
environmentalists and the business community involved in forest 
exploitation, in the emergence of the new force, the conglomerates, 
and in the dream for more participatory democracy are found the 
most popular themes of all the performances; the inspiration for 
songs, poetry, and theatre. The issues thus boil down to the nation's 
agenda to verify who gets what; who has how much; what is the 
cost to others; for how long will the 'haves' prevail; and how the 
present circumstances could have come about. 
Statistics, however, can not sufficiently answer those questions. 
As far as traditional social indicators are concerned, all figures 
clearly indicate a social development which is indeed not that 
gloomy. Infant mortality has dropped significantly from 117.0 to 
73.7 for males and from 98.4 to 59.5 for females during the period 
1980-85. Life expectancy has also seen a respectable improvement, 
from 50.9 years to 59.1 years for males and from 54.0 years to 62.7 
years for females, for the same period 1980 to 1985. Literacy rates 
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were 90.5 per cent for urban and 77.4 per cent for rural areas in 1985. 
This level of achievement had almost been attained in 1980. 
Labour force participation among women also increased very 
significantly during the early eighties. In 1980 there were 17.3 
million women in the labour force, while in 1985 the number 
reached 22.9 million, an increase of 32.6 per cent in a period of five 
years. Compared to the male labour participation rate, the figure 
was significantly higher. For male labour participation, the figure 
rose from an absolute number of 35.1 million in 1980 to become 40.8 
million in 1985, an increase of 16.4 per cent for the same five year 
period. Although the open unemployment rate has been 
consistently low since the 1970s, a device to calculate under-
employment using number of hours at work during the week of 
observation reveals a more realistic picture of the prevalence of 
disguised unemployment, under-employment and less than full 
employment in Indonesia. Irrespective of a relatively high rate of 
under-employment, there were no long periods of famine and serious 
shortages of food in any region in the country reported for the last 
ten years. The gloomy part of the statistics might be rep~esented ~y 
the controversial 30 million population who were considered still 
to be living below the poverty line. 
An interesting question may still be bothering some observers 
regarding Indonesia's contemporary social and poli~i~al 
development. How sensitive is the government to the prevailing 
sentiments among their constituents as well as the population at 
large? The speech delivered by President Soeharto on 16 August 
1990 indicates some degree of response to popular concerns. In the 
last three pages of the substantive content of the 31-page speech, 
the President speaks about equity and prevailing poverty and how 
the government tries to deal with it. The macro-policy will remain 
intact, namely :!o encourag~tbe_fast mover to carry the burden of 
drawing with them the slow mover'. The three pillars of equity 
were stated as: just and equal opportunity for all; capacity to take 
advantage of the equal opportunity for all; and the prevalence of 
solidarity (kebersamaan) among all social strata. This is a strong 
commitment, but many still feel that is it not strong enough to deal 
with the prevailing social inequalities. Among the par.ts of the 
speech which provoked a wide reaction was that which dealt 
with dissent. 'Differences in opinion should be considered as the 
trigger to the dynamism of our (social) life'. I would assume that 
this part of the speech reflects a change in mood rather than a 
substantive change in political orientation with regard to 
democracy and freedom of expression. Besides, the plurality of the 
prevailing basic attitudes and interpretations among the enforcing 
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government apparatus and the military establishment prevents the 
society from taking the President's encouraging statement at face 
value. The same ambivalence applies to the President's 
appreciation of the need to balance the security approach with the 
prosperity approach in dealing with social and political 
aspirations of the public, which has been engaging Indonesia's civil 
liberty activists for many years. 
The cultural prayer of 1990 has to convey the prevailing 
popular concern about issues of social relevance. The government 
has responded with some actions and many statements containing 
detailed statistics and progressive policies. The actions and 
statements still have a long way go to reach proximity, but both 
appear to be moving toward a closer proximity while seeking the 
true path to a just and prosperous society. This is, after all, the 
most cherished goal of all Indonesians: 
.. Editors' note: Following the paper there was a long discussion 
period in which Soetjipto expanded some of the thoughts 
presented in his paper. A selection of some of the main themes 
is presented below. 
Some Questions and Answers Provoked by the description of the 
'Cultural Prayer' 
Q: If we cannot believe the political scientists, in attempting to 
chart the mood of Indonesians, are there more people like you 
to enlighten us on what's actually happening in Indonesia? 
A: I am statistician, but I do not a believe that quantitative 
measures are everything. When you ask about whether there 
are many people 'like me' in Indonesia I would say that they 
are not in the majority, but certainly they are very influential. 
There is a group of intellectuals who don't believe in the 
exercise of intellectualizing of the social and political 
phenomena out of the context of its current dynamics, but rather 
who are led by the dreams and goals of the nationhood _which 
we try to form. We are not so interested in the short-term 
formation of the political structure as such, but we are 
interested in the much longer term, how the future society of 
Indonesia which we dream about could be attained. Hopefully 
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this is also related to what the people dream about their 
society. 
In this context it is irrelevant who is the next president and 
who is going to determine that. What is relevant is how th.e 
Indonesian society of the future will be forme~, and h~w ~ong it 
will take to reach the desired goals of prospenty and iustice. 
Q: It seems to me that we have got two dimensions: structu~al and 
socio-cultural and political. I can imagine a loose~mg .up 
process occurring on the latter score, I can't really 1magme 
structural changes reversing at this stage. We are no~ so far 
into a process of structural transformation, both of the kind Hal 
Hill talks about and the analysis of Conroy on 
industrialization, that such structural change is probably 
irreversible. 
A: When we titled the paper, and also the per~om.'ance '~ultural 
Prayer', we wanted to indicate a prayer which 1s not ttme a~d 
spacebound. When people pray, they cut across the boundanes 
of time and break the time frames and space frames. Prayer 
reflects the soul and the dream of the people. Is that rel~va.nt? 
I would say so. Because if I recall 25 y~~rs ago s1m1l~r 
comments were made regarding the irrevers1b1hty of Sukam~ s 
era and we conducted the same type of exercises that Dr Cnbb 
is ~ow doing. Then we talked of ~he possibility of Dr 
Subandrio, or Nasution or others, replacing Sukarno. Then the 
whole system completely collapsed and no~ody expected what 
turned out to be a radically different scenario. 
The Muslim intellectuals and this cultural group feel that this 
is the strength of the prayer and the stre.ngth of the cultural 
outlook. It looks at the possibility of rapid structural change 
from the perspective of power of 'prayer'. I do not ~long to the 
group who believe in superstition, but I would classify my~elf ~s 
being among those who believe in the power of faith .m 
goodness. And we say this with all sincerity: wit~ good faith 
God will bless us in finding ways and means to achieve a better 
society. 
Q: Dr Cribb has mentioned Golkar and its future role. I wonder if 
you'd comment more sp~cifically .on t~e role of ABRI, and 
particularly the dwifungsi of ABRI m this process. 
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A: It is not for me to speculate on what the army feels, or what 
Golkar feels. My interest is in what the people feel. 
Q: Indo~~sia clearly is still a very poor country. It is still 
classified by the World Bank as a low income country 
although Jamie Mackie and others have stressed the changes i~ 
the structure of production that occurred in the 1980s. We have 
to bear in mind that whether we look at the structure of 
production or the distribution of the labour force across sectors 
the I~donesian econo1_11y is about where the United Kingdo~ 
was in the early or middle decades of the nineteenth century, 
where Germany was at the time of Bismarck, perhaps where 
Japa.n and Russia were in the first decade of this century. 
?bv1?usl.y n?ne of these countries were by any stretch of the 
imagmahon Just and prosperous societies at that stage of their 
~con?mi~ devel~p.ment. None were by any stretch of the 
imagmahon participatory democracies. Why do Indonesians 
expect to be different? 
A: Now I have to become a statistician. I made the calculation 
that wit~ a 5 yer cent growth average for the coming 25 years 
Indonesia will reach the per capita income of only about $~S2000. This compares with the current per capita income of 
Singapore of $US8000. Thus in the year 2015 Indonesia would 
have only one quarter of the 1990 Singaporean level. We cannot 
imagine what level Singapore will have reached in 2015 or 
what Japan, the US and Germany and so on would achieve. 
That's why our group is taking a different approach to that 
followed by many economists. We think that probably we 
should advise our people that since in the past they were able 
to adapt to their poverty relative to affluent countries and 
still maintain humane values, then with improvements i~ real 
standards over current levels, provided that the structure of relativ~ povert~ ca~ ~ bridged in such a way that the feeling 
of shanng and Justice is there, then their relative international 
poverty will be bearable. This concept of adapting to relative 
pcverty was discussed at one time by Sudjatmoko in the terms: 
if we fmd that the physica~ room to manoeuvre is limited, why 
not develop a non-physical room to manoeuvre which is 
unlimited. He mea~t a spi~it.ual dimension but not necessarily 
one based on orgaruzed religion. The universal values of love 
of solidarity, and of fellow-feeling are integral to th~ 
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teachings of major religions and should ~e the basis of our 
attempt to achieve a just and prosperous society. 
Since massive quantitative growth sufficient to achie~e an 
'affluent society', as I indicated, will not even be reached. in ~he 
coming 25 years, we must fight at the p~es~nt mom~nt for JUStice. 
If we cannot afford to give prospenty m physical terms, at 
least we can provide prosperity in non-physical .terms by 
developing the non-physical room to manoe~vre, that is room to 
develop solidarity, justice, and democracy, in s~ort to develop 
all the ideal universal human values to which we ~dhe~e, 
whether under Pancasila or as part of the value~ w.e 1den~fy 
with a major religion. This is the line of th1~king be1~g 
nurtured by intellectual groups who feel that without so~1al 
justice we will be forced to~ destiny whic~ is far from the JUSt 
and prosperous society promised by Pancasda . 
Q: I have two questions, one short, one long: for P~k Soetjipto. 
Firstly, you have given us a run down on this meeting of about 
1000 young people in Jakarta, and told us what they we~e 
concerned about, and then you have gone on to say th~t this 
reflected the prevailing social sentiments among Indonesians. I 
just wonder how you come to the conclusion that a thousand 
young people at a poetry reading session in Jakar!'1 can be ~a~en 
to be representative of a hundred and eighty m1lhon 
Indonesians. 
Secondly I am little bit hesitant about what I'm going to say, 
because this paper I think has been written in Javanese style. I 
am an economist and I think it's attacking me. and. my fellow 
economists, but I'm not really sure. If I'm too thin-ski~ed, then 
please tell me. The implied criticism of economists and 
perhaps political scientists here is that we can all produc~ a 
lot of nice statistics about what's happening in the Ind?nes1an 
economy, and yet you can reply that people are grum~h~g. We 
as economists must pay attention to the sorts o~ stahsti~s ~ou 
have quoted here; they are very impressive stahsh~s, 
especially when you compare Indonesia's p~rformance with 
other countries at a similar stage of economic ~evelopment, 
frankly Indonesia is doing very well compared wit~ .mo~t other 
countries. But the sorts of concerns that you are ra1smg m your 
paper about a just and equal opportunity for all are another 
matter. I think we are also concerned about that, .but I am not 
sure there is all that much we can do about it. I think we all get 
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upset every time we hear about a new license or a special deal 
for one of the conglomerates close to the president, including 
those recently given to his children, but I am not quite sure 
what we can do about that. We can mutter and quietly 
persuade people to bring pressure to bear to prevent such 
injustice, but I am not sure what else you would have us do to try 
to overcome these sorts of problems. 
A. The representativeness of the one thousand artists cannot be 
inferred statistically, in the way you imply in your criticism. 
But if you use the cultural way of inferring representativeness 
it's usually a question of whether the poetry reflects only one's 
own sentiments or rather represents a more general public 
sentiment. The degree of acceptability of an artistic work lies 
not in the reflection of a single individual's feeling, but the 
feelings shared by most listeners. If that happens, then we can 
say it is an attitude prevailing in the society. Only then is 
artistic work acceptable. You see, the work of an artist is not as 
self-absorbed as one might imagine. The way I look at it the 
artists were also trying to reflect what they see and what they 
feel with regard to the social environment. In that respect as I 
indicated in my paper, if (I use the word 'if' deliberately) the 
spirit of the times can be represented artistically, then the 
performance in front of 1000 that night has meaning for the 180 
millions. 
I am a keen watcher of the social conditions in Indonesia and 
feel that what is expressed in the poetry represents more or less 
what the public feels. These themes are also reflected in 
Indonesian cartoons. Social scientists already use cartoons to 
draw conclusions about how the people feel, because cartoons 
will be ignored by the reader unless they reflect the people's 
feelings. I mentioned in the paper that if there is a deep 
feeling crying out for justice then the government should set a 
firm political agenda to guarantee that those who have less in 
life should have more in law. Dr Cribb referred to the example 
of land in the Puncak which is being acquired for a golf course 
with the payment of 30 rupiah per square metre while land in t 
the area is valued at 270 rupiah. This reflects that those who 
have less are not being protected from the abuses of law which 
prevail at the present time. My proposal is that this should be 
a political agenda. This is not a legal question, it is a political 
question, whether there is a political way to guarantee that 
those who have less in life should have more in law. Unless 
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this is to be well guaranteed the poor will always be deprived 
of access to resources, physical, financial or otherwise. 
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Ownership in Indonesia: Who owns what and does it 
matter? 
Hal Hill 
Ownership in Perspective 
The vigorous public debate on ownership issues in Indonesia 
developed quite suddenly in 1989, but the topic has long been a 
c~ntentious one, reflecting the country's turbulent post-Independence 
~story and deep-seated ethnic divides. The specifics of the debate 
m 1_989/~0, es~cially concerning the conglomerates, differ from 
earlier discussions, principally because for the first time in its 
history !ndo~esia possesses a large and modem corporate economy in 
domestic (pnvate) hands. But a cursory inspection of the literature 
on Indonesian economic history reveals the prominence of the 
ownership issue over the last 50 years. Indeed, apart from the 
gene~al fortun~s of ~he economy, no other topic has received such 
sustamed and mtens1ve scrutiny. 
Foreign domination and privilege lay at the roots of the anti-
colonial movement in the Netherlands Indies, but it was Polak 
(~943) who provided the first detailed estimates of the huge 
~tf!erences between European and indigenous ownership shares and 
hvmg standards. In the early post-Independence period, successive 
governments attempted to boost pribumi (indigenous Indonesian) 
participation in the economy, but the results were disappointing 
(Djojohadikusumo 1954; Sutter 1959). The former Vice-President, 
Hatta, a~d oth~rs struck a responsive chord in the community by 
adv_oc~tmg a 7alan tengah (a middle way), neither socialist nor 
cai:i1ta~1st but based on cooperatives as the primary commercial unit 
(H1ggms 1958). By the early 1960s, direct state intervention and 
control had risen sharply, hastened by the disappointing results of 
the. indu.st~ proi:notion programs of the 1950s and by the wave of 
nationahzat1ons m 1957 /58 (Mackie, 1961-62). In the first half of 
the. 1960s, foreign capital inflows fell to a trickle, being confined 
mamly .to smal.l amounts in the petroleum industry and in 
product10n-shanng agreements with partners from Japan and 
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Eastern Europe (Gibson 1966, parts I and II). Nevertheless, in spite 
of this dominant state role, some sections of the business community 
somehow managed to prosper, often through access to foreign 
exchange and other licences (Castles 1965). 
The New Order witnessed a sharp change in policy directions. 
A new and liberal foreign investment code was introduced in 1967, 
domestic investment by pribumi and non-pribumi groups alike was 
encouraged, and state enterprises were assigned a much reduced 
role. However, the change in community attitudes was not as 
pronounced as the official policy. The widespread mistrust of 
foreign and non-pribumi control in some sections became evident once 
again during the Malari protests of January 1974. Flushed with 
hitherto unimaginable resources from oil price increases, the 
government responded by emphasizing pribumi business 
development and by embarking on a program of ambitious state 
enterprise development. Such a focus was to be the corner-stone of 
the government's strategy during the oil-boom decade of 1973-82. 
Meanwhile, the general economic prosperity led to the emergence of 
a number of very large and diversified domestic business groups 
(Robison 1986). Many of these developed from trading corporations 
in the Old Order; most had connections of some sort with foreign 
enterprise; and nearly all had impeccable political ties. It is these 
groups which have prospered in the more liberal economic 
environment after 1985. In the near boom conditions of 1989/90, and 
without the stifling commercial controls which existed before 1985, 
Indonesia's corporate structure for the first time features a number of 
domestically-owned conglomerates which are beginning to rank 
with the big business entities of East Asia . The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a brief sketch of ownership patterns in 
Indonesia in the late 1980s, and to raise some key public policy 
issues in the debate. 
Ownership in Indonesia: some estimates 
A major problem confronting empirical research on this topic is the 
inadequate data base. Aggregate and sectoral estimates of 
ownership are generally not available. Even where detailed 
ownership information is collected, as in the case of manufacturing, 
there is no breakdown within the 'domestic private' group into 
pribumi and non-pribumi shares . Moreover, ownership is often a 
fuzzy, imprecise concept, not easily amenable to straightforward 
classifications: Is an army-controlled corporation 'private' or 
'state'? How should one classify a wholly domestically owned firm 
~I 
I 
I 
I 
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which is nevertheless entirely reliant on a foreign licensor for 
technology, product specification and finance? Within the 
dominant non-pribumi business groups, should further distinctions be 
introduced according to whether the owners are more or less 
integrated into Indonesian society? There are no simple answers to 
such questions, but it is important that these often blurred 
distinctions be emphasized as a prelude to the discussion that 
follows. 
Some extremely approximate estimates of ownership shares 
for each sector are presented in Table 6.1. Although very crude, the 
data do underline several key points. First, foreign economic 
participation in the economy is less modest. Foreign firms probably 
generate a little over 10 per cent of Indonesia's GDP (perhaps as 
much as 1S per cent of non-agricultural GDP), but only about half 
this figure if the oil and gas sub-sector is excluded. Even though 
these data do understate the foreign presence for a variety of 
reasons, any suggestion that foreigners dominate the Indonesian 
economy is clearly preposterous. 
Secondly, the government presence in what is nominally a 
'liberal capitalist' regime is very considerable, even during the 
'deregulation era'. Government entities probably contribute about 
30 per cent of the nation's GDP, and close to 40 per cent of non-
agricultural GDP. Apart from public administration and utilities, 
government corporations are key actors in banking, transport and 
communication, mining, parts of manufacturing and a few 
agricultural sub-sectors. Both the macro financial statistics and a 
number of detailed firm case studies point to the generally poor 
performance of state enterprises, although a proper assessment 
needs to take account of the complex and often conflicting objectives 
imposed on these firms (see the chapter in this volume by Ahmad 
Habir, and also Pangestu and Habir, 1989). Of course, ownership 
shares reported in Table 6.1 vastly understate the government's 
economic reach, in establishing the key macroeconomic and 
commercial parameters, in its direct expenditures, and in its 
capacity as regulator and dispenser of privilege. 
By any indicator, private firms are the largest ownership 
group, contributing somewhere between SO and 70 per cent of GDP, 
depending on definitions. This is the most heterogeneous of the 
three main groups, its activities ranging from petty traders and 
small-holders to the newly-emerging corporate giants .. While 
detailed estimates of pribumi/non-pribumi shares are not 
available, it is generally conceded that most of the conglomerates 
are in non-pribumi hands. According to one widely-cited set of 
estimates, reproduced in Table 6.2, all of the top ten groups are so 
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Table 6.1: Approximate estimates of ownership shares in 
Indonesia, late 1980s 
(% of each sector's value added) 
Domestic Foreign Govt. 
Sector share 
(1988)a 
Agriculture 
food crops, small-
0 holders, livestock 100 0 
fisheries, forestry, 
plantation 80 5 1S 
Mining 
50 50 oil & gas 0 
other 30 30 40 
Manufacturing 
0 100 oil & gas 0 
other 59 17 24 
Construction 90 5 5 
Utilities 0 0 100 
Transport & 
0 so communications so 
Trade & tourism 90 s s 
Banking & finance 30 s 6S 
Goverrent 0 0 100 
Accommodation 90 0 10 
Other services 100 0 0 
Total 57 12 31 
(excluding oil & gas) 71 5 25 
55 
18 
3 
1S 
1 
4 
14 
s 
1 
s 
16 
4 
8 
3 
4 
a Refers to share of GDP at current prices. These shares are used as 
weights to compute the ownership shares in the last two rows. 
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classified. Among the 40 largest, ten may be regarded as pribumi; of 
these all but three are in the bottom half of the rankings, and most 
if not all have impeccable New Order political credentials (see the 
chapter in this volume by Jamie Mackie; see also Kwik and Marbun, 
1990). 
The only detailed ownership data of which I am aware relate 
to manufacturing (Table 6.3)1. These data confirm the significant 
state presence, especially if oil and gas processing is included in 
manufacturing: the inclusion of this activity pushes the share up to 
44 per cent of the output of large and medium firms. Ownership 
patterns in Indonesian manufacturing can be explained quite 
accurately by the interplay of 'policy' and 'industrial economics' 
factors. For example, high government shares are generally the 
result of historical factors (in food processing, sugar) or strategic 
planning (as in oil and gas, basic chemicals, basic metals, cement, 
and machine goods). The shares of foreign firms are above average 
where, government regulation permitting, they are able to exploit 
their competitive advantages in the form of superior technology 
and product names. These factors explain higher shares in paper 
products, chemicals, capital goods, beverages and certain food and 
textile products. Even allowing for understatement in the shares of 
foreign firms, their role in Indonesian manufacturing remains a 
fairly modest one, a point emphasized by Thee and Yoshihara 
(1987); see also Hill (1988). 
The limited foreign presence in Indonesia is illustrated also by 
some international comparisons (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). In East Asian 
perspective, aggregate direct foreign investment (DFI) in Indonesia 
over the period 1972-88 was sizeable (nearly $4 billion in 1980 
prices), but not really large. Though exceeding Korean, Thai and 
Philippine figures, the total was much smaller than that of 
Malaysia and Singapore, two states with traditionally open DFI 
regimes. Moreover, apart from the peak in the mid-1970s, 
coinciding with OPEC I and much of it related to the Asahan 
Project, Indonesia's DFI flows in relation to GDP, population, gross 
domestic investment or capital inflows, have been quite low by 
regional standards. Notwithstanding the recent liberalizations, 
therefore, by any relevant yardstick, aggregate foreign investment 
1 It might be noted that, thanks to the excellent work of BPS, Indonesia 
is one of the few countries for which timely and reasonably accurate 
industrial ownership data are available. 
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in Indonesia during the past two decades has not been large.2 
Cooperatives occupy such a minor position in the economy that, 
were it not for the current debate, their role would hardly deserve 
comment. Producer and trading cooperatives were supported by 
governments before 1965, and they were of some significance in 
industries like textiles, where they were responsible in part for the 
allocation of scarce yarn supplies (Palmer 1972). In the early years 
of the New Order, textile cooperatives lingered on, especially in 
parts of Central Java and Yogyakarta, around the Gabungan 
Koperasi Batik Indonesia (GKBI). But GKBl's large factories have 
not been able to compete with the new more efficient privately-
owned mills and, like the small-scale co-operatives, they have 
slid into obscurity. In trading, also, cooperatives are unimportant. 
For example, according to the results of the 1986 Economic Census of 
small industry, just 1.4 per cent (1,349) of the 94,500 firms 
enumerated marketed their output through co-operatives. Almost 
half of the firms using this channel were engaged in rice milling, 
but even in this industry, characterised by extensive government 
intervention and support for co-operatives, only 7 per cent of the 
firms resorted to this marketing outlet. Similarly low usage rates 
were found in the 1983 Agricultural Census. 
-l 
::j--------'~-1 
•>+-------------------li~ 
Figun 6.1: ToW Cumulativt Stock o( Di.net ForTign Investment 
(Dfl) in Stlected wt Asim Countrits, 197~ 
USSbilJCn 8 +-----------l 
2 
Indonesia Korea Singapore 
Source: IMF, Bld•nct of P•ymrnts Slatistics Ymrboo/.:, 
Washington OC, various issues 
For more detailed examinations of foreign investment issues and 
trends, see chapters by Sanjoto Sastromihardjo and Thee Kian Wie. 
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Table 6.3: Ownership shares in Indonesian manufacturing, 1988a 
(% of each industry's value added) 
Industry Private 
311 ) Food products 53.9 
312) Food products 53.8 
313 Beverages 39.2 
314 Tobacco 95.9 
321 Textiles 68.1 
322 Garments 98.0 
323 Leather products 99.1 
324 Footwear 86.9 
331 Wood products 83.3 
332 Furniture 91.8 
341 Paper products 50.2 
342 Printing & publish. 64.4 
351 Basic chemicals 14.6 
352 Other chemicals 54.6 
353/4 
Oil & gas process. 
355 Rubber products 
356 Plastics 
361 Pottery & china 
362 Glass products 
363 Cement 
364 Structural clay 
products 
369 Other non-metal 
mnfg 
37 Basic metals 
381 Metal products 
382 Non-electr. mach. 
383 Electr. equipment 
384 Transport equipm. 
385 Prof. equipment 
39 Miscellaneous 
Total 
Exel. oil & gas 
Incl. oil & gas 
0 
47.5 
91.2 
76.3 
88.5 
24.8 
91.4 
95.9 
6.0 
50.8 
31.9 
59.9 
59.0 
77.0 
88.3 
59.1 
43.8 
Source: Unpublished data from BPS. 
Government 
36.7 
18.6 
34.2 
0.8 
7.1 
0.2 
0.9 
0.2 
3.7 
1.8 
10.l 
24.3 
72.6 
7.8 
100.0 
34.9 
0.3 
0.5 
3.6 
61.5 
1.5 
4.1 
89.1 
22.4 
31.0 
13.8 
13.8 
0 
0.2 
24.2 
43.8 
Foreign 
9.4 
27.6 
26.6 
3.3 
24.8 
1.8 
0 
12.9 
13.0 
6.4 
39.7 
11.3 
12.8 
38.6 
0 
17.6 
8.5 
23.2 
7.9 
13.7 
7.1 
0 
4.9 
26.8 
37.1 
26.3 
27.2 
23.0 
11.5 
16.7 
12.4 
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One final aspect of ownership is that of seller concentration, 
detailed estimates of which are available only for the 
manufacturing sector (Table 6.4). These data suggest very high 
concentration indeed: in 1985 19 per cent of manufacturing industries, 
generating 28 per cent of non-oil manufacturing output had 
extremely high concentration, in that the four largest plants 
produced at least 70 per cent of industry output; including oil and gas 
processing, the share of the highly concentrated industries jumped 
to 54 per cent. Moreover, to some extent these figures actually 
understate the incidence of concentration, since the measures refer to 
plants rather than establishments (that is, one establishment - not 
to mention 'conglomerate' - may own several plants), and until 
recently many of the highly concentrated industries also received 
considerable import protection. 
Table 6.4: Seller concentration, 1985a 
Concentration Ratio 
(Share of four 
largest plants, No. 
%) 
90-100 
80-89 
70-79 
60-69 
50-59 , 
40-49 
30-39 
20-29 
10-19 
0-9 
Total 
12 
4 
7 
15 
15 
13 
19 
16 
9 
9 
119 
Exd. Oil & Gas 
lndushies 
% Cml. 
of Total % 
10.1 
3.4 
5.9 
12.6 
12.6 
10.9 
16.0 
13.4 
7.6 
7.6 
100 
10.1 
13.5 
19.4 
32.0 
44.6 
55.5 
71.5 
84.9 
92.5 
100.0 
Value Added 
% Cm!. 
of Total % 
17.7 
6.0 
4.5 
11.8 
7.4 
6.8 
17.4 
14.1 
10.7 
3.7 
100 
17.7 
23.7 
28.2 
40.0 
47.4 
54.2 
71.6 
85.7 
96.4 
100.0 
Incl . Oil & Gas 
% of Cm!. 
Value % 
Added 
46.7 46.7 
3.9 50.6 
2.9 53.5 
7.6 61.1 
4.8 65.9 
4.4 70.3 
11.3 81.6 
9.1 90.7 
6.9 97.6 
2.4 100.0 
100 
a Data refer to shares of the four largest plants in each industry, 
for all firms with a workforce of at least five. 
Source: Hill, (1990: 97). 
cml. =Cumulative 
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Policy Issues 
The overriding objective of economic policy in most countries is to 
maximize the rate of improvement in community living standards, 
consistent with environmental sustainability, satisfactory 
distributional outcomes, and the maintenance of some notion of 
internal and external balance. The productivity of capital is 
therefore the key economic issue, and ownership patterns become 
relevant only insofar as they may conflict with productivity goals 
(capital is in the hands of owners who have little interest in 
investing it productively) or equity objectives (that is, that the 
distribution of wealth is so uneven that some asset redistribution is 
necessary to achieve acceptable distributional outcomes). The 
orthodox economic prescription, then, is wherever possible one of 
maximizing production, which in turn enables equity issues to be 
tackled, directly because the growth process generates enhanced 
opportunities for economic participation (for the poor, principally 
through employment creation), and indirectly because a larger 
economic pie provides governments with the resources to finance 
poverty alleviation programs and supply public goods such as 
health, education, drinking water and sanitation. Such an 
idealized model of labour-intensive growth with equity is nowhere 
better illustrated than in Taiwan, which has achieved one of the 
highest growth rates and most even income distributions in the 
world (see Oshima 1987; and Kuo, Ranis and Fei 1981). 
A development strategy of this type rests on several key 
assumptions, however, not all of which are valid for Indonesia (and 
most other countries). First, it assumes that the existing 
distribution of wealth is reasonably even. A distinctive feature of 
Taiwan was its vigorous post-war land reform (see Dorner and 
Thiesenhusen 1990), unparalleled in scope among market-oriented 
developing economies. Taiwan's excellent equity record therefore 
has been the result not only of its particular style of growth, but of 
the earlier redistribution measures. Countries with very unequal 
wealth distributions often appear to become 'locked in' to such 
structures during the growth process (see Morawetz 1977). In the 
case of Indonesia, there are no reliable data on the distribution of 
wealth, but it is probably safe to assume that it is a 'moderate 
inequality' country, somewhere between the egalitarian Taiwanese 
record, and the much higher inequality found in Latin America and 
the Philippines, where deeply entrenched land ownership 
structures have spawned such unequal patterns of wealth, income 
and power. Thus, while the newly emerging conglomerates have 
almost certainly resulted in increased concentration in the 
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ownership of commercial and industrial capital, one of the legacies 
of the first quarter century of Indonesian Independence was a 
comparatively low inequality in wealth distribution. 
Secondly, a liberal economic strategy assumes the existence of a 
development-oriented, 'hard' state, immune to capture by vested 
interests, with a capacity to manage an efficient and equitable tax 
regime, and with a commitment to the adequate provision of public 
goods. Whether and to what extent the New Order regime 
resembles such a state is a matter of conjecture. Its record on 
macroeconomic management is very good. It has demonstrated a 
capacity to respond flexibly and decisively when confronted by 
economic crisis, as in the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. Its social 
achievements, particularly in the field of education, have been 
good, although much more could have been done. Nevertheless its 
score-card is hardly unblemished, particularly on microeconomic 
reform and when times are good: witness the direction of trade 
policy and the increased resort to non-tariff barriers over the 
decade 1974-84, and the highly politicized allocative procedures in 
what may be termed the 'non-traded sector', from the dispensation 
of subsidized credit (now largely eliminated) and government 
contracts to all manner of franchises and licences. It is perhaps not 
unreasonable to characterize the New Order as 'cl hard staterun 
consistently on macroeconomic management, but one that is a good 
deal softer on microeconomic issues when times are not tough. 
A final consideration in the political economy equation is the 
capacity of the government - and the community more broadly - to 
manage the 'politics of envy'. A liberal foreign investment policy, 
for exami..te, is based on the premise that the net economic benefits 
of the inflow of capital and technology (in the form of greater 
efficiency, higher wages, better products) will outweigh any 
perceived social costs associated with loss of national control. 
However, if national ownership of productive resources is 
considered by the community to be of such overwhelming importance 
as to forgo the potential economic benefits of foreign investment, 
then there is little scope for orthodox economic counsel. Ownership 
issues are, not surprisingly, sensitive in a country like Indonesia, 
still only 45 years removed from a prolonged period of intense 
colonial subjugation; ethnic divides, particularly the fact that most 
of the new conglomerates are in non-pribumi hands, render the issue 
still more complex. Consequently, it may be perfectly rational for a 
development-oriented state to introduce policies - ranging from 
restrictions on foreign ownership, to support for ailing state 
enterprises, and to forced divestiture of shares to cooperatives with 
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dubious management capacities - which do not accord with first-
best economic principles (see the chapter by Andrew Mcintyre). 
In conclusion, however, it would be inappropriate not to restate 
briefly some basic guiding principles on the economics of ownership, 
not in the expectation that they are likely to be adopted in the near 
future, but rather so as to inform the policy agenda for the 1990s. At 
least four issues are of importance. 
(1) A continuation of the trade liberalization process. High 
protection first and foremost harms Indonesian consumers and 
exporters. It also hampers the ability of Indonesia's trade 
negotiators to extract concessions from its major tradin~ partn~rs, an 
issue of crucial importance in the current export dnve. Finally, 
trade restrictions, especially when they take the form of non-tariff 
barriers, contribute to rent-seeking behaviour and to the monopoly 
problem. Many of the conglomerates have amassed very 
considerable fortunes behind such barriers, particularly in highly 
concentrated industries (see Table 6.4). Although there have been 
significant trade reforms since 1985, effective rates of protection 
remain very high in some industries, and there is thus much scope 
for continuing reform (Fane and Phillips 1991; Wymenga 1991). 
(2) Reform of the state enterprise sector. Indonesia can 
hardly afford to have such a large sector of the economy under-
performing. Jn some instances, the poor performance may reflect the 
provision of social services which might otherwise have to be 
provided directly from the public purse. But more often th~ problem 
is dead-weight losses owing to inefficiency, and the fulfillment of 
non-commercial objectives which could be addressed effectively by 
more direct means. The issue in the first instance is not so much one 
of ownership, but of improving performance. This requires both a 
competitive environment wherever possible as a spur to efficiency, 
and organizational structures with sufficient autonomy and 
workable incentives systems to respond to the challenge. 
Privatization may be one of the means of achieving the goal of 
improved performance, but there are others (for example, 
management contracts), and there is little benefit in 'privatization 
without competition'. 
(3) Maximum transparency in the government's decision-
making process. To allay widespread suspicion that many of the 
conglomerates owe their position to government patronage as mu~h 
as (if not more) to entrepreneurship, the importance of openness m 
government procedures cannot be overstated. Whether it be 
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subsidies to (or disposal of) state enterprises, the allocation of 
tariffs and NTBs, the awarding of government contracts and 
franchises (for example, in the construction industry), or the 
distribution of lucrative export quotas (as in textiles), there is a 
strong case for public disclosure, and for a greatly strengthened (and 
better funded) State Auditor. In the political market for 
~overnment support, knowledge is power. Less public information 
ipso facto means more power to those privileged enough to have 
access to the inner sanctum of government. Equally, inadequate 
disclosure strengthens public perceptions of unequal treatment 
before the government. 
(4) An activist government in the provision of public goods 
funded by an efficient and equitable taxation system. The most 
effective means of improving community living standards is an 
economic strategy which maximizes the growth of productive 
employment opportunities. This requires not only high and 
sustained rates of economic growth, but also the effective provision 
of go~d quality education and health services, to enable the poor, 
especially, to take advantage of these opportunities. Programs 
aimed specifically at particular regions or groups may also be 
necessary where general strategies cannot meet special local needs, 
but ideally these should be supplemental in nature and not take the 
form of rigid, centrally-determined divisions and quotas, as in 
Malaysia's New Economic Policy. Lest there be any doubt that a 
liberal economic order is incompatible with the vigorous 
government supply of such public goods, one only has to survey the 
extraordinary success of Singapore in the areas of education, health 
and housing. 
To an economist (and an outsider at that!) interested in first-
best principles these approaches hold out more promis\ for 
Indonesia in the 1990s than alternative strategies which may be 
growth-inhibiting, have little real impact on distributional 
outcomes, and contribute minimally to much needed social progress. 
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The Investment Surge from Asia's NICs into 
Indonesia 
Thee Kian Wie 
Introduction 
It was only four years ago that Mr Hiroshi Oshima the then 
Director of the Jakarta Office of JETRO (Japan Exte;nal Trade 
Organisation), gave an unusually frank assessment of Indonesia's 
unfavourable investment climate which, he maintained, was 
adversely affected by 'structural' and 'institutional' factors 
(O'Shima 1986, pp.6-11 ). 'Structural' factors referred to certain 
characteristic~ of the Indonesian economy, such as the relatively 
small domestic market, the low labour productivity which offsets 
the advantages of low wages, the shortage of local technical 
expertise, and the inadequate infrastructure. 'Institutional' factors 
?n the other hand, referred to government policies affecting forei~ 
mvestment, such as the mandatory deletion (local content) 
programs for the metal goods and electronics industries, restrictions 
on the employment of expatriate personnel, limits on the use of 
~utoma~ed mac~nery, and the frequent changes in economic and 
mdustnal policy. In combination, these 'structural' and 
'institutional' factors contributed to the substantial decline in 
Japanese-and indeed total foreign-direct investment in Indonesia 
during the first half of the 1980s. 
In recent years, however, domestic as well as foreign investment 
have increased rapidly as a result of the recovery of the Indonesian 
economy and the various measures taken by the Indonesian 
gov~rn1:1ent to improve the investment climate, particularly for 
foreign investors. A notable feature of the recent foreign investment 
bo~m has been the rapid rise in foreign investment by the four East 
Asian newly-industrializing countries (NICs), particularly (South) 
Korea and Taiwan. 
In this ch.apter we will take a closer look at the pattern and 
nature of the i~vestments of these East Asian NICs, particularly of 
Korea and Taiwan, as they reflect the rapid economic changes 
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which have recently taken place both in these NICs as well as in 
Indonesia itself. 
'Push' and 'pull' factors affecting the investment surge 
Recent developments, both in the East Asian NICs as well as in 
Indonesia, have contributed to the remarkable investment surge into 
Indonesia by East Asian investors. These countries, especially 
Korea and Taiwan, have in the past few years been subjected to 
strong pressure from the US to revalue their currencies because of 
the large surpluses they have accumulated in their trade with the 
US. Although the currency appreciation has not been as large as 
the appreciation of the Japanese yen, the Korean won and the New 
Taiwan dollar have nevertheless appreciated by more than 20 per 
cent, and 40 per cent respectively since the end of 1985 (Watanabe, 
1989: 173). Moreover, if the large trade surpluses of these two 
countries persist, it is likely that their currencies will continue to 
appreciate. 
At the same time, sustained rapid growth has led to tight 
labour markets in the NICs, resulting in strong upward pressures on 
wages in the manufacturing sector; in Korea the upward pressure 
appears to have been stronger and there have been violent labour 
disputes. 
These developments have rendered several manufacturing 
industries in Korea and Taiwan uncompetitive, particularly the 
labour-intensive industries, resulting in firm closures, in an 
upgrading of firms' activities to higher value added products, and 
in the off-shore relocation of operations to lower wage countries 
including Indonesia. The latter process has been facilitated by the 
fact that Korean and Taiwanese firms have been able to accumulate 
considerable managerial expertise and by their considerable 
international experience gained during the export phase since 1960 
(Watanabe 1989: 174). 
Besides these 'push' factors, 'pull' factors were at work in 
Indonesia which have attracted large numbers of Korean and 
Taiwanese investors in the past few years. There have been two 
major 'pull' factors underpinning the recent investment boom in 
Indonesia: the improved investment climate, particularly for 
foreign investors, resulting from the many reform measures 
undertaken by the government (see the chapter by Sanjoto 
Sastromihardjo); and the strong and sustained recovery of the 
Indonesian economy. 
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The policy reforms have not only attracted more foreign 
investment, but they have shifted the orientation of foreign firms 
in the non-energy sector from 'defensive investments' aimed at the 
highly protected domestic market to a much stronger emphasis on 
export-oriented investments. A similar switch is evident in the 
case of domestic investments. Both these trends can be observed in 
Table 7.1. Investment approvals, both foreign and domestic, have 
risen sharply, and more and more are export-oriented. Many of the 
latter are in manufacturing and, to the extent that these projects 
have been realised, they have contributed to the remarkable surge 
in manufactured exports which has taken place over this period. 
The rising number of export-oriented projects has been 
particularly striking in the case of foreign investment, indicating 
that foreign investors have been especially responsive to the 
improvement in Indonesia's investment climate as well as to the 
trade and industrial policy reforms. Although the data of the 
Capital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) do not provide 
information on the source countries of these export-oriented foreign 
investment projects, it can be safely assumed that quite a large 
number have been established by investors from the four East Asian 
NICs, and notably Korea and Taiwan. 
Besides general improvements in the business climate, 
Indonesian policy-makers have also taken other steps to attract 
more investment from the East Asian NICs, owing to the export-
oriented nature of many of their investments. In fact, in January 
1989 Mr Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo, the chairman of the BKPM, stated 
that Indonesia would put a high priority on attracting investments 
from Japan and the four East Asian NICs in view of the export 
potential of their investments. An additional factor, according to 
Sanyoto, was that Thailand, arguably Indonesia's strongest 
competitor in attracting foreign investment from these countries, 
was becoming less attractive as a base for export-oriented foreign 
investment, owing to infrastructure bottlenecks, especially the 
Bangkok Port (Kompas, 21January1989). 
To this end, BKPM has sent investment promotion missions to 
these countries, and several cabinet ministers, notably Mr Hartarto, 
the Minister of Industry, have also worked hard to attract more 
investment from the East Asian NICs. In addition, Indonesian 
private businessmen have also been making greater efforts to 
cultivate closer business relations with their counterparts in the 
East Asian NICs. 
To attract more investment from Taiwan, Indonesian and 
Taiwanese officials have been working on an investment guarantee 
agreement as well as a bilateral tax treaty (Business News, 11 
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November 1989). Thus far Indonesia has concluded bilateral tax 
treaties with the Philippines, Thailand and India, while 
bilateral investment guarantee agreements have been concluded 
with Korea and are being negotiated with other countries including 
Japan. Indonesia has also waived some of its bans, for instance the 
ban on Chinese education, by allowing the establishment of a 
Chinese language school for the children of the staff attached to 
Taiwanese-Indonesian joint ventures. In addition, the recent 
reduction in the minimum required amount of foreign equity 
investment from $US1 million to $US250,000 has also contributed to 
an increased inflow of foreign investment from East Asia, because 
many of the firms investing abroad from their countries have been 
small and medium-scale operations. 
Recent trends in foreign direct investment in Indonesia, with special 
reference to the East Asian NICs 
Table 7.2 presents a more detailed breakdown of approved foreign 
investment by source country. The data clearly show that, in terms 
of numbers of approved projects, Asian developing country 
investments, particularly from the four East Asian NICs, have been 
growing steadily in importance over the past three years. 
Although the total number of approved foreign investment projects 
in 1988 was considerably less than in 1987, the number of approved 
projects by Asian developing country investors, particularly from 
the four East Asian NICs, rose steeply in that year. As a result, 
Asian developing country investments rose from 20 per cent of 
approved projects in 1987 to 46 per cent in 1988 and to 52.7 per cent in 
1989, and virtually all of these originated from the four NICs. 
Hence, in 1989 the four NICs alone accounted for more than one half 
of all approved foreign investment projects, far exceeding Japan, 
traditionally the largest investor in the non-oil and gas sectors of 
the economy, which accounted for only 21 per cent of project 
approvals in that year. The data also indicate the dominant role 
which Japan and the NICs are playing as sources of foreign 
investment in Indonesia, at least outside the energy and financial 
sectors of the economy, since these five constituted 72 per cent of 
approved projects in 1989. One minor qualification to this conclusion 
is that the East Asian share may be overstated by the substantial 
proportion of Hong Kong investments that is thought to be derived 
from British firms domiciled in the colony. There are a few 
instances, also, of Japanese firms using their investments in the 
NICs as a springboard for entry into Indonesia (Hill, 1988, p.59). 
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of Ori in 1987-89 
1988 1989 
No. Value No. Value 
Region/Country 1987 
No. Value 
91 1,866.8 218 2,064.6 
24 247 .o 63 768.7 
65 1,589.4 149 1,197.2 
25 199.5 64 466.1 
12 239.5 16 406.8 
15 910.2 50 158.2 
13 240.2 19 166.1 
2 30. 4 6 98.7 
1. Asia 83 707.3 
Japan 43 531.8 
Asian NICs 38 171. 7 
South Korea 8 23.0 
Hong Kong 22 134.9 
Tai van 4 7.9 
Singapore 4 6.0 
Other Asia 2 ).8 
2. America 18 106. 3 749.7 16 366. 6 
3. Europe 47 606 . 5 27 1,433.3 35 604.4 
4. Other 42 2.5 54. 2 15 51.5 
5. Combined countries 11 34 .o 12 304.3 10 1,632.0 
Total 201 1,457.1 145 4' 408. 3 294 4,718.8 
Note : Data refer to nev projects and expansions, 'No. 1 to number of cases. America refers mainly to USA but also includes Canada and Panama. 
'Other' refers mainly to Australia, but also includes Nev Zealand and 
Liberia. 
Source: BKPH La oran Perkemban an Penanaman Hodal Tahun 1987 (Report on Developments n nvestment or t e ear , an subsequent years. 
Table 7 .): Approved Korean and Taivanese Investment in Indonesia 
1968 - Hay 1990 
Year 
1968-70 
l 972-82 
1985 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990a 
Total 
a. 
n.a. 
Korean investment 
Projects Amount 
(US S million) 
9 
26 
67 
n.a. 
111 
67 . 8 
374. 7 
48. 7 
16. 8 
196. 4 
416. 1 
n.a. 
1,120.5 
TaiYanese investment 
Projects Amount 
(US S million) 
l 195 
19 916 
50 158 
40 335 
115 1,604 
January to Hay only 
not available 
Sources: 1. For Korean data: 
Korea Trade Center, 
Jakarta Office, April 1990; 
2. For Taivanese data: 
Ta~ei Economic and Trade Office, 
Ja rta office, July 1990. 
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The data in Table 7.2 illustrate another important feature of 
investments from the four NICs: in 1989 their approved investments 
were just 25 per cent of the total approved value (in contrast to the 
50 per cent numbers share), suggesting that firms from these 
countries tended to invest in relatively smaller projects than do 
developed country investors. While this is indeed generally the 
case, a few projects from the NICs are large and capital-intensive, 
including two large Korean monosodium glutamate projects, one of 
which with an approved investment of $995.5 million, and a very 
large textile and garment factory with an approved investment of 
$265.1 million. 
That Korean and Taiwanese investments have increased very 
rapidly during the past few years is shown in Table 7.3. While 
Korean and Taiwanese investments in Indonesia were relatively 
modest until 1987, they increased very rapidly thereafter. While 
Taiwanese investments through to 1987 had tended to lag behind 
Korean investments, they started catching up very rapidly in 1989 
in terms of number of projects, and exceeded Korean investments in 
terms of the amount approved.1 
A more detailed picture of Asian developing country 
investments, particularly from the four NICs, is provided in Table 
7.4. It is clear from the data on total approved foreign investment 
that the total figures overstate the foreign equity investments, as 
these figures include both the equity contribution of the Indonesian 
partner(s) as well as foreign loans. As there is no information 
available on realised Indonesian equity investment, the above data 
on realised investment only refer to realised foreign equity 
investment as well as realised loans. 
The data in Table 7.4 show that by 30 June 1989 only 18 per cent 
of the approved investments from the East Asian NICs had been 
implemented, as compared to the 42 per cent of realised Japanese 
investments. In view of the fact that among the four East Asian 
NICs, the highest realised figure is shown by Hong Kong 
investments, many of which were set up during the 1970s, the much 
lower proportion for Korean and Taiwanese realised investments is 
clearly caused by the fact that many of these investments have 
only been recently approved, as indicated by the data in Tables 7.2 
and 7.3. (It remains puzzling, however, why realised Singaporean 
investment has remained so low, lower even than that of Taiwan, 
1 These data are from the Korean Trade Center, Jakarta Office, April 
1990. 
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even though quite a number of Singaporean projects were already 
establ~shed during the 1970s). 
The data in Table 7.4 also show that a large amount of foreign 
investments is financed by foreign loans, as indicated by the fact 
that the debt-equity ratios of almost all source countries are higher 
than one, except for the group of other Asian developing countries. 
This low ratio is caused by the fact that the Thai and Philippine 
investments have not relied much on loan capital. 
The average debt-equity ratio of the four East Asian NICs is 
only 2.1, which is not high by international standards (Hill 1988, 
p.58), and lower than the gearing (debt-equity) ratio of Japanese 
investments, which in turn is higher than that of most developed 
country investors. The high gearing ratio of Japanese investments 
may to a large extent be caused by the very high ratio of the 
Asahan project (Hill 1988, p.58), which is by far the largest 
Japanese investment project in Indonesia. The above observations, 
however, need to be qualified by taking into account the fact that 
the data on 'realised gearing ratios' exclude the realised equity 
investments of the Indonesian partners (information on which is 
unavailable) as well as domestic loan capital (which was also 
provided in spite of the ban on foreign investment projects to obtain 
loans in the domestic credit market) (Hill 1988, p. 58). This ban 
was only recently lifted by the Indonesian government as one of the 
measures to make the investment climate more attractive to foreign 
investors. 
The data in Table 7.4 also show that the equity shares of the 
Indonesian partners is still relatively small, both as a percentage of 
total equity investment, and even more so as a percentage of total 
investment (including foreign loans). The relatively small equity 
contributions of the Indonesian partners suggest, that in most joint 
ventures, management control remains in the foreign hands. 
The pattern of investments from the East Asian NICs 
In this section we will take a closer look at the investment patterns 
of investors from the four East Asian NICs, and the relative 
importance of their investments in various sectors, (excluding energy 
and finance, as shown in Table 7.5). Hong Kong realised 
investments are the second-largest after Japanese investments. 
Most Hong Kong investment is concentrated in manufacturing (37 per 
cent), reflecting the colony's economic structure, followed by real 
estate (27 per cent), forestry (12.7 per cent), construction (12.3 per 
cent), and a range of minor activities. Hong Kong investments are 
T1blt 7.4 Cumulative Planned and Re1listd Foreign Dirul lnvtslmtnt in lndonula, 1967-30 June 1939• 
Region/ 
Coun1ry 
Projects 
No. 'ii> 
(I) (2) 
AsWi Developing 
Countries m 
A Total Wt Atian N!Cs 31 O 
I. Kaea 72 
2. TaiWM 48 
3. Hong Kong 136 
4. Singapore 57 
B. Tow Other Asian 
Dcyclonjng Coynaic.s 27 
5. Thailand 
6. Ph1hpp1nes 
7. Malaysia 10 
8. India 
JI Japan 273 
28 4 
26 2 
6.0 
4.0 
11.4 
4.8 
22 
0.4 
0.4 
0.8 
0.6 
22 9 
Planned lnyestmen! OJS$ nod %) 
Eqyj1y Cgpjtal 
Indonesian Foreign 
Share Share 
(3) (4) 
Foreign 
Loan 
Capiial 
(5) 
To<alb 
(3-+4+5) 
(6) 
442 496 679 307 3 094 962 4 216 76l 
41l914 
63,965 
(I0.5%) 
55,978 
(13.4-J.) 
238,843 
(12.3%) 
57,128 
(5.5%) 
26m 
5,733 
(15.1%) 
2,985 
(24.2%) 
6,332 
(15.0%) 
11.532 
627 744 
99,273 
(163%) 
68.406 
(16.4%) 
384,534 
(19.7%) 
75,531 
(7.2%) 
51 563 
13,218 
(34.7%) 
6,292 
(50.9%) 
11,347 
(26.9%) 
20,706 
868 105 I 381 757 
(13.2%) (21.1%) 
297l!44 
444,713 
(73.!%) 
292,621 
(70.2%) 
1,323,679 
(68.0%) 
914,131 
(87.3%) 
4 018 802 
607,951 
(100%) 
417,005 
(100%) 
1,947,056 
(100%) 
1,046,790 
(100%) 
119 818 197 963 
19,115 38,066 
(50.2%) (100%) 
3.081 12,358 
(2A.9%) (100%) 
2A,479 42,158 
(58.1%) (100%) 
73,143 105,381 
4 305 195 6 555 657 
(65.7%) (100%) 
Realjscd Jnycstment CSUSl 
Equity 
Capital 
w 270 
240 IOl 
28,619 
9,814 
188,854 
12,818 
11 165 
4,074 
1605 
4,560 
926 
Loan 
Capital 
(8) 
l07 198 
498 20l 
53,117 
12,537 
406,683 
25,868 
8 993 
200 
7,000 
1,793 
TotaJC 
(7+8) 
(9) 
7l4 194 
738 310 
81,736 
22.351 
595,537 
38.686 
! 5 884 
4,274 
1,605 
11,560 
2,719 
616 940 2 139 202 2 776 842 
Realised Realised 
to Debt· 
Planned Equity 
Investment<! (8(T) 
('ii>) 
(to) (11) 
17 9 20 
18 4 2 I 
13.4 1.9 
5.4 1.3 
30.6 2.2 
3.7 2.0 
8 0 08 
11.2 
13.0 0.0 
27.4 1.5 
42 4 3 4 
Region/ 
Coun1ry 
Realised IO 
To<al Realised 
(%) 
(12) 
II I 
10 9 
0.8 
0.3 
8.8 
0.6 
02 
40 8 
lll...A!rka.'·~~~~~--'--~Jo~1,__~_2...,.22~1L--~J8~4~5~8'--~-"5o~s~3LJ3'--~~6~1L..l.J18u2.___~..-:3~3~!~2~~~11~l~I~2c__~-1u7w8~3u1~~~2~2~oi__~~4l4~~~~ 
IV Octania 100 8.4 61,542 163,037 11841 1443 210661020 20,511 119,905 140.416 6.8 5.8 2.1 
I. Australia 96 8.0 57,898 161,245 1,831,220 2,050,363 19,995 117,129 137,12A 6.7 5.9 2.0 
2. Other Occaniar 
Region/ 
Country 
y America 
I. USA 
2. Other America& 
VI Europe 
I. EEch 
2. Other Europei 
vu Comhjned Countries 
lOTAL 
(2.8%) (7.9%) (89.3%) (100%) 
0.4 3,644 1,792 10,223 15,657 516 2,770 3,292 
TABLE 4 (conL) Cwnulariw PloMtd and Rtalistd Foreign Dirut /n~stmtnt in lruJon.ui.a , 1967-JOJUN 1989" 
Projects 
No. % 
(I) (2) 
IOI 
24 
241 
214 
27 
106 
1,123 
10 7 
8.5 
2.2 
12 2 
18.1 
I.I 
-8 9 
Planned lnycstmeot OJSS and %.) 
Fnuity Capital 
lndonesUn 
Share 
(3) 
mm 
330,003 
(14.6%) 
27,148 
mm 
510,414 
60,964 
336 171 
Foreign 
Share 
(4) 
479 73-4 
422,490 
(18.8%) 
57,244 
I 0423l8 
953,799 
88,559 
I 581 873 
Foreign 
Loan 
Capiial 
(5) 
1126 on 
1,500,411 
(66.6%) 
225,664 
2 861 832 
2,542,364 
319,468 
463934$ 
To<aJb 
(3+4+5) 
(6) 
2l62960 
2.252,904 
(100%) 
310,056 
4 733036 
4,263,595 
469,441 
6SS7389 
2,632,134 5.336,974 18,n7,323 26,753,431 
Realised Investment CSUSl 
Equity 
Capital 
100 627 
92,482 
8,145 
244 025 
215,682 
28,343 
820 591 
2,077,276 
Loan 
Capital 
(8) 
165 394 
147,905 
17,489 
444 686 
411,494 
33,192 
I 331 116 
4,722,720 
TotaJC 
(7+8) 
(9) 
266 021 
2A0,387 
25,634 
700 096 
638,561 
61,535 
2 151 707 
6,799,996 
21.0 5.4 
Realised Realised 
LO Debt-
P!anned Equity 
lnvesunent<I (8(T) 
('ii>) 
(10) (II) 
10 4 
10.7 
8.3 
14 8 
15.0 
13.1 
32 8 
25.4 
I 6 
1.6 
2.1 
I 8 
1.9 
1.2 
I 6 
2.3 
Region/ 
Country 
Realised 10 
To<al Realised 
(%) 
(12) 
39 
3.S 
0.3 
10 3 
9.3 
0.9 
31 6 
"The above data on foreign dinlct investment in Indonesia (FD!) eac!ude its substantial FD! in the energy sector (oil and ruitura! gas) and FD! in the financial sector (banking and insurance), 
which ore n:gulal.Cd under difTcren1 laws. 
b-Jlie data on planned foreign direct investment n:Cer 10 gross invC!LmenL, i.e. both the equity investments of the Con:ign and the Indonesian pru111er(s) as well as loon capital. Hence, the above 
FDI dall overstolt the equity conlribulions or the foreign investors. 
0Reolised foreign investment ref en IO realised foreign equity investment plu.s realised foreign loans. 
ctrbis ratio n:fen 10 the ratio of realised fon:ign investment plus realised foreign loans 10 planned Indonesian plus fon:ign equity investments plus planned fott:ign loans. 
•Africa includes Liberia and Nigeria. 
fOLher Oceania include.! New :ua!and and Fiji. 
IOther America includes Canada, Panama. Bahamas and Bermuda. 
hEEC includes the UK, the Netherlands, France, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Spain. 
.ioiher Europe includes Austria, Switterland, Lich~nsLein, Norway, Sweden, Finland and C2echoslovakia. 
n • negligible, i.e. IC!s lhan 0.1 'ii>. 
Source: Calculated Crom Bank lndonlesia, PenoNJmilll Modal A.sing dorl Tohwt 1967 sld 30 lwti 1989, Jakarta, June 1990, pp. 1-3. 
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quite diversified, and in this regard differ from the more 
concentrated investment patterns of the other three NICs. Hong 
Kong investment is very important in construction, where it accounts 
for almost 56 per cent of realised total, in forestry (53 per cent), and 
in real estate (50 per cent). Hong Kong investment is also significant 
in restaurants and hotels (35 per cent) and in recreational services 
(20 per cent). Hence, although Hong Kong is a distant second to 
Japan in non-energy investments, it is the leader in a range of 
important activities. 
Korean and Taiwanese investments are much more concentrated 
in a few sectors, particularly manufacturing which accounts for 66 
per cent of the Korean total and 53 per cent of the Taiwanese total. 
The other sector which has received significant Korean investment 
is forestry (30 per cent), which was initially stimulated by a desire 
to gain access to timber supplies for the Korea-based plywood 
industry (Jo, 1981, pp.65-74). However, with the ban on the export 
of logs in the early 1980s, a number of Korean plywood firms were 
forced to relocate their operations to Indonesia. Korean investment 
in Indonesian manufacturing was initially import-substituting in 
nature, but became more export-oriented after 1986 in response to the 
reform packages. 
Similarly, Taiwanese investment has been concentrated in a 
few sectors, namely manufacturing (53 per cent), coal mining (36 per 
cent), and transport (11 per cent). Being a resource-poor country like 
Korea, it is not surprising that Taiwanese investment has been 
motivated partly by a desire to secure supplies of raw materials for 
its own manufacturing industries (hence its investment in coal 
mining) (Ting and Schive 1981, pp.102). Like Korean investment, 
Taiwanese firms have quickly shifted to more export-oriented 
patterns during the past few years. 
Singaporean investment has been more diversified than Korean 
and Taiwanese investment, but less so than Hong Kong investment. 
Unlike the other three, the bulk of Singaporean investment has 
taken place in real estate (49 per cent), which accounts for almost 
one-half of the country's total, in contrast to the share of 
manufacturing which is only 33 per cent. The only other sector of 
any note is 'other' (that is, non-coal) mining, with 11 per cent of the 
total. These three sectors constitute 93 per cent of Singapore's 
investment in Indonesia. 
In contrast to the great importance of Hong Kong investment in 
construction, forestry, and real estate, none of the other NICs could 
be said to be a leader in a particular sector, with the partial 
exception of Korean investment in forestry, which accounts for 17 
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per cent of total realised foreign investment in this sector (Table 
7.5). 
Table 7.6 provides a closer loook at the pattern of the NICs' 
investment in manufacturing, the dominant sector among the four 
NICs, with the exception of Singapore. The largest Hong Kong 
investment is still in the textile industry, as it already was during 
the early 1970s (Chen 1983, p.94). Significant Hong Kong 
investment is also found in the food and chemical industries, 
accounting for 23 and 19 per cent respectively of the colony's total in 
manufacturing. Hong Kong investment is very important in the 
paper products industry (42 per cent of total foreign realised 
investment in this industry) and the wood products industry (37 per 
cent of the foreign total), and sizeable also in the food industry (28 
per cent of the total). 
There are significant differences in the manufacturing 
investment patterns of Korean and Taiwanese investors. Korean 
investment is heavily concentrated in chemicals (58 per cent of 
Korean investment in manufacturing) and wood products (34 per 
cent), these two industries alone accounting for 92 per cent of the 
Korean total. Taiwanese investment in the manufacturing sector is 
even more concentrated, with 86 per cent located in just one industry, 
namely paper products. 
Singaporean investment is found mainly in metal products (49 
per cent of the Singaporean investment is in this sector), wood 
products (23.2 per cent), and the chemicals (23.1 per cent); these 
three total 96 per cent of Singaporean investment in manufacturing. 
Thus investments of the latter three NICs are significant only 
in wood products, where Korean investment accounts for 33 per cent 
of the foreign total, and to a lesser extent in the paper and paper 
products industry, where Taiwanese investment accounts for 18 per 
cent of the foreign total. 
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Indonesia's Foreign Investment Policy: Towards a 
More Relaxed Posture 
Sanjoto Sastromihardjo 
Introduction 
The position of the Indonesian government on the issue of foreign 
capital, and foreign investment especially, is always predicated on 
the assumption that foreign funds are invited in to complement 
local capital for investment. That the Law on Foreign Investment 
(PMA) no. 1/1987 was enacted one year ahead of the Law on 
Domestic Investment (PMDN) no. 6/1968 could be interpreted as a 
reflection of the high priority the Indonesian government put on the 
inflow of foreign funds at that time. Apart from the actual need for 
investment as a result of the capital shortage right after the 'New 
Order' government took over, there was also the additional 
political advantage that this move underlined the difference 
between the new administration and the former Sukarno regime. 
This difference was also emphasized in the introduction of a fully 
convertible currency and the pursuit of a balanced budget; in both 
respects the New Order approach was in stark contrast to that of 
the Old Order. 
With the jump in oil prices and the increased capacity of the 
Indonesian government itself to finance investment projects, 
however, policies towards foreign investment became more 
restrictive and, coupled with a protectionist trade regime, greatly 
reduced the international competitiveness of Indonesian exporters. 
The high tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including even 
outright import bans, eventually created huge problems for the 
Indonesian government when in 1983 and especially in 1986 the oil 
bonanza ceased filling the coffers of the Indonesian treasury and 
Indonesia had to switch over to a more open and export-oriented 
trade policy. The excessive regulation of the economy which was a 
logical by-product of the earlier protectionist policies had to make 
way for a more simplified system to make the country more 
attractive for investors, both domestic and foreign. While this 
... 
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'deregulation' and 'debureaucratization' process had in fact 
already started with the banking system in June 1983 a~d the 
customs reform of April 1985, the first major reform relating to 
investment and trade did not come out until May 1986, which is now 
commonly referred to as the 'May 6 package' (Pakem). 
It is useful to examine this package in some detail to 
illustrate how-even while it was intended and presented by the 
Indonesian government as a major step t~wards ~pening u.P. the 
economy for foreign capital-it still contained vanous provis10ns 
which reflected the reluctance of the administration, or at least 
the dilemma it faced, in letting go of its earlier protectionist stance. 
The May 6 package (Pakem) 
The following is an overview of Pakem 1986 insofar as it relates to 
foreign investments: 
(i) 
(ii) 
1 
Investments in a bonded zone are not subject to the DSP 
(Daftar Skala Prioritas = Priority Ranking List). T~is means 
that foreigners can invest in industries/sectors which would 
normally be closed to them. 
The distinct dividing line between PMA and PMDN is 
maintained but the new DSP of 1986 did indeed give more 
room to PMA than before, providing 'equal treatment' with 
PMDN in certain circumstances.1 Equal treatment means that 
this company can get credit from state banks and can ~o its 
own marketing. At that stage, it should be emphasized, 
access to credits from state banks was very attractive to a 
foreign investor, since in the 1983 devaluation several foreign 
firms suffered heavy exchange losses because of their big 
offshore credits. The ability to market their products was 
attractive because they were then able to oversee this 
activity directly rather than having to reso:t to 1:'ationally 
owned distribution channels (some of which might even 
handle the marketing of a competitor's products), or to 
These are if 75 per cent of the shares of a company are o"'.ned ~y the 
state or by Indonesian nationals, if the company g~s pubhc selling ~1 
per cent of its shares in the capital market, or if 51 per cent of its 
shares are owned by the state or by Indonesian nat~onals and more 
than 20 per cent of its shares are sold through the capital market. 
I 
I 
I 
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(iii) 
(iv) 
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circumventing the existing regulations through the creation of 
a dummy company or other dubious modes of operation. 
Profits made by PMA can be invested outside the same 
compa~y whereas ~orm~rly they could be used only for 
expansion, or repatnated if by then the particular sector was 
already closed for PMA. But it needs to be pointed out that 
the company rec7iving capital from the profit by a PMA 
co?'pany automatically becomes a PMA investment. Thus the 
?am for the PMA company from this new ruling may be illuso~y because formerly, with the profit that had to be 
repatnat.ed, the PMA company could easily look for a new 
partner m a new venture. Also, because the new venture 
becomes a PMA company, it does not have access to credits 
from state banks, nor the possibility of marketing its own 
products. 
In. ~iew of the limited supply of domestic capital, the 
minimum share of local capital in a company was lowered 
from 2? per ~~nt to 5 per cent if certain requirements were met.2 
But this fac1htr lasts ~o~ only five years, after which 20 per 
cent local equity participation must be restored. This also 
re~lected the .~asic reluc~ance of the government to provide 
this extra facility to foreign firms. 
{v) The pro~ision that after 10 years local capital participation 
must be increased to over 51 per cent, which in practice cannot 
be .e~fo~ced properly (in many cases local capital 
parhc1pahon has decreased), is modified.3 
2 
3 
These are if there is a high risk involved, if the company needs high ~echnology a~d a huge investment, if the location of the venture is isolate~, a.nd if the company produces solely for the export market. 
The prmc1pal changes are that the shares which cannot be bought by 
the local partner can be offered for sale to other national companies 
that if this does not work out, the shares can be offered to a bank or ~ 
non_-bank financial institution or to the capital market, and that if this 
a?am ~oes not work out the BKPM will help the foreign investor to 
divest .its. shares. Only later the provision was relaxed in that the 10 
years hm1t was extended to 15 years. 
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(vi) Foreigners can now invest in projects worth less than $1 
million in the services sector, but the $1 million minimum is 
maintained for all other investments. 
(vii) In the Pakem it is also stressed that the investment permit is 
valid for 30 years, not only till 1997 (that is, 30 years after 
the promulgation of the Foreign Investment Law in 1967) as is 
sometimes wrongly perceived. When the investment permit 
relates to an expansion, the 30 years start from this latter 
date. 
To be sure, the primary purpose of the May 6 package was to 
increase non-oil/ gas exports in order to compensate for the drop in 
oil/ gas export revenue. Thus the relaxation on foreign capital 
inflow and on imports (especially those used as inputs for 
exportable items) was in a way only a means to achieve the main 
goal: non-oil/gas export promotion. Moreover, the liberalized 
treatment of imports and foreign investments was regarded very 
much as the exception rather than the rule, so that parties opting 
for these new facilities often had to prove that they were really 
entitled to these dispensations. They had to substantiate these 
claims with the necessary documents, adding to the complexity of 
the system which, ironically, was introduced with the very 
purpose of simplification. Also, the distinction between foreign and 
domestic investment was expressly emphasized on various 
occasions, thus partly neutralizing the effects of the earlier 
concessions granted to foreign investors. Pakem 1986 in this context 
is taken just as a starting point for comparison, mainly because it 
covers a rather wide range of issues. It is also important in that it 
clearly reflects the thinking of the administration at these earlier 
stages of the deregulation process. 
The new facilities for foreign investment introduced as part of 
Pakem in effect only reduced the earlier discriminations against it, 
and were singularly intended to promote non-oil/ gas exports. This 
means that investments producing for the local market and non-
PMA investors had to continue to struggle with the high costs of 
operation as before. Not much was d~ne to r~uce these c~sts 
resulting from red tape and payment of illegal levies to get thi.ngs 
done. The gains for national investors from Pakem were mai~ly 
derived indirectly, such as through the 'equal treatment' for foreign 
investors which are export-oriented (defined as exporting at least 
85 per cent of their output) or in which the share of local capital in 
their companies exceeds 75 per cent. 
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Other 'packages' 
Seven years after the first deregulation package on banking of 1 June 
1983, the Indonesian government is still talking about a continuation 
of the deregulation process. This indicates how the dismantling of 
excessive regimentation which hampered Indonesia's economic 
progress has been undertaken gradually, in a step-by-step fashion. 
Also, there are big differences in the scope, approach and content of 
the various deregulation packages. Some cover several sectors, in a 
more or less integrated fashion like the May 6 package; others are 
very limited and specific in their coverage, such as those affecting 
financial institutions and the capital market. It needs to be 
understood that several political, psychological, social, and 
economic factors stood in the way of a drastic change in the way of 
doing things. Powerful lobby groups interested in maintaining the 
status quo have been one of the most important factors inhibiting 
change. There are also economic considerations that make for a 
cautious pace in introducing reforms, such as the danger that too 
drastic a change might cause bankruptcies and lead to large-scale 
unemployment. But given enough time to make adjustments and to 
improve efficiency, the dismantling of excessive regulation can 
proceed further. The deregulation process has been able to generate 
its own momentum, in that the opposition to change has begun to 
crumble in the face of the rapid growth in manufactured exports and 
improved international competitiveness.4 
The most fundamental switch has been a change in the way of 
thinking, in which the bureaucracy has to serve the public rather 
than playing the role of the benefactor who distributes favours in 
the way of licences, permits and credit. But no less important are 
the structural changes that have taken place during the process of 
deregulation. In fact, the general relaxation in the government's 
stance towards foreign investment and protection is partly a result 
of changing business structures in Indonesia. Domestic companies 
have become stronger, larger and more sophisticated, as reflected 
among others in the value of domestic investment, which far 
exceeds that of foreign investments. For this reason it would not be 
~urprising if the minimum of $1 million prevailing for PMA 
investments were lifted or at least raised within the not-too-
distant future. 
4 An interesting illustration of this process is the involvement of 
hundreds of small-scale textile and garment manufacturers in Bali in 
the rapid export growth during the last few years. 
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This increase in size, financial strength and sophistication of 
domestic investments is obviously the result of the deregulation 
policy pursued by the Indonesian government during the last seven 
years, although there are also some very valid criticisms related to 
the unevenness of the gains reaped from the deregulation policies. 
Tackling the problems created by this uneven progress is an urgent 
issue for the Indonesian government, and I return to this point later 
in the chapter. 
It is not possible to provide a detailed discussion of each of the 
twenty odd deregulation packages. Suffice it to say that the 
majority deals with various aspects of finance; only a small number 
have dealt with the 'real sector' such as transport, investment and 
trade, particularly the 'special trading system' (sistem tata-
niaga). This term, which is in fact quite 'neutral', has acquired a 
special connotation in its Indonesian usage, in that it is almost 
identical to the term 'non-tariff barrier'. This 'special trading 
system' was hardly touched by the earlier deregulation measures, 
and it was not until the November 1988 package that the system 
began to be dismantled substantially. But even then the 'special 
trading system' for steel products remained more or less intact, 
although the import of another item which drew much attention 
from the public in those days-plastics-was opened for general 
importers. The most recent package (May 1990), which again 
liberalized and/ or lowered the import duties for hundreds of 
import items, did make changes in the 'special trading system' for 
steel products, but it was more a token change: 42 steel products, the 
import of which had been monopolized by PT Krakatau Steel, were 
assigned to 'importer producers' (importir produsen - JP), meaning 
the steel industry in general. Since general importers were thus 
still banned from importing these steel products, the virtual 
monopoly of PT Krakatau Steel was hardly changed. 
A most profound change was introduced with the so-called 
Inpres 4/1985 in April 1985, in which the whole Customs Service 
was virtually relieved of the control and determination of customs. 
Instead, this function was put in the hands of the state-owned 
surveying company, PT Sucofindo, which in turn delegates the 
authority to a private Swiss Company SGS (Societe Generale de 
Surveyance). The reason for this drastic step was the corruption 
which infested the Customs Service in those days and which would 
have hampered the promotion of non-oil/ gas exports if it were 
allowed to continue. Naturally this drastic reform increased 
business confidence in the policy of the government. Meanwhile the 
SGS is providing training facilities to hundreds of Indonesian 
customs officials to teach them modern techniques and systems of 
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customs management and control. The contract with SGS, which 
was extended once in 1988, will expire in May 1991. It is not certain 
yet what the government will decide on the matter, although 
undeniably pressures to restore the function of the Customs Service 
have become stronger. Meanwhile the narrowing of the loopholes 
in customs control in Indonesia following the engagement of SGS has 
resulted in a marked increase in government revenue from customs. 
Also, the clearing of goods through customs now takes much less 
time than before. 
Another very important feature of Inpres 4/1985 was that 
restrictions on the choice of a carrier for international shipment for 
exports were removed. These changes were expanded further in the 
November 1988 package. The five categories for shipping licences 
were reduced to two, leaving only a distinction between big 
operations for domestic/international shipping and small 'people's' 
operations. Shipping routes were no longer fixed by the government 
but by the shipowners themselves, while any changes in routes only 
need to be reported to the Department of Communications. Any 
routes which are not being served by private shipowners will be 
served by state-owned shipping lines. When a shipping company 
lacks tonnage it can easily hire or charter foreign ships for a certain 
period or a certain voyage. The result of these changes is that 
exports do not have to wait a long time to get shipping space. 
Instead, the shipping space available to carry these goods can be 
easily adjusted to the needs of exporters. 
The deregulation measures introduced in the 'real sector' 
naturally served to increase general economic stability. When the 
deregulation took place mainly in the financial sphere, as was the 
case in the earlier stages, the lagging opportunities in the 
investment and trading sectors tended to be too narrow for the 
expanding variety of financial instruments made possible in the 
deregulation process. This frustrated a considerable part of the 
financing capability of the economy, leading to speculation in 
foreign exchange and other markets. It would certainly be 
desirable, therefore, if future deregulation measures were to focus 
more strongly on the real sector. 
A further relaxation of the stance of the government with 
regard to foreign capital has been in the area of capital market 
reforms. Until early 1988 foreign capital activity was limited to 
buying shares of companies listed in the capital market which were 
less than 49 per cent foreign owned. But since the majority. of the 
listed companies in those days were PMA companies (more as a 'PR' 
exercise than for reasons of capital shortage), shares of only six 
companies were available to foreign investors. Later the ruling was 
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changed and foreign investors could buy up to 49 per cent of any new 
capital issue. A maximum of 49 per cent was also set on the issue of 
bearers' shares, obviously to limit the possibility of purchase of 
these shares by foreign investors to 49 per cent. At present foreign 
investors still cannot buy shares of banks in the capital market. 
However, there is a widespread belief that this limitation will be 
abolished shortly. 
A further relaxation of the attitude of the Indonesian 
government towards foreign investment was reflected in the facility 
for foreign capital to invest in joint venture banks. Banks which 
already have a representative office in Indonesia and are 
prominent in their country of origin can set up a joint venture bank in 
cooperation with a national bank. The minimum capital of a joint 
venture bank is Rp 50 billion, of which the foreign partner can have 
at most 85 per cent of the capital, while the local capital 
participation must exceed 15 per cent. The condition for these joint 
venture banks is that, within one year at least, 50 per cent of their 
credit portfolio must consist of export credits. These joint venture 
banks can be opened in seven major cities, as is the case with 
branches of existing foreign banks which previously had been forced 
to limit their operations to Jakarta. For these branches of the 
existing foreign banks the same condition with regard to export 
credits also prevails. Furthermore, since the October 1988 package 
state-owned enterprises (national and regional, BUMN and BUMD 
respectively) were allowed to deposit their capital (with a 
maximum of 50 per cent) in all general banks, with a maximum of 20 
per cent in each bank. In theory at least there is thus the 
possibility that a BUMN or BUMD deposits part of its funds in a 
foreign or joint venture bank. Previously, BUMNs and BUMDs had 
to deposit their funds in state-owned banks exclusively. 
Finally, with the November 1988 package foreign investors 
were allowed to set up a separate company to distribute and market 
their products at the wholesale level; distribution at the retail 
level, however, must remain in the hands of national companies. 
The Question of Equity 
With the rapid growth of the modern sector in the economy during 
the last few years, equity has become one of the major politico-
economic topics of the day. This is especially since President 
Soeharto in his budget speech before parliament in January 1990 
insisted on a fair distribution of the fruits of development in order 
to prevent the outbreak of violent social unrest. The statement 
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naturally caused some unrest among foreign investors, who were at a 
loss as to how to implement the appeal of the head of state. But 
Coordinating Minister Radius Prawiro, as well as the 
Minister /State Secretary Murdiono, in a statement to the press 
hastened to emphasize that the President had only made an 
appeal to business and that 'no regulations will be issued' on the 
matter. The statement was obviously meant to allay fears among 
foreign investors. 
But it seemed that nobody had counted on the fact that 
President Soeharto indeed meant business. In March he invited the 
heads of 31 'conglomerates' to the Tapos ranch where he repeated 
his appeal to big business to sell 25 per cent of their shares to 
cooperatives. Only a handful of pribumi (ethnic Indonesians) were 
invited, while the rest were all of Chinese extraction. At the 
Tapos meeting these tycoons pledged to sell 1 per cent of their 
shares to cooperatives under their immediate control 'to start 
with', probably beginning with cooperatives of their own 
employees. But later-because they finally woke up to the fact 
that the President was dead-serious with his 'appeal'-statements 
issued by representatives of the Tapos group showed that they were 
more receptive to the idea. After a 'safari' organized by Kadin, the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in which they had a dialogue 
with representatives of cooperatives, a spokesperson for the Tapos 
group stated that they had misjudged the capability and the 
potential of cooperatives and that they could now see definite 
possibilities to sell shares and to cooperate with them. 
It is not possible to be absolutely sure of the motives behind 
Soeharto's appeal to big business to sell 25 per cent of their shares 
to cooperatives. But the most plausible speculation might be that 
Soeharto wants to counter the unfavourable impression caused by 
some of the government policies during the last few months, in 
which low income groups had been neglected while facilities were 
being granted to the more well-to-do. There have been several 
well-published incidents supporting this perception. One was the 
case of the construction of a golf course in West Java, in which the 
people who had been tilling the land were unreasonably 
compensated. Another was the action taken against street vendors 
who ply water, newspapers, snacks and other goods to the occupants 
of passing cars. These activities were said to 'pollute' the streets 
and some officials took the view that the vendors should either be 
sent to school, be given some vocational training, or be sent back to 
their village of origin. Letters to the editor in various newspapers 
expressed the opinion that such actions against these 'small people' 
were in blatant contrast with the huge gains that the big businesses 
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have enjoyed through the deregulation process, ~nd especia~ly 
through the lax rules in the capital market. With t~e earlier 
abolition of the becaks (tricycles for personal transport) m !akarta 
and other big cities, which was also widely vi.ewed as an uniust act 
against the 'small people', it. seems that ~re~ident Soeharto dee~s 
it necessary to call in big business and to msist that they share their 
profits with cooperatives in order to correct the balance. 
The initial opposition of the conglomera~es to the sale of 25 per 
cent of their shares to cooperatives was motivated partly by a fear 
of how their foreign partners would react, a.n~ p~rtly ?Y the 
challenge to marry extensive cooperative participation with the 
maintenance of modem business practices. However.' although the 
25 per cent target may have been watered. down, it now seems 
· 't ble that foreign firms will have to divest at least a part of 
mevi a · b · · 
their capital to cooperatives if they want to stay m usmess m 
Indonesia. 
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State Enterprises: Reform and Policy Issues 
Ahmad D. Habir 
Ownership issues in the state enterprise sector in Indonesia have 
historically been related to the question of 'who controls what'. At 
the national level, this has usually involved the extent to which 
the state should control the economy through state enterprises vis-
a-vis the private sector and, to a much lesser extent, cooperatives. 
At the enterprise level, this has meant political struggles to control 
the state enterprises, much of it between government departments, 
usually the Finance Department against other technical 
departments, but occasionally involving powerful enterprise 
managers and other political actors, such as the army. 
While these issues remain matters of contention, recent policy 
changes, spurred on by budgetary constraints due to decreasing oil 
prices in the early 1980s, have begun to focus on the efficiency of 
state enterprise at the micro level. Implementation at this level 
will inevitably have repercussions on future ownership and control 
patterns, some of which are already being felt. 
Ideological dimensions 
Implicit in the changes are ideological and political issues that 
influence how fast these changes are being made. Ownership issues 
are by their nature politically sensitive, touching on basic questions 
of the proper role of the state in the economy. Reformers have 
therefore been scrupulous in stressing the more acceptable aim of 
improving state enterprise business performance. 
Commenting on the political economy of deregulation, Hadi 
Soesastro wrote 'that of all the policy packages, this one [state 
enterprises] would be the most political, in the sense that to be 
meaningful it will have to be based on a new political consensus on 
interpretation of Article 33 of the Constitution' (Soesastro, 1989: p. 
865). This Article is inevitably quoted in debates on ownership and 
control issues of the state enterprise sector. It states that 1) the 
economy shall be organized cooperatively, 2) branches of 
production vital to the state and which affect most of the people 
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shall be controlled by the state, and 3) land, water and natural 
resources shall be controlled by the state and exploited for the 
welfare of the people. . 
Continued discussions on the respective roles of the pubhc, 
private and cooperative sectors ai;d the ten~~ncy to use Arti~le 33 .to 
justify each claim indicate a new political consensus on ~ts 
meaning is still some way off. Perceptions of state enterprise 
ownership alone range from the notion of ownership b~ the ~ople 
to the equally widely expressed view of state enterprises bemg a 
cash cow (sapi perahan) for various vested interests. For ~xample, 
one member of parliament, opposing plans for state enterprises to go 
public, said that since they were already owned by the people, the 
public should not have to be asked to pay for shares (Infobank, ~o. 
120, 1989). Another member felt that, because state ent~rprises 
were owned by the people, the govern~ent should fi;st ask 
permission from parliament before selling them (Ed~tor, 25 
November, 1989). On the other hand, the Minister of Minm~ and 
Energy, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, in an address to newly appointed 
directors of state enterprises under his department~ told t~em ~ot to 
contribute to the public impression of state enterpnses being milked 
by those managing them (Suara Karya, 14 March, 1989). 
However, it may well be argued that unquestioned assumptions 
of the right of the state to dominate the eco~omy have b~n eroded, 
for a number of reasons. First, the economic downturn in the early 
1980s not only constrained government spending b~t also e~po~d the 
weaknesses inherent in a high cost economy. This was highhghted 
by general public recognition of poor pu~lic sector performance, both 
in the bureaucracy and in state enterpnses. Second, the growth of 
the private sector became apparent and more acceptable, as it fed 
from and contributed to a growing middle cl~ss. Finally, a ~eneral 
weariness of pervasive government control in every-day h~e has 
widened support for the notion of deregula.tion. All of .this has 
contributed to the widespread perception concerning the 
inefficiency of state enterprises, thus facilitating a gradual 
approach to reform in that sector. 
A Historical Overview of State Enterprise 
Colonial Period . 
The presence of state enterprises dates ba~k to the Dutch period 
when the colonial government estabhshed about 20 state 
enterprises in such key areas as railways, seaports, ~awnshops, 
printing, publishing, electricity, and drinking water during the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century. In 1925, these enterprises 
came under a treasury law (Indische Comptabiliteitswet, ICW) 
which made them part of government departments. While a 
special regulation governing state enterprises was issued in 1927 
(Indonesische Bedrijvenwet, IBW), allowing cost accounting 
principles to be used, their budgets were still controlled by 
government departments. This strong governmental control of state 
enterprises under these regulations was to be continued when 
Indonesia gained independence and the companies were transferred 
to the new government. 
Early Independence Period (1945-1960) 
In the early independence period, the Indonesian government 
established a number of other state enterprises in such areas as 
banking (Bank Negara 1946), trade (Pantja Niaga, 1947), industry 
(Semen Gresik, 1953, Pertamina, 1957) and tourism (Natour, 1952). 
Economic policy makers, influenced by socialist ideas and imbued 
with strong nationalist sentiments, began to negotiate and 
implement nationalizations of a few Dutch enterprises, including 
the largest bank (which became the Central Bank, Bank 
Indonesia), tin mining, and later the joint venture airline, Garuda 
Indonesian Airways. Up to 1957, however, the economy was still 
dominated by foreign (mainly Dutch) private firms which began 
returning after 1949, and to a lesser extent, by Chinese businesses. 
However, Dutch intransigence over West Irian led to the 
nationalization of all Dutch enterprises in Indonesia. Under 
government regulation no. 23/1958 and Act no. 86/1958 about 600 
Dutch companies were taken over; almost 300 were plantation 
estates, more than 100 were in industry and mining, while the rest 
were engaged in trading, finance, communication, gas and elecricity, 
and construction. Dutch managers and workers were replaced by 
Indonesian military officers, civil servants or lower level 
employees, all of whom had little or no management or 
enterpreneurial background. In 1964, as a consequence of the 
'confrontation policy' against Malaysia, British and American 
companies were also taken over. As a result, the Indonesian 
government became the owner of about 800 enterprises, coming under 
various regulations and laws. 
In order to achieve uniformity, a new law was issued in 1960 
(Law 19, 1960) which changed all enterprises to Perusahaan 
Negara (PN) status. Under this law, ownership was not divided 
into shares, explicitly to prevent any private participation. 
Existing departmental control over these enterprises was 
complicated by the addition of general management boards (biro 
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pimpinan umum) responsible for the coordination of their 
respective public enterprises. In some cases, however, these general 
management boards were also assigned the operating management 
of each state enterprise under their jurisdiction, effectively 
creating a dual management along with the board of directors. 
Such unwieldy managerial structures, combined with other adverse 
conditions existing during that period, resulted inevitably in a 
weakening of the now large public sector. The state enterprises, 
many of which had already suffered from asset stripping and 
sabotage by their former owners, underwent continual 
reorganization and regrouping in order to cope with the uncertain 
environment, but this only aggravated matters. By 1965, the total 
number of state enterprises was reduced to 233. Patronage was the 
rule. Enterprises were vastly overstaffed. Most were high cost 
operations which suffered losses, or recorded a profit only because 
of protected markets and monopoly rights (Pangestu and Habir, 
1989:225-227). 
With politics, both in the form of continuing regional strife as 
well as international disputes, taking precedence over economic 
management, the economic situation deteriorated rapidly. By the 
mid 1960s, the country was suffering from hyper-inflation, official 
trade declined, foreign exchange reserves were negligible, the 
manufacturing sector was operating at only 20-30 per cent capacity, 
and the economic and physical infrastructure was badly damaged. 
These were the conditions that contributed to President Sukarno's 
downfall and the change to President Soeharto's New Order 
government in 1966. 
Consolidation after Chaos 
The economic chaos of the early 1960s left its mark on the collective 
memory of the new government, which began to rehabilitate the 
economy. Economic policy, influenced heavily by a group of 
Western-trained economists, moved towards a liberal investment 
regime and away from the direct controls over the economy 
identified with the old regime. This was based on a Resolution of 
the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly No. XXIII/1966, 
which laid the foundation for policies on the economy. Article 40 
stated that, 'In implementing its role in the economy, the 
government has to emphasize more the supervision of the economy 
and, as much as possible, not the control of economic activities. To 
do so, it is important to undergo debureaucratization from the 
supervisory system and decentralization in the management of 
state enterprises' (Subijanto, 1988: 560). 
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A number of nationalized enterprises were returned to their 
former owners. Under Presidential Instruction 17 1967 state 
enterprises, previously relegated to being mere a~pend~ges to 
gove~ment departments, were given more autonomy. Ministries 
were instructed to abolish subsidies to enterprises with the 
exception of public utilities, and to stop using enterprise funds under 
their control fo~ their own budgetary expenses (Djamin, 1987). 
Restructurmg of the state sector continued with Law 9 1969 
which organi_zed state enterprises into three categories.' On~ 
category (Per7a~, Perusahaan /awatan) included those enterprises, 
such as the railway system, operating in a public service area 
attached to a government department and financed out of the 
gover~ment budget. A second category (Perum, Perusahaan Umum) 
compnsed those operating in areas considered vital to the general 
welfare of the public, such as the telephone company; they were to 
be wholly government own~~ an~ not divided into shares. They 
are expected to generate suff1C1ent mcome for their operations and 
would theref?r.e not normally _require subsidies. The vast majority 
o_f t~e 200_ off_ic.ial state enterpnses were to be organized under the 
hmited-habihty company category (Persero, Perusahaan 
Perseroan) whose shares are owned wholly or partly by the 
Ministry of Finance on behalf of the government. They are expected 
to o~~rate as profit-oriented ventures governed by the same 
provis10ns of the Indonesian Commercial Code as private limited 
liability companies. 
A number of important state entities remain outside official 
listings of state enterprises, however. These include Pertamina 
the national oil company, which is governed under its own la~ 
(Law 8, 1971); the state banks (governed under Law 14 1967)' the 
rice procureme~t agency, BULOC; and a large number of enterPrises 
owned by regional and local governments, and subsidiaries of 
individual state enterprises,1 that are not included in the first 
three categories already mentioned. 
. . :he conversion of official state enterprises into their limited 
habihty forms was not without problems (Lembaga Management 
UI, 1970). Procedural matters such as re-evaluation of assets took 
long~r than expected. More importantly, ministries were reluctant 
to s~ift c~ntrol over 'their' enterprises to the Finance Department. 
Presidential Instruction (Revised) No. 11, 1973, in the words of one 
observer, 'in effect altered the balance of power and control over 
1 There are no official listings of state enterprise subsidiaries. 
However, one source lists 54 major state enterprises owning wholly or 
partly 305 subsidiaries (Wibisono, 1989:174-220). 
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these companies in favour of the 'old' ministries from which the 
companies were transferred; whereas the primary intention of the 
original legislation governing reorganization was specifically to 
transfer this authority away from these ministries and into the 
Ministry of Finance' (Funkhouser 1976:200). This cumbersome dual 
command structure, multiplied in practice by other government 
agencies and extra-official influences (see Figure · 9.1), either 
relegated managers of enterprises to being department bureaucrats 
or paradoxically created conditions in which managers operated 
without any control (Warwick, n.d.). In 1983, another regulation,2 
originally intended to free state enterprises from excessive 
departmental control, instead ended up reinforcing the dual 
command structure with more of the same inhibiting effects 
(Jusmaliani, 1987; Tim Peniliti, 1984). Table 9.1 provides a 
summary picture of the recent organizational status of the state 
enterprise sector. 
Oil Boom Opportunities 
By the end of 1973, rationalization moves were put aside as the oil 
boom provided the opportunity for a return to inward-looking and 
nationalistic economic policies. The government used increased oil 
revenues to initiate a massive program of investments in the 
industrial sector. These included the basic metals sector, 
principally the huge Krakatau Steel complex and the Asahan 
Aluminium smelter; the chemical industry, in particular three 
large fertilizer complexes in West Java, East Kalimantan and 
South Sumatra; LNG and oil refining; and a range of other 
activities including paper, cement, and aircraft assembly and 
manufacturing. 
Post Oil Boom Period 
The decline in oil prices over the period 1982-1986 resulted in sharp 
cuts in government revenues and exports. The government responded 
by imposing austerity measures, by expanding non-oil domestic 
revenues (principally taxation), and by promoting non-oil exports. 
This entailed reductions in government expenditures as well as 
mobilization of domestic funds from the financial sector and 
improved tax collection. Included in the budget cuts were 
2 Viz, Regulation Government of Indonesia No. 3, 1983 on the 
Procedures for the Development and Supervision of Perjan, Perum 
and Persero. 
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Figure 9.1: Indonesian State Enterprises: Controllers and Interest 
Groups 
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allocations for capital participation in state enterprises. In fact, 
operating surpluses of state enterprises in such important sectors as 
plantations and mining had declined in the early 1980s, while 
public utility companies supplying electricity, gas and water 
operated at a loss (Simandjuntak, 1988:235). In the context of public 
sector austerity and the drive for efficiency, therefore, the state 
enterprise sector again became a target of reform. 
Table 9.1: 
The Organizational Structure of the State Enterprise Sector 
(as at December 1989, number of firms) 
Technical Persero Perum Perjan PN Old Special Total 
Wholly Partly PT Status 
(751 3 ) 
Industry 30 8 2 3 1 44 
Agriculture 31 1 2 2 36 
Finance 10 6 2 1 7 29 
Transportation 7 10 1 18 
Public Works 16 2 18 
Mining 3 3 1 1 8 
Trade 9 1 10 
Tourism, Posts 
and Tele-
communication 6 2 8 
Forestry 3 1 1 8 
Defence 2 3 5 
Health 1 3 4 
Information 2 2 4 
Labor 1 1 
Education 1 1 
Non Department 1 1 
120 17 32 2 7 3 8 189 
Source: Department of Finance. 
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Public debate and 'minimal consensus' 
In January 1986, an official of the Auditing Board of the Finance 
Department, Ruchyat Kosasih, delivered a paper to a seminar on 
public finance at the Law Faculty, University of Indonesia, in 
which he argued for the privatization of state enterprises not 
strategically important to the country, such as trading companies 
and contractors, and for the liquidation of those in a poor financial 
condition. This, he argued, would lessen the administrative burden 
of the bureaucracy and the financial risk borne by the government. 
Furthermore, those enterprises remaining in state hands should 
raise their efficiency and take steps to avoid 'leakages', fraud and 
the like by improving management, so that revenues could be 
raised and costs kept to a minimum (Kompas, 1 February, 1986). It 
was the first time a government official had come out openly for 
the sale of state enterprises. Press reports of his paper sparked a 
prolonged debate on the state of the public sector, which helped to 
shift the climate of opinion towards an acceptance of a more open 
economy and the need for a more competitive state sector. The 
strongly state-led, nationalistic-oriented but often inefficient drive 
towards industrialization floundered as world oil prices dropped. 
The emerging debate served the purpose of establishing a minimal 
consensus that would pave the way for public acceptance of the 
reforms of state enterprises that were to follow. The consensus 
centred around the recognition that state enterprises tended to be 
inefficient because of various factors such as inadequate planning, 
lack of skilled managers, centralized decision making processes, 
government intervention in daily operations, unclear and multiple 
objectives, and political patronage. 
Deregulation Period (1983-present) 
First Phase 
With the onset of decreasing oil prices in the early 1980s, the 
technocrats took advantage of that 'window of opportunity' to 
initiate a number of reforms that opened up a heretofore highly 
regulated and bureaucratic economy. The initial moves for 
reforming state enterprises were tentative, in recognition of the 
potential for opposition to restructuring of the state sector, from 
within the government as well as from the public. In January 1986, 
President Soeharto legitimized concerns for the inefficiency of state 
enterprises when, in an plenipotentiary cabinet meeting, he 
instructed all state enterprises to increase their efficiency. In 
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December 1986, he instructed the. Coordinating Mini~ter for 
Economics, Finance and Industry, Ah Wardhana, to look into ~he 
possibility of privatizing ~np~o.fitable state enterprises or wor~mg 
with the private sector in ioint ventures. In another ~a~inet 
meeting, in February 1987, the President instructed all Ministers 
with state enterprises under their jurisdiction to report on the 
financial condition of these enterprises. In March 1987, an 
interdepartmental team headed by the Coordinating Minister was 
established to assess the results of the review, with the express 
purpose of determining which enterprises should be sold, converted 
into joint ventures, or liquidated. 
Second Phase 
The efforts of the team led to a Presidential Instruction 5, 1988 
classifying state enterprises as 'very healthy',. 'hea~thy',. 'le.ss 
healthy' or 'not healthy', on the basis of three fi~anc.i~l cntena. 
These are 'rentability', which measures the pr?fita?~hty of the 
company liquidity; which measures t~e. compa~y s abihty to cover 
short term liabilities, and 'solvabihty' which measures the 
ability to cover long term liabilitie·s" This was ~ollowed by two 
regulations from the Finance M1mster.3. The first covered t~e 
possible actions that could now be taken to. improve state enterpnse 
performance. These include: a) a change in the legal stat~s of the 
SOE (state-owned enterprise), b) operational cooper.aho~ and 
management contracts with a third party, c) .consohdah~n or 
merger, d) breaking up into smaller umts, e~ selling shares 1~ the 
capital market, f) direct placement to an outside par.ty, g) m~kmg a 
joint venture, or h) liquidation. The second regulation re~mred all 
state enterprises to make a long-term corporate plan for five years, 
and a yearly work plan budget for better control by managemen~ an.d 
the government (Kompas, 29 June 1989). The performance c~itena 
are to be applied uniformly to all SOEs, whether persero, per7a~ or 
perum. This has become a source of controversy as t~chmcal 
departments complained that the performance o.f theu state 
enterprises burdened with social ob_jectives, was inevitably poor as 
measured by these criteria (Eksekutif, Nove~b7r 1989). Ther7 were 
other attacks on the fairness of the cntena but the Finance 
Department was adamant that they would apply universally, 
with the assurance that this was a preliminary step to be foll~we.d 
by further evaluation (Hadianto, 1990). The use of .these cnte~ia 
made it difficult for technical departments to continue to claim 
3 These were Finance Minister Decision 740/KMK.00/1989 and 
Finance Minister Decision 741/KMK.00/1989 on 28 June, 1989. 
100 
Ahmad D. Habir 
that th~ir state. enterprises were profitable, as they were wont to 
do dunng pubhc debate. In August 1989, another interdepartmental 
t~am led by ~he ~inance Department was formed to implement the Fmanc~ Ministers regulations. In October 1989, Finance Minister f umarlin announced that 92 out of 189 state enterprises were in the 
ast. category, ,of 'not healthy'. Furthermore, there were only 35 
which were very healthy', 25 were 'healthy' and 37 'I 
healthy'. The ~inister stressed, however, that new' uity fund~s 
for state enterpnses during 1990/91 would not be av~labl g 
for the strategic industries (Suara Karya, 7 October 1989) e except 
Strategic Industries Board 
The strategic indus.tries referred to by the Finance Minister were 
the 10 state enterpnses that were to be supervised by the Strate ic 
Industry ~o.ard (BPIS, Badan Pengelola lndustri Strategis), head~d 
by the Mmister of Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie. The 
announcement of the Board came as a surprise to many as it seemed 
to sharply reverse the general trend toward a more deregulated 
state sector. However, it had been some time in the makin I 
1984, ~n Implementation Team for a Strategic Industry Boarf wa~ 
established. In 1986, it was replaced by the Council for the 
De~e~opment of Strategic Industries which had the stated aim of 
assisting the :r~chnological Research and Development Board (also heade~ by Minister Habibie) to formulate long term policies and to 
coordmate t.he development of strategic industries. On August 28 
1989, a Presidential D.ecision (No. 44, Year 1989), was issued which 
took 10 state enterpnses out of their respective departments and 
pl~ced them under the supervision of BPIS. The IO are PT IPTN 
(aircraft manufacturing), PT PAL Indonesia (shipbuilding) PT 
PINDAD (ammunition), ~erum Dahana (explosives), PT Krak~tau 
Steel, PT Bar~ta Indoi:esia (machine working), PT Boma Bisma 
Indra (machme workmg), PT INKA (rail industr ) PT I f (tel~communications) and Unit Produksi Lembaga ~l~ktroni~~ 
Nasional Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan (electronics) (Suara Karya 
13 Sep.tember 1989). All planning and supervision of thes~ 
enterpnses was transferred to Habibie. 
. The rat~onale for the consolidation was that it would enhance 
the. i~ternattonal competitiveness of the enterprises by increasing effici~ncy and productivity. However, the timing of the 
estabhshment of the Board raised suspicions that it was designed 
as much to avoid possi.ble reforms of the state enterprises involved 
and ~o ensure continued subsidies. More generally, the 
establishment of BPIS also denoted continued political support for 
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the concept of a long term coordinated policy aimed at transforming 
Indonesia into an advanced industrial country. 
Implementation of the Reforms 
By November, 1989, Finance Minister Sumarlin announced that 52 
state enterprises would go public between 1990 and 1992. Other 
measures that would be implemented included 17 mergers, 16 joint 
ventures, 15 changes in legal status (one perjan to a perum, 14 perum 
to persero), four management contracts, one operational joint venture 
and three liquidations. Seventy-five others are to undergo 
improvements in management and organizational structure 
(Kompas, 13 November, 1989). The option to sell shares to the 
public was made feasible by the resurgence of the hitherto 
moribund Indonesian stock exchange. This resurgence was a direct 
consequence of the deregulation of the stock exchange begun in 
December, 1987. However, the government may have 
underestimated the difficulties inherent in issuing shares in a 
developing capital market (Habir, 1990). In April 1990, the 
government announced that three state cement companies, PT Semen 
Tonasa, PT Semen Gresik, and PT Semen Padang were to go public by 
July. However, the issue was postponed to September pending legal 
clarification of the relevant state enterprises. Concerned that 
investors would be reluctant to buy shares in state enterprises still 
constrained by bureaucratic controls and procedures that would 
hamper business operations, the underwriters wanted a more 
autonomous structure for state enterprises to safeguard investor 
interests. The main underwriter was confident that the regulations 
would indeed be modified to allow the state enterprises to act as 
private companies free from government interference. Should that 
transpire, it would signal a fundamental change in the control 
structure of Indonesian state enterprises. 
In April 1990, a private placement was made when 70 per cent 
of PT Intirub, an unprofitable state tyre company, was sold to PT 
Bimantara Citra, a large business group led by Bambang 
Trihatmodjo, a son of President Soeharto. Soon after the 
announcement, Bimantara sold 32.5 per cent of its share to PT Astra 
Internasional, the country's second largest conglomerate. Both 
groups have major interests in automobile assembling, Bimantara 
with Mercedes Benz and Ford, and Astra as the indisputable 
market leader in the industry with Toyota. 
A senior Member of Parliament, Tadjoeddin Noor Said, 
decried the closed nature of the sale of a national asset (Suara 
Pembaruan, 24 April, 1990), while another prominent economist and 
social critic, Kwik Gian Kie, warned of declining competition in 
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the tyre industry resulting from the sale (Kompas, 4 April, 1990). 
Despite such criticism, and general resentment simmering over the 
favored access enjoyed by such groups as Bimantara, reaction to the 
sale was surprisingly mute, suggesting a mood of resignation by the 
general public on the issue. 
Another important development occurred in July 1990, when 
the salary structure of state enterprise directors was changed. 
Levels of salaries would now be tied to the performance of the 
enterprises. Directors would not be considered as employees of their 
enterprises, but rather as professional managers assigned to the 
enterprise for a specified period (Kompas, 16 July, 1990) These 
changes reflected a concern among reformers that a professional 
manager corps should be able to formulate and implement the long-
term corporate plans now required and, just as importantly, to act 
independently of untoward and obstructive external interference. 
Such measures also reflect a growing willingness of the 
government to work at reform at the micro enterprise level, 
signalling a move away from the past, often cosmetic, changes at 
the macro level. The general direction of the changes is now 
towards a workable autonomy that has the potential to effect 
significant increases in efficiency and productivity. While it is too 
soon to evaluate the impact of these measures, they do portend a 
willingness by some in the government to continue deregulation of 
the state enterprise sector, albeit within a framework still 
dominated by patron-client relationships. 
Despite the gradual nature of the deregulation steps in the 
state enterprise sector, taken almost entirely at the initiative of 
the economist technocrats from the Finance Department, 
predictably some opposition has arisen, both from those who for 
ideological reasons are unable to accept any reduction of the role of 
the state and from those whose economic and political interests are 
threatened. Prominent among these are the technical departments, 
which derive financial gain from the state enterprises under their 
supervision (Editor, 25 November, 1989.) A continuation of the 
reform process could depend on the ability of those in favor of 
reform to lower the political stakes related to the state enterprise 
sector. It is this factor that is forcing the Finance Department to 
adopt a more conciliatory, lower profile in continuing the reforms. 
Further implementation will probably see the involvement of the 
technical departments under existing bureaucratic structures rather 
than through an interdepartmental team, which could m·ean a 
further slowing down of the process. 
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Some Future Issues 
One major issue involves the consistency of reform measures. As 
Liddle (1987) has pointed out, if bad times can mean good policies, 
good times can also mean bad policies. The reforms of the early 
New Order period gave way to the expansion of the state sector 
during the oil boom of the 1970s. There followed another policy 
cycle as oil prices decreased in the 1980s, which facilitated the 
introduction of deregulation measures including the beginning of 
state enterprise reform. By 1990 economic conditions have 
improved markedly owing to the strong growth of non-oil exports 
and a firming of world oil prices. Reformers therefore have to 
contend with the preference of some for high-cost, long-term 
projects which promise the attractive future of a modernized and 
industrialized high-technology Indonesia. The establishment of 
the BPIS heralds a possible shift towards a less cost-conscious and 
a more protectionist policy. It also places important state 
enterprises further from the reformist web of the Department of 
Finance, with the prospect of future additions to the ten state 
enterprises already grouped under the Board. The extent to which 
the economist reformers can hold the line will depend, among other 
things, on gaining the high ground on the ideological battle for 
policy support. 
One issue that needs to be highlighted is that of transparency. 
The sale of state enterprises to the private sector without a fair 
and open procedure does little to promote public confidence in t_he 
government's capacity to effectively reform the state e~~erpnse 
sector. Indeed, quite the reverse. Such sales promote susp1c10n that 
collusion and patronage still hold the upper hand. Similar 
comments apply to the holding company structure exemplified by 
the BPIS, which has as much potential for collusive high-cost 
behaviour as it does for a management autonomy conducive to 
efficient performance. Divestitute of enterprises through the stock 
exchange is preferable as it holds some promise that transparency 
in the public sector will be forthcoming. 
Related to the issue of transparency is that of accountability. 
With requirements for corporate plans and incipient moves to 
professionalizing the management corps, progres~ ~s being made_ in 
defining and clarifying management accountab1hty. One ma!or 
area of concern, however, is the proliferation of state enterprise 
subsidiaries, many of them funded by employee pension funds. 
These are not fully incorporated into the government's existing 
control system, and there is great potential for the abuse of inter-
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firm relationships through the creation of captive markets and 
other non-competitive behaviour (Table 9.2 at the end of this 
chapter provides some illustrations of the proliferation of these 
state enterprise subsidiaries. 
The debate on privatization which began in early 1986 
included discussion of the appropriate balance between the private 
and public sectors in the economy. Much of the rationale for a 
continuing strong state presence was attributed to the need for a 
counterweight to a private sector dominated by Chinese Indonesian 
business groups and by foreign investors. Recent public debates on 
conglomerates indicate that this issue has still not been resolved. 
This has been complicated by the equally sensitive question of 
the President's children, who are gaining a larger stake in the 
economy through their favored access-often at the expense of the 
state enterprise sector-in activities as diverse as toll roads, 
airlines, and television stations. 
Related to the improved performance of the state enterprise 
sector is the importance of a competitive commercial environment. 
Some question whether the performance of such 'agents of 
development', as state enterprises are often regarded, can be 
adequately assessed by a rate of return measure. Equally, this 
performance criterion is much less useful in evaluating the record of 
state enterprises which enjoy monopoly rights as well as other 
preferential treatment in the form of captive markets and access to 
cheap credit and government contracts. The establishment of the 
BPIS encapsulates both the issues of efficiency versus 'infant 
industries' and monopoly versus competition in the state enterprise 
sector (Sjahrir, 1990; Alam, 1990). Consequently, its progress will 
have a crucial bearing on developments in this sector during the 
1990s. 
Table 9.2: Some State Enterprises and their Subsidiaries 
GROUP 
I.GARUDA 
1. PT Garuda Indonesia 
2. PT Merpati Nusantara 
3. PT Aero Wisata 
4. PT Angkasa Citra Sarana 
5. PT Mirta Sari Hotel 
r 
BUSINESS AREA 
Airline 
Airline 
Tourism 
Catering 
State Enterprises: Reform and Policy Issues 
Development Corp 
6. PT Bukit Nusa Hotels 
. Corp 
7. PT Jasa Angkasa Semesta 
II. KRAKA TAU STEEL 
1. PT Krakatau Steel 
2. PT Cold Rolling Mill 
Indonesia Utama 
3. PT Krakatau Hoogovens Int'l 
Pipe Industries 
4. PT Industri Mesin Perkakas 
Indonesia 
5. PT Krakatau Steel Industries 
Estate Cilegon 
6. PT Katama Betindo Int'l 
7. PT Krawindo Utama Dinamika 
8. PT Pelat Timah Nusantara 
ID MEGA ELTRA 
1. PT Mega Eltra 
2. PT Mega Daya 
Assembling 
3. PT Mega Ganda Sarana Teknik 
Manufacturing 
4. PT Mega Guna Concrete 
5. PT Mega Putra Ganda Dinamika 
6. PT Sigma Utama 
IV. PAN1JANIAGA 
1. PT Pantja Niaga 
2. PTDjenggerTour 
3. PT Gapura Intra Motor 
4. PT Indonesian Consortium of 
Construction Industries 
5. PT Mesin Isuzu Industries 
6. PT Pantja Bangun Contracting 
7. PT Pantja Motor 
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Hotel 
Hotel 
Airport Ground Services 
Holding Company 
Cold Rolling Steel Mill 
Steel Pipes 
Machine Assembling 
Industrial Estate and 
Property Management 
Factory Construction 
Mining and Stone Crushing 
Tin Plate 
Trading, Import-Export 
Electric Equipment 
Bridge Component 
Concrete 
Electrical Equipment 
Paint Manufacturing 
Trade, Import-Export 
Tourism 
Automobile Dealer, Isuzu 
Contractor 
Isuzu Assembling 
Contractor 
Agent and Distributor Isuzu 
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8. PT Partisipasi 
9. PT Trisari V eem 
10. PT Tropicom Utama Furniture 
V.RAJAWALI 
1. PT PPEN Rajawali Nusantara 
Indonesia 
2. PT Apotik Bima 
3. PT Industrial Management Co. 
4. PT Mu tiara Rajawali 
5. PT Pabrik Gula Krebet Baru 
Factory 
6. PT Pabrik Gula Rejo Agung 
Factory 
7. PTPhapros 
8. PT Perkebunan Cimayak 
9. PT Perkebunan Karet Cileles 
10. PT Bandoreksa Rajawali 
Warehousing 
11. PT Rajawali Nusindo 
VI. SEMEN GRESIK 
1. PT Semen Gresik 
2. PT Eternit Gresik 
3. PT Pan Esge 
4. PTSemenCibinong 
5. PT Semen Kupang 
6. PT Semen Batu Raja 
7. PT Varia Usaha for Semen 
Gresik 
VII. ELNUSA (Pertamina Subsidiary) 
1. PT Elektronika Nusantara 
Engineering (Elnusa) 
2. PT Elnusa Chem Link 
Ahmad D. Habir 
Trade, Import-Export 
International Freight 
Forwarders 
Rattan Manufacturing 
Holding Company 
Chemist 
Industrial Consulting 
Industrial Consulting 
Sugar Plantation and 
Sugar Plantation and 
Pharmaceutical 
Rubber Plantation 
Rubber Plantation 
Freight Fowarders, 
Trading 
Portland Cement 
Cement and Asbestos 
Building Material 
Data Processing 
Consultancy 
Portland Cement 
Portland Cement 
Portland Cement 
Distributor and 
Transportation 
Data Processing, 
Design, Oil Services 
Chemicals 
State Enterprises: Reform and Policy Issues 
3. PT Elnusa Multi Industri 
Komputer 
4. PT Elnusa Schlumberger 
Gas 
Drilling 
5. PT Elnusa Yellow Pages 
6. PT Medcom Indosa Engineering 
7. PT Nippon Steel Construction 
Indonesia (Nisconi) 
8. PT Indonesian Consortium of 
Construction Industries 
9. PT Elnusa Cono Ship Marine 
Engineering 
VIII . BERDIKARI 
1. PT PP Berdikari 
2. PT Amro-Duta Leasing 
3. PT Asuransi Timur Jauh 
4. PT Batik Berdikari 
5. PT Berdikari Sari Utama 
Flour Mill 
6. PT Berdikari United 
Livestock 
7. PT Duta PCI Leasing 
8. PT Duta International 
9. PT Duta Yasa Infotek 
10. PT Graha Sarana Du ta 
11. PT Kapas Indah Indonesia 
12. PT Ujung Lima Raya 
13. PT Ujung Lima Selatan 
14. PT Ujung Lima 
15. PTUjung Lima Timur 
16. PTUjung Lima Utara 
17. PT World Trading Corporation 
Micro Computer 
Assembling 
Data Processing Oil and 
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Telephone Book Publisher 
Engineering Consultancy 
Steel Construction 
Contractor 
Marine Engineering 
Holding Company 
Lease Financing 
Insurance 
Batik Textile 
Flour Mill 
Livestock Breeding 
Lease Financing 
Leasing Financing 
Data Processing 
Property Development 
Cotton Plantation 
Freight Forwarders 
Freight Forwarders 
Freight Forwarders 
Freight Forwarders 
Freight Forwarders 
Trading, Import-Export 
Source: Datatrust, as reported in Warta Ekonomi, 31 July, 1989. 
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The Indonesian Conglomerates in Regional 
Perspective 
J.A.C. Mackie 
The emergence of many big corporate conglomerates in Indonesia-
more accurately categorised as 'economic groups' (following Leff 
1978)-has been a new and very striking feature of the country's 
socio-economic life over the last 15 or 20 years. Amongst these, 
Liem Sioe Liong's group and William Soeriadjaya's Astra group 
stand out from the rest, with assets estimated at about $3.5 and 
$1.1 billion respectively, while ten others control assets of between 
$400-800 million, with another 80 or so exceeding $60 million 
(Table 10.1). This is a quite remarkable phenomenon in Indonesia's 
socio-economic development, no matter whether we regard it 
approvingly or with dismay. Yet it is not something unique to 
Indonesia, by any means. In fact, it is surprisingly similar in 
several respects to the patterns of corporate development that have 
occurred in the other booming capitalist economies of the ASEAN 
region, Thailand and Malaysia-Singapore (but not Brunei, for its 
own special reasons) over that same period, albeit with distinctive 
characteristics in each case.1 
Several of the most striking similarities are worth noting 
before we go any further. First, in each of these countries a handful 
of very large business groups stands out from the rest, about a dozen 
to 20 in the three cases examined h~e-(depending on the criteria we 
use to identify them), exercising-great power over important parts 
of the economy. Each country also has a much larger array of 
several hundred smaller corporate groups, some growing rapidly 
1 Malaysia and Singapore are treated together here because they 
virtually constituted a single economic unit for most of the century 
prior to 1963-6, when Singapore was briefly part of Malaysia, then 
abruptly expelled; but the two have still remained closely interlinked 
financially and commercially. Oil-rich Brunei has few big businesses 
or businessmen apart from the Sultan in whose name (and very 
personal power) the vast financial reserves accuring from oil are held 
(Bartholomew 1989). 
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Table 10.1: Indonesian Conglomerates: size ranking 
Main 1988 No. Name 
activity sales 
Rp.tril. 
SEDC (Liem Sioe Uong) miscellanous 6 1. 
autos, etc. 3.7 2. Astra (Soeriadjaya) palm oil, 3. Sinar Mas (Eka Tjipta 2 Wijaya) cooking oil 1.5 kretek 4. Djarum kretek 1.5 5. Gudang Caram banking 1.4 6. Lippo (Mochtar Riady) 
Rp. billion 
# 7-12 . 
includes Dharmala, Darmad1, 
Bob Hasan, Bimantara 
#13-24 
incl. Roda Mas, Panin Bank, 
Ongko, Barito Pacific, 
Sempurna, Bentoel, Soeda~po, 
Sudwikatmono, Metropolitan 
#25-36 
incl. Ciputra, Krama Yudha, 
Humpuss 
#37-48 . 
incl. Bakrie Bros, ABC, Batik Kns, 
Gramedia, Mertju Buana 
#49-90 
incl. Kedaung, Hero Supermarkets, 
Gesuri Lloyd, Nyonya Meneer, Gobel, 
Wanandi, Maspion, Gunung Sewu, 
1000-1300 
500-1000 
400-500 
300-400 
200-300 
Sampuma (kretek), Jamu Jago, ~albe 
Farrna, Indoconsult, Asia Permai, B~nk . 
Rama, Grafiti Pers, Harapan, Hasyim Nmg, 
Manggala, Hanurata, Berkat, Tempo 
#91-250 (unspecified) 100-200 
1988 
assets 
Rp. tril. 
6 
2 
1.3 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
Rp. billion 
600-800 
400-700 
240-350 
200-240 
110-200 
70-110 
. d f · ous published and Notes· The data have been compile rom van . t 
· t' t s are approx1ma e. 
unpublished sources. Sales and assets es ima e 
! 
J 
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and others declining over the course of the last decade or so, with 
the result that there has been a good deal of mobility and change in 
the rank order of both the top 20 or top two or three hundred, as we 
I 
would find in most other competitive capitalist economies. But it is 
the ~op 20 or 30 that attract most attention, for they are generally 
dep1cte~ as the heart of the financial oligarchy supposedly 
controlling key aspects of economic and political life there. That 
may be a .caricature or exaggeration of the true position, although 
not an entirely unwarranted one in any of these countries. 
Second, the predominance of ethnic Chinese at the top levels is 
very .striking-so much so that it brings up all the perennial 
questions that have puzzled observers throughout this century 
about why they have been so much more successful than indigenous 
businessmen. This is not the place to open up those thorny issues.2 
But it is worth noting that the patterns of ethnic involvement in 
vari?us economic roles are significantly different in each country. 
Thailand has almost no indigenous capitalists of significance (and 
a relatively feeble set of state corporations, apart from the special 
case of the Crown Property Bureau); but because the Sino-Thai are 
~o thor.oughly acculturated, this has not been a significant political 
issue smce the 1940-50s, and hence not an impediment to growth. 
Indonesia, on the contrary, has been attempting to foster its 
embryonic pribumi businessmen, with some success, although not 
much; but the competition between the two groups has created overt 
anti-Chinese discrimination and troublesome political tensions of a 
kind that Thailand has been spared. Malaysia had virtually no 
such group of incipient bumiputera businessmen prior to 1970, when 
the New Economic Policy began to produce a few politically well-
connected Malay high fliers in the business world, in circumstances 
of ethnic discrimination that are quite distinctive, with even 
greater potential for racial tensions and conflict. Thus the leading 
Chinese businessmen, including the largest, have in each country 
had to learn how to cope with very different (and in two cases, 
extremely costly) types of economic nationalism, discrimination and 
racial antagonism. 
Third, it happens to be the case that in each of these countries 
one man, or the group he has created, has emerged as by far th~ 
largest of the big corporate conglomerates, each by a substantial 
2 I know of no very satisfactory discussion of the reasons why Chinese 
busin.essmen have been so much more successful than indigenous 
ones m so much of Southeast Asia, apart from the Philippines. Some 
aspects of the question are explored in Somers-Heidhues (1974) and 
Mackie (1989b). 
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margin-that is Liem Sioe Liong's huge and rambling business 
empire in Indonesia, Robert Kuok's in Malaysia (and well beyond) 
and the late Chin Sophonpanich's wide-ranging Bangkok Bank 
group in Thailand. There is no compelling explanation for this 
phenomenon, which has not been a universal feature of early 
capitalist development in other parts of the world, except insofar 
as it may have been due to the influence of political connections in 
the first two cases (but far less so in the third, surely). Yet many 
other business leaders in each of those countries have exploited 
business connections almost as vigorously, so it can hardly be 
attributed solely to that factor. It is interesting, moreover, that 
each of these three men has made use of his political connections in 
very different ways, Liem through his long-standing and quite 
blatant association with President Soeharto as the foremost of his 
cukong over several decades; Kuok through his Johore-based 
contacts with the Malay leaders of UMNO, Tun Ismail and Husein 
Onn in particular, prior to 1981; Sophonpanich by developing very 
close links with Thailand's military leaders in the 1950s (too close, 
in fact, for he had to flee the country when General Phao was 
overthrown in 1958), but relying on a more deliberately diverse set 
of political connections in later years, particularly as the Thai 
polity became increasingly pluralistic.3. They have differed also 
in the character of the corporate structures they have built up and 
in their managerial style, Kuok having from all accounts the most 
coherent business strategy and modern managerial techniques, Liem 
apparently the most old-fashioned approach to both business and 
politics, the Bangkok Bank group somewhere in between, rather 
old-fashioned initially under Chin Sophonpanich but more 
modernised under his son, Chartri. 
Fourth, the relative importance of 'old money' and 'new money' 
has varied significantly in each case. In Indonesia, virtually all 
the big conglomerates can be regarded as 'new money' that have 
come into prominence only since the late 1960s. None of the major 
Chinese firms of the 1920-30s has survived the disruptions of the 
1940-SOs. In Malaysia, 'old money' was more prominent until the 
1970s, with several of the leading Chinese corporate groups 
traceable back to the earlier decades of this century; but most of 
these have fallen behind in the new era of 1980s 'money politics' 
3 The Bangkok Bank's political connections make a complex story, for 
General Praphet was invited to be chairman of the board immediately 
after General Phao's overthrow, even though Chin Sophonpanich 
himself fled to Hong Kong until the death of March Sarit in 1963: see 
Suehiro (1989, 106-10). 
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under Mahathir, when a new breed of fast-rising high fliers who 
relied heavily on political connections has emerged. Thailand is 
an intermediate case, with a few of the old pre-World War II rice-
trading firms, then the largest, still prominent among the top 30 or 
so, but also with various fast-rising newcomers. The differences 
seem to be explicable in terms of the relative discontinuities or 
continuities of government policies and institutional arrangements 
in these various countries. 
Malaysia-Singapore 
Until the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, these two 
former colonies functioned as virtually a single economic unit, so 
that many of the big British and Chinese corporations which 
operated there had interests on both sides of the causeway. That 
has still been the case for some of them since 1965, although they 
are now more sharply separated. The two stock exchanges, which 
are the oldest and largest in the ASEAN region, used to be closely 
linked, with virtually common trading boards (until recent curbs on 
the Malaysian side). The degree of corporate cross-holdings of 
shares is consequently much higher in these two countries than in 
either Thailand or Indonesia. 
Little need be said about the Singapore situation here, since big 
private corporations have played nothing like such a prominent 
part there as in the other ASEAN countries. The reason for that 
state of affairs has been mainly the PAP government's reliance on 
state enterprises and foreign capital rather than on its domestic 
businessmen for the development of the island's economy since 1965 
(Rodan 1990). The three major groups are the OCBC-Lee Rubber 
group, the Hong Leong property group and the vast Kuok Brothers 
empire, originally based in Singapore, but now truly multinational. 
There are several other large property-based and commercial 
groups in Singapore, but big business has not been able to exert much 
political influence upon the Singapore government at any time since 
independence. 
A list of around 20 of the leading business groups in Malaysia is 
given in Table 10.2. A distinctive feature of the Malaysian 
situation is that half a dozen groups describable as 'old wealth', 
all based on prewar tin-mining and rubber plantation interests, 
except in the unique case of Kuok Bros (which started in sugar 
trading and plantations in the 1950s, then diversified into shipping 
and manufacturing), are still among the largest in the country, 
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Table 10.2: Business Groups in Other ASEAN Countries 
(A} MALAYSIA (and Singapore) 
'Old Wealth' 
A: survivors from pre-independence era: 
OCBC-Lee Rubber 
LokeEu 
Eu Tong Sen 
Lee Loy Seng 
Hong Leong 
KuokBros. 
B: prewar big towkays, no longer significant: 
Tan Kah Kee 
Aw Boon Haw 
SQ Wong 
Tan Cheng Lock 
Col. HS Lee 
banking, rubber plantations and 
trading 
tin mining, banking 
tin mining, banking 
rubber plant'ns, banking, 
investment 
real estate, construction, 
manufacture 
sugar trading & plant'ns, 
shipping, manufacture, finance, 
real estate 
pineapples, rubber plantations 
'Tiger Balm', newspapers etc. 
banking 
rubber plantations 
tin mining 
'New Wealth' 
A: pre-NEP (1971) origins: 
Loh Boon Siew /Honda 
Khoo Teck Puat 
U:n Goh Tong /Genting 
Chong Kok Lim/Landmark 
Teh Hong Piow /Public Bank 
B: post-NEP 'money politics' tycoons: 
Khoo Kay Peng/MUI 
Vincent Tan/Inter-Pacific 
Yap Lim Sen/lpoh Gdns. 
Lim Thian Kiat/Kamunting 
Loy Hean Heong/MBF 
Teo Soo Chuan/Paramount 
Chau Teik Huat/Metroplex 
C: post-NEP Malay tycoons. 
Asman Hashim/ Arab Malaysian 
Tunku Abdullah/Melawar 
Tunku Naquiyuddin/ Antar 
(lJMNO) I Renong 
Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir/Sabura Holdings 
motor cycle distributor (Honda) 
banking, hotels, real estate 
casinos, miscellaneous 
tin, real estate, hotels 
banking 
real estate, hotels, banking 
lottery , real estate, mfrg. 
construction, real estate, etc. 
toll road concession, 
miscellaneous 
finance 
miscellaneous 
contruction, miscellaneous 
banking 
insurance, property 
miscellaneous 
miscellaneous 
telecommunications 
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(B) THAILAND 
'The Big Four' - banking as main base: 
Sophonpanich/ Bangkok Bank 
Lamsam/Thai Farmers Bank 
Techapaibul/Bangkok Metropolitan 
Bank 
Ratanarak/Bank Ayudhya 
Rice, sugar and agribusiness groups: 
Chia Bros./Charoen Pokphand 
Hong Yiah Seng/Betagro 
Wang Lee family group 
Asadathon/Thai Roong Ruang 
Wongkusolakit/Mitr-Pol 
Industry and trade-based groups: 
Boonsoong /Bunsung 
Thawon Pomprapha/Siam Motors 
Danakananda/Saha Union 
Sukree Bodhithanangkura/Thai 
Wuthipat Osathanukroh/Osothsapha 
Chirathiwat/Central Department 
Stores 
Laohathai/Metro 
State-owned/connected groups: 
Crown Property Bureau 
Siam Cement (owned by CPB) 
Krung Thai Bank (owned by 
Finance Ministry) 
largest banks, miscellaneous 
investments 
fast-growing bank, with trade 
and manufacturing interests 
whiskey, brewing, banking 
lighterage (initially), then 
banking and other interests 
animal feed, com and rice seed, 
real estate, petrochemicals, 
telecommunications 
rice trading, manufacture 
rice trading, banking 
sugar (and related industries) 
sugar 
tin mining, auto import and mfrg. 
auto import and mfrg. 
household goods mfrg., importing 
and exporting 
textiles mfrg., 
pharmacueticals, real estate, 
fincancial services 
retail trade, real estate 
fertiliser, flour, trading 
diverse Crown investments and 
acquisitions (e.g. from defaults) 
cement, steel, finance, banking 
banking 
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although the smaller of them are declining in significance and all 
of them are diversifying into other fields also. 
The OCBC-Lee Rubber group was built up in the 1930s and is now 
the largest in the rubber industry in Southeast Asia (although the 
OCBC Bank is less eminent than it used to be). The Hong Leong 
property group and the numerous Kuok Bros. interests in Malaysia 
date back to the 1950s. A second-ranking set of 'New Wealth' 
corporate groups emerged in the 1960-70s, the most successful of 
them the Genting Highlands casino-based conglomerate. But the 
most dynamic and fast-growing 'New Wealth' groups in the late 
1980s belong to a quite distinctive category, characterised by 
highly leveraged loans, heavy reliance on property dealings and 
stock exchange transactions, and above all on close links with 
Malay political leaders, of a kind that were almost unknown until 
the Mahathir government came into office. Among these are 
several large groups controlled by Malay businessmen who have 
succeeded in building up substantial business groups, a hitherto 
unparalleled phenomenon. Frequently referred to as 'paper 
millionaires', these new men and the groups they have created 
have risen and fallen in size quite spectacularly during the boom 
and bust years of the 1980s. Few of them have the same sort of 
solidity as the older groups have had. None are heavily involved 
in manufacturing industry. Only the Kuok Bros. conglomerate has 
built up substantial industrial interests in Malaysia. 
Four large Chinese-owned business groups stand out in the story 
of how Chinese interests have developed there over the course of 
the twentieth century. Tan Kah Kee emerged as the first of the 
rubber barons in the years 1910-30, making a fortune out of rubber 
estates, then losing it, then recovering to make another and live out 
his days as the foremost Chinese community leader and 
philanthropist in all Southeast Asia by the 1940s; but he did not 
pass his business empire on to his sons, rather unusually (Yong 1987). 
In the 1920s, his son-in-law Lee Kong Chian started to lay the 
foundations of the Lee Rubber companies and the Overseas Chinese 
Banking Corporation, which had become one of the major corporate 
groups in Malaysia and Singapore by the 1970s, controlling the most 
extensive network of rubber plantations, remilling and crumb rubber 
factories and rubber trading companies in the region, ranging from 
southern Thailand to Indonesia. The Singapore-based OCBC is not 
the largest of the Chinese banks in the region, but it is one of the 
oldest and most solid, with subsidiary interests which range 
widely into other investments (Lim 1981; Tan 1982). There were 
several other wealthy rubber and tin barons in the early twentieth 
century, such as Loke Eu with his tin mining interests, Lee Loy Sen's 
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plantations and the Tan Cheng Lock/Tan Siew Sin family's rubber 
plantations. Since independence, Robert Kuok's corporate empire 
has grown to be by far the largest in Malaysia, based initially on 
sugar trading in the 1950s, then on closely related investments, 
including sugar plantations in Perlis and southern Sumatra, 
shipping, shipbuilding, steelmaking and other manufacturing 
industries in Malaysia, as well as property developments, hotels 
and financial services. Although he has shifted his business 
interests increasingly to Hong Kong, China and other parts of the 
region in the 1980s, his network of Malaysian companies is still the 
most solid group in that country. The political influence he exerts 
used to be quite considerable in the 1970s but has since diminished. 
By contrast, Khoo Kay Peng, the foremost of the 'paper 
millionaires' of the 1980s, has followed a more perilous path of 
highly-leveraged expansion of his MUI group from finance to 
property and hotels, emerging as a reasonably solid corporate 
structure only in the late 1980s.4 
The careers of these four men epitomise the character of 
Chinese business in Malaysia-Singapore in their times. Tan Kah 
Kee was very much the buccaneering towkay of the prewar rubber 
boom era, Lee Kong Chian a more cautious and solid institution-
builder who made good use of trained managers (his executive 
director of OCBC, Tan Chin Tuan, was the dominant figure in the 
Singapore banking world for nearly 30 years); and Robert Kuok also 
a very effective and unostentatious empire-builder of a more modem 
type. Khoo Kay Peng, however, has been a risk-taker of the new 
breed of the 1980s in Malaysia, relying heavily on political 
contacts and borrowed money to expand his business empire. 
Thailand 
Two striking features of the pattern of private big business 
ownership in Thailand (Table 10.2) are that the bank-based groups 
predominate at the top level and that there is a relatively sharper 
distinction than we discern elsewhere between 'banking capital', 
'industrial capital' and 'commercial capital', as Hewison (1990) 
categorises them. By far the largest of all are the 'Big Four' - i.e. 
the Bangkok Bank-Sophonpanich family group, the Thai Farmers 
Bank-Lamsam family group, the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank-
Tejaphaibul family group and the Ayudhya Bank-Ratanarak 
4 For much of this information on Malaysia I am indebted to Mr Peter 
Searle, a PhD candidate in the Department of Political and Social 
Change, ANU. 
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family group - with the state-owned Krung Thai Bank and the 
Siam Cement-Siam Commercial Bank groups ranking close to them. 
Nine of the top 12 groups identified by Suehiro (1989: 334-8) in his 
list of the hundred largest groups in Thailand in 1979 were bank-
based. In this respect Thailand differs radically from the situation 
in Malaysia and Indonesia where the big state banks have 
overshadowed the private banks. Although several of the 
industry-based groups have been expanding quite rapidly in the 
1980s, in particular the Charoen Pokphand agribusiness complex, 
Hong Yiah Seng and Saha Union, they still rank well behind the 
banking groups in assets and turnover. The distinction between 
banking, industrial and commercial capital should not be drawn too 
sharply, however, for the bank-based groups also own or control 
substantial industrial and commercial or property companies as 
well.5 Moreover, there are significant cross-holdings of shares and 
directorships between the various groups, which blur the lines 
between them even further. 
The big Sino-Thai conglomerates of Thailand present a pattern 
that is intermediate between Malaysia's and Indonesia's, insofar as 
several of the old rice-trading and tin-mining families of the early 
twentieth century have survived into the 1980s, although generally 
not with the same eminence as in Malaysia. Most of the top 30 or 40 
groups have emerged since the 1950-60s, with only a few at all 
prominent in the 1940s or earlier (Suehiro 1989). In general it was 
the economic policy changes introduced by Marshal Sarit in 1958 
that opened up the opportunities for private enterprise that they 
have been able to seize since then during three decades of 
unprecedentedly rapid economic growth. 
One striking feature of the Thai situation during that time has 
been a marked change in the character of the political connections 
of the leading Sino-Thai businessmen. Previously, they had had no 
choice but to rely heavily on close links with political leaders, so 
that they were rightly characterised as 'pariah entrepreneurs' 
(Riggs 1966) who had little or no independence or leverage vis-a-
vis their patrons. But that has gradually changed as the political 
system has become more pluralistic, especially since the 
'democratic experiment' of 1973-6 (Girling 1981), and the increasing 
5 Suehiro (1989), ch. 7, divides the main companies into financial 
conglomerates, industrial groups and the agri-business group (as of 
1979), but much of the detailed information scattered throughout his 
book reveals a high degree of overlap, which has increased greatly 
since then. 
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wealth of the Chinese business community has enhanced their 
political influence. 
It is more clearly the case in Thailand than elsewhere that 
these large business groups have been as much the beneficiaries of 
the economic growth of the country as the prime source of it, at least 
prior to the last few years. It was primarily the extension and 
diversification of agriculture that gave rise to the rapid 
development of Thailand in the 1960-70s, the years when the big 
groups were coming into existence. Only in the 1980s did 
manufacturing industry become a major component in Thailand's 
GDP and the contributions of the large business groups become a 
major element in the nation's growth. The expansion of commercial 
and financial services, particularly in Bangkok, has doubtless been 
so closely intertwined with the growth of the finance-based groups 
that it would now be difficult to disentangle cause and effect in that 
set of circular relationships. While much the same could probably 
be said of Indonesia and, perhaps more hesitantly, of Malaysia, 
the pattern is much clearer in Thailand. 
Indonesia 
The big business groups in Indonesia are almost entirely 'new 
money', to a far greater degree than is the case in either of the 
other two countries. None of the top 40 or 50 Indonesian private 
groups were at all significant in the 1950s and hardly any can trace 
their origins back into the 1940s. (Ironically, that could not be said 
of the huge, cumbersome state enterprises, nearly all of which are 
linear descendents of the former Dutch trading and plantation 
companies established in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.) 
Conversely, none of the larger Chinese companies that were able to 
get started in the late colonial era managed to survive the 
disruptions of the years 1941-49, an era of intense economic 
nationalism after independence. Even the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, 
by far the largest and most durable of them, was nationalized in 
1961 at a time of intense anti-Chinese sentiment. 
Political connections have been extremely important, of course, 
in determining the success of the big Sino-Indonesian business groups 
that have emerged under the New Order (Table 10.1). The long-
standing links between Liem Sioe Liang and President Soeharto, 
that stemmed from the farmer's role as a supplier of clothing and 
foodstuffs to the Diponegoro Division during the struggle for 
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independence in 1945-9, are the most conspicuous example of this.6 
A dozen or so of the other cukong who aroused so much adverse 
comment in the early 1970s have also had close ties with the 
military leadership. But not all are still prominent today and none 
of them has achieved anything like the same influence with the 
President or the same business success as Liem, whose wealth and 
eminence are quite extraordinary. The nature of those relationships 
has changed since then as both sides have become less dependent on 
what the other then had to offer, ready cash and political 
protection respectively. The Astra group, for instance, is now 
regarded as relatively 'non-political', although its head office in 
Jakarta was burnt down during the 1974 Malari riots largely because 
of the company's association with the President's wife. Because of 
the importance of these political connections and the various forms 
of special privileges, contracts, protection and subsidies received by 
most of the so-called 'conglomerates' over the last 20 years, they 
have been dismissed as mere 'rent-seekers' and 'ersatz capitalists' 
by Yoshihara Kunio (1988), not true enterpreneurs and innovators in 
the Schumpeterian mould. While that criticism may be partly true 
of some of them, it is a gross exaggeration to apply such a 
characterization to them all. In fact, several of these men and the 
groups they control have shown impressive business acumen and 
real initiative in rising to the top ranks with relatively little 
political backing. 
The sources of capital of these groups have been mainly bank 
credits from the state banks, often at subsidized rates, on the basis 
of which many groups have than been able to leverage up the scale 
of their investments dramatically. Funds supplied by foreign joint-
ven ture partners were important in only a few cases, while 
accumulated savings from family networks seem to have been 
relatively insignificant except in the early stages. In 1989-90 the 
Jakarta stock market began to emerge as a potentially significant 
source of capital for several of the major groups, but it had 
previously been almost completely stagnant. Because the priv~te 
banks were so weak in Indonesia until the late 1980s, nothmg hke 
the degree of control over the modem-sector economy by 'finance 
6 The political connections of the big business groups in Indonesia, 
particularly of Liem Sioe Liong's Salim Economic Developme~t 
Corporation and Soeriadjaya's Astra groups, are most fully set out m 
Robison (1986): see also the two biographies of Liem by Siregar and 
Widya (1989) and Soetrijyono (1989). 
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capital' that Suehiro and Hewison have noted in Thailand can be 
discerned in Indonesia. Nor has foreign capital had anything like 
the degree of control over the economy that critics predicted in the 
early years of the New Order (Thee and Yoshihara 1987; see also 
Hill, chapter 6). 
The high degree of diversification of the largest groups is a 
striking feature of the corporate pattern in Indonesia. It makes 
sense in such an uncertain economic environment to spead one's risks 
in this way. Liem Sioe Liong's heterogeneous array of over 240 
companies, embracing a wide range of activities is the outstanding 
case. But nearly all groups are involved in real estate and financial 
services in some form or other, presumably because of the lucrative 
rates of return there. A few are relatively concentrated - most 
notably the Sinar Mas group in a vertical combination of palm oil 
plantations and cooking oil manufacture, Astra in automobiles, the 
Lippo and Bank Bali groups in financial services, and the four major 
kretek firms. But even they have investments in other areas too. 
Several large pribumi groups have emerged among the top 30 or 
40, but apart from the Sudarpo-Tahiya (Bank Niaga ) group and 
lbnu Sutowo's Krama Yudha group, they are all either owned by 
members of the President's family (Bimantara, Humpuss, 
Danurata, Mercu Buana, Sudwikatmono) or closely connected with 
them, as in the case of the fast-rising Bakrie Bros group. But the 
predominantly Sino-Indonesian ownership of such a large 
proportion of the largest and most important business enterprises in 
the country has aroused increasing antagonism towards both the 
ethnic Chinese minority and 'conglomerates' in general, which has 
become a code-word that can safely be used to refer (usually in 
critical vein) to either the Presidential family or to Sino-
Indonesian businessmen. 
I 
Conclusion 
Is the number of large corporate groups increasing, or is a process of 
concentration occurring, as the giants swallow up the smaller ones? 
The statistical data are not adequate to provide a sure answer to 
this question, but it is my general impression that the latter process 
is not occurring to any significant extent because all three economies 
are still growing very fast. There are said to have been many cases 
in the mid-1980s where small and medium sized firms and groups in 
Indonesia which were in difficulties at a time of economic 
contraction fell into the hands of Liem Sioe Liong. And in the latter 
half of the decade the predatory tactics of the President's children 
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have resulted in the virtual takeover of many others, negating 
much of the progress the Soeharto regime has achieved towards 
the creation of a self-sustaining capitalist class. But the aggregate 
numbers of large groups seem to be still increasing at all levels. I 
would guess that the same could also be said of Thailand and 
Malaysia, even though the politicization of business activity in 
the latter could have adverse consequences especially for Chinese 
business groups, if carried to extremes. 
The trend towards internationalization of big business 
throughout the region sometimes gives rise to fears that the giants 
will swallow up the gnats, but I doubt if such a process is yet 
occurring in Southeast Asia. The one truly regional multinational so 
far has been the Bangkok Bank, with its network of branches in all 
the ASEAN countries (except the Philippines) set up by Chin 
Sophonpanich in the 1960s. But it has been contracting rather than 
expanding its overseas operations since the mid-1980s, after a spate 
of bad debts at a time of recession. Meanwhile none of the other 
regional banks is yet moving to assume such a role, despite the quite 
numerous offshore investments (mostly of limited scope, except in 
the cases of Liem's First Pacific group in Hong Kong and the 
Philippines, and Robert Kuok's interests). 
Finally, and most controversial of all, is the accusation by 
Yoshihara Kunio (1988) that all these Southeast Asian 
businessmen are not really independent capitalists but merely 
'ersatz' or rent-seeking capitalists, because they depend upon both 
government patronage and privileges and lack the capacity to 
create their own technology like Japanese capitalists learnt to do at 
a comparable stage of development. Does that make them any less 
'real' capitalists, however ? It cannot be denied that many of the 
big corporations mentioned here have indeed depended on favours 
from government in greater or lesser degree, Liem Siew Liong and 
~ob Hasan more spectacularly than most. But there are exceptions 
in all three countries and political connections seem to be becoming 
less vital than they used to be, except in Malaysia, as more and 
more of these groups become large enough to stand on their own feet. 
The Malaysian experience shows, however, that there is no 
unilinear path towards progress in this matter. And there will be a 
long way to go before significant technological independence is 
attained. 
11 
Political Dimensions to Controversy over Business 
Conglomerates 
Andrew Madntyre 
One of the more significant developments in Indonesian politics in 
the last 12 months has been the mounting public debate about the 
country's increasingly conspicuous business conglomerates. Of 
particul~r inte~est h~s been the rather dramatic intervention by 
the President m calling upon the leading corporations to divest 
themselves of some of their wealth in order help the less well-off. 
Much of the public debate on this subject has been critical of both 
the conglomerates themselves and the apparently symbiotic 
relationships linking them to the government. Infusing the debate 
have been concerns about economic concentration and inequality as 
well as resentment arising from the widespread perception that the 
vast. wealth of the leading business groups has been achieved by 
dubious means. Class-based political tensions of this sort are 
scarcely unique to Indonesia; they feature to a greater or lesser 
degre~ in all marke.t eco~omies, especially rapidly developing 
countnes. In Indonesia, as ma number of Southeast Asian countries, 
these class tensions are overlaid with strong racial overtones. The 
fact the private sector is overwhelmingly dominated by members of 
Indonesia's small Chinese community has been a source of enduring 
resentment among indigenous Indonesians. · 
In r.esponse to the recent upsurge of public criticism and open 
pressunng from the President, Indonesia's leading business groups 
announced mid-way through 1990 that they would transfer some of 
their shares to a number of economic cooperatives. This was an 
extraord~na~ development: pushed by the government the largest 
companies m the country were apparently taking steps to 
~edistribut: some of their wealth to the poor. In attempting to 
interpret this development, three basic questions must be addressed. 
First, why has this debate erupted when it has? What has been 
the catalyst? Second, does the President's intervention and use of 
what has been described as 'socialist rhetoric' represent some kind 
of reorientation of economic policy by the government? In other 
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words, are concerns about economic inequality likely to lead to a 
turning away from a market-oriented economic policy en~ironmen!? 
And finally, what is driving this whole issue and what 1s the logic 
behind it? 
Popular resentment towards big business groups and anti-
Chinese feelings are of course nothing new in Indonesia. In order to 
explain the current surge of critical activity we need to look t? the 
rapid development of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE). A senes of 
regulatory reforms since late 1987 has transform.ed the JSE fr?m 
being an inconsequential institution to a focal pomt. of the cap1.tal 
market in Indonesia. For a variety of reasons, maior companies 
have developed a keen interest in raising capital through listing 
shares on the stock exchange. A sudden surge in the number of firrns 
wanting to go public, together with a rush by the major 
international securities firrns, has seen the JSE rapidly transformed 
into one of the fastest growing exchanges in the world. 
The boom on the stock exchange has been an important factor 
behind the current wave of critical attention towards the 
conglomerates for two reasons. On the one hand it has served. to 
draw attention to the size and prosperity of some of the leadmg 
business conglomerates, while on the other the~ are seen . as 
benefiting disproportionately from the deregulation of capital 
markets. Taking the first of these, in order to list their shares, 
companies have had to disclose some details about their assets. ~nd 
performance. While their can be little doubt some of the aud1tmg 
and reporting standards adopted by firms wishing to go pu.blic have 
been dubious, the fact remains that they have had to pubhsh much 
more detailed financial profiles than ever before. This is an 
important development, as previously many of the l~adi~g firi:is 
had been deliberately tight-lipped about their fmanc1al 
circumstances. One consequence of this is that they have revealed 
to the public just how well they are in fact doing. The erstwhile 
scarcity of detailed data about the major business groups ensured 
that the publication of their financial statements has attracted 
widespread media attention. In short, the disclosure requirements 
of the stock exchange have catapulted corporate wealth into the 
public eye. On top of this is the fact that firms going public have 
done extraordinarily well in a booming stock market. With most 
new issues of shares being heavily over-subscribed (largely as a 
result of interest from international investors), a number of firms 
have seen their listed assets sky rocket in value. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, this has fuelled popular perceptions t~at it is big ~usin~ss 
which is benefiting most from the deregulation of the financial 
sector (and, indeed, economic liberalisation more generally). 
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The rapid growth of the stock exchange has, in effect, been a 
catalyst which has stimulated critical interest in the affairs of big 
business and served to bring latent social resentments back to the 
boil. In response to the heating up of debate on the conglomerates, 
President Soeharto summoned a group of the country's leading 
business figures to his ranch at Tapos (near Jakarta) for a meeting at 
which he delivered a homily on the need for business leaders to act 
in a socially responsible manner and to consider the well being of 
the wider community rather than simply their own.1 In what was a 
well publicised media exercise, Soeharto reiterated and re-
emphasised a call made earlier in the year for leading companies 
to transfer a staggering 25 per cent of their share holdings to 
designated cooperatives. This was a dramatic move which seemed 
to take people by surprise. After a period of some confusion and a 
series of publicised messges from senior officials confirming that the 
President was really serious about the importance of the 
conglomerates assisting the cooperatives, the company heads 
summonsed by Soeharto (or the Tapos group, as they became known) 
announced that they would transfer one per cent of their listed 
share capital to the cooperatives. In addition, it was announced 
that the whole matter would be reviewed in five years, at which 
time it would be decided if further steps needed to be taken. 
This whole incident was a dramatic affair, with the President 
apparently forcing big business to assist the poor. The reaction from 
a number of quarters, including sections of the press, was rather more 
sceptical. Instead of transferring 25 per cent of their listed shares, 
the conglomerates were in fact transferring only one percent. 
Moreover the shares were not simply being handed over to the 
cooperatives; rather the cooperatives were, in effect, being lent the 
money to purchase the shares. The shares could not be traded until 
such time as their initial value had been repaid by the 
cooperatives (something likely to require several years). In short, 
this was not the great financial burden to the companies involved 
that was originally implied and, importantly, a one per cent 
shareholding had no implications for control of company 
management. (In this context it should be remembered that most 
firms which have issued shares have in fact listed only a modest 
percentage of total shareholdings.) Nevertheless, there can be 
little doubt that providing the cooperatives with one per cent of 
their listed shares was a step which the conglomerates took with 
1 See 'Sharing the Goodies', FEER, 29 March 1990. 
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very great reluctance. Even if the actual cost to them was small, a 
precedent was being set-a precedent with which they were most 
uncomfortable. 
One of the important questions which arises from the 
government's pressuring of the congl~merates to trans~er ~~ares to 
the cooperatives is whether this m some way signifies the 
beginning of a much tougher approach to big business. More broadly, 
does this development suggest that the President's support for the 
liberal economic policy agenda of the so-called 'technocrats' withi.n 
the government is now waning and that the future of theu 
deregulatory drive may now be in doubt? There are at least th~ee 
basic reasons for believing that this affair does not presage a maior 
reorientation in economic policy. 
First, it seems highly unlikely that having presided over .a 
series of hard fought policy battles to promote greater economic 
efficiency and international competitiveness, and having a~hieved 
some promising results in the last few years, Soeharto will now 
suddenly abandon the reform drive. There may of course be some 
increase in the attention given to distributional questions, but this is 
unlikely to be accompanied by an abandonment of the market-
oriented macro- and micro-economic policy settings. Although not 
a trained economist, it is hard to imagine that the President does 
not have some appreciation of the nature of the basic economic 
problems confronting Indonesia and, moreover, of just how easily 
some of the recent economic achievements could be swept away. One 
of the consequences of economic liberalisatio~, parti~ularly in ~he 
financial sector, is that capital has become mcreasmgly mobile. 
Having moved to integrate itself more closely into the global 
economy, Indonesia cannot now-except at great cost-adopt 
measures which have the effect of making the country a less 
attractive market in which to invest. Whether it is foreign or 
locally sourced, capital in Indonesia is now very mobile and ':ill 
flow out rapidly if the government introduces ~han?~s to the pohcy 
environment which threaten corporate profitabhhty. Soeharto 
may tamper at the margin with economic policy, but he is unlikely 
to jeopardise the reform drive he himself has overseen to make 
Indonesia more internationally competitive. 
A second basic reason for doubting that the President will 
change tack and impose redistributive measu~es o.n the 
conglomerates is that in doing so he would be harming his o~n 
personal material interests, as well as those of many other senior 
government people. As is well recognised, close links b~tween 
political leaders and leading business groups have resulted m very 
considerable personal benefits for both sides. Ultimately there are 
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zero-sum game dimensions to the situation; the more parties among 
which corporate profits are to be shared, the less there is likely to 
be for any one party. It is hard to imagine that government will 
harm the conglomerates, for its key members have benefited so 
much from them. Or, to put it in more stark terms, is the goose 
which has laid so many golden eggs for political leaders now to be 
throttled? 
The third reason for believing that we will not see a major shift 
in economic policy following the 'Tapos affair' is that, if the 
government did seek to move seriously in the direction of restricting 
corporate profitability, business leaders would be unlikely to stand 
by idly while the government threatened their basic interests. Big 
business in Indonesia is now very big, and with that comes a greater 
measure of flexibility and independence. Business leaders could 
rea~t defensively by simply diversifying their risks, and moving 
capital off-shore, or they could respond in a more assertive manner 
and seek to resist the policy measures constraining them. This 
might, for example, take the form of business leaders looking to 
channel resources to power brokers in the military willing to listen 
sympathetically to their cause. While the government could of 
course readily make life difficult for selected conglomerates, it is 
almost certain to encounter resistance if it attempted to squeeze 
broad sections of the corporate sector. 
What of the last of the three main question addressed in this 
chapter, namely what lies behind the President's insistence that 
the leading conglomerates transfer shares to the cooperatives? 
There is a logic behind the President's move, but it is a 'political' 
rather than 'economic' logic. The decision to push the 
conglomerates into parting company with one per cent of their listed 
shares makes little sense if it is viewed as a genuine attempt to 
bri~g a~ou~ economic change and ameliorate economic inequality by 
redistnbutmg corporate wealth. Quite simply, its impact in terms 
of promoting wider income distribution will be negligible. 
However, the intitiative does make considerable sense from a 
political viewpoint, from the viewpoint of a President keen to 
secure his base of support. The 'Tapos affair' can be viewed as a 
highly political exercise at two levels. 
At one level, Soeharto is engaging in the time honoured practice 
in Indonesian politics of turning on the Chinese when confronted 
with class-based discontent. This is a tactic which pre:-dates . 
Soeharto by a long way. Faced with an upsurge of public resentment 
about economic concentration, Soeharto's reaction has been to place 
the blame on big business. The message he sought to broadcast from 
Tapos (the whole exercise was telecast live nationally) was a 
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simpl~ one, in effect: my government will stop the greedy and 
grasping conglomerates from going too far and will force them to 
accept some responsiblity for the plight of the poor. Soeharto was 
seeking to deflect criticism about economic concentration away from 
the government and its policies by using the conglomerates as a foil. 
This, of cours.e, is a tactic used by governments in many countries. 
For example, m South Korea where the combined sales of the top 10 
conglomerates represent a staggering 67.4% of GNP (Amsden, 1989, 
p. 116),. public hostility towards big business is legendary, and 
successive governments have turned periodic and judicious 
'conglomerate-bashing' into an art form. 
The Tapos affair can, however, also be viewed as part of a 
deeper political exercise which centres around the issue of whether 
or .not the President will serve another term. It is now increasingly 
evident that there are some serious tensions between Soeharto and 
se~ti.ons of the military leadership. The statement by Defence 
M1~iste.r. Benny ~~rdani in late May, referring explicitly to the 
des1rab1hty of pohhcal change and reinvigoration, is only the most 
recent and conspicuous sign that sections of the military want 
Soeharto to step down as President and not seek another term in 
1993.2 While it is impossible to know Soeharto's intentions it is 
quite conceivable that he is determined to serve another te~. At 
the very least, it seems likely he is anxious to keep his options 
open. 
Evidence of this is to be found in the fact that Soeharto has in ~ va~ety of ways, been moving to secure his position and reduce 1the 
~1kehho?~ of any possible attempt by the military to pressure him 
mto retmng. He has, for example, recently appointed officers of 
un.questionab~e loyalty to key military positions. Major-General 
W1smoyo Ansmunandar (the President's brother-in-law) and 
Brigadi.er-General Kentot Hars~no were recently appointed as, 
respectively, head of the Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) 
and the Jakarta garrison. Both of these postions would be crucial in 
the event of any political emergency which threatened the 
government. Beyond making strategic military appointments, 
S~e~arto seems to have been seeking to go over the heads of 
m1htary leaders and even Golkar with a view to developing his 
?Wn direct links to the wider community. The inititiative to 
introduce legislation allowing Islamic courts jurisdiction over issues 
such as marriage and inheritance can be viewed in this light, with 
2 See 'A Stir in the Ranks', FEER, 5July1990. 
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Soeharto seeking to polish his relationship with the Islamic 
establishment. 
And it is in this context that the Tapos initiative becomes 
readily intelligible. It is commonly argued in Indonesia that the 
President's biggest weakness is the fact that he has allowed 
collusive links between big business groups and political leaders to 
flourish. It is no secret that this is a source of widespread 
resentment in Indonesia. It is not inconceivable that this issue could 
be used as a pretext by power brokers within the military wishing 
to ease the President out. In this light, the conglomerates emerge as 
the meat in the sandwich as the president and military leaders 
manouvre in the lead-up to 1993. The high profile and 
demonstrative fashion in which Soeharto was seen to move against 
the conglomerates may well have been designed to reduce his 
vulnerability to criticism over symbiotic links between the 
government and big business and economic inequalities. The move 
against the conglomerates makes little economic sense, but it does 
make sense for a President who is seeking to reduce his 
vulnerability and polish his image. 
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